Georgia — no collection statute, no collector license; SOL is the whole story

Authority

Georgia has no mini-FDCPA and no debt-collection statute of any kind. Nothing in the O.C.G.A. regulates collection conduct as such — no licensing, no bond, no call caps, no call-time window, no validation overlay, no time-barred-debt disclosure. Three bodies of law do the work instead:

1. Statutes of limitation — O.C.G.A. §§ 9-3-23 through 9-3-26 (contracts) and § 11-3-118 (negotiable instruments), with revival governed by §§ 9-3-110 to 9-3-114 and tolling by § 9-3-94. This is the only part of Georgia law that materially changes a collection operation's behavior, and it is unusually intricate: four different periods (4, 6, 20 years, plus a UCC track) turn on the paper, and Georgia's revival rule is the inverse of the industry default.
2. Fair Business Practices Act of 1975, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 et seq. ("FBPA" / "GFBPA") — the general UDAP statute. Enforced by the Attorney General as "administrator" (§ 10-1-397) and by private action (§ 10-1-399). It reaches collectors, but only through a public-marketplace-impact filter that defeats most individual-conduct claims.
3. Georgia Installment Loan Act, O.C.G.A. tit. 7 ch. 3, plus the payday-lending ban at O.C.G.A. § 16-17-1 et seq. — these do not license collectors, but they void and make uncollectible whole categories of small-dollar Georgia paper. This is the real Georgia entry-gate risk for a buyer or servicer.

Verification note — read before relying on a quote

Georgia's official O.C.G.A. is published only through a LexisNexis Advance JavaScript application. Every official state route to the code text — including the Department of Banking and Finance's own "Go to the Official Code of Georgia (O.C.G.A.)" link — terminates at advance.lexis.com, which is session-gated and not machine-readable. There is no Georgia equivalent of Texas's tcss.legis.texas.gov file server.

Statutory text below was therefore assembled from two independent official sources, and every load-bearing quote is corroborated across both wherever possible:

• Source A — the Georgia General Assembly's own "Unannotated Georgia Code" server (legis.state.ga.us/cgi-bin/gl_codes_detail.pl?code=…), read via Internet Archive captures of those official pages. The server labels itself "Current through 2002 Regular Session of the General Assembly"; captures used are from 2003. This is the state legislature's own publication, but it is 24 years stale on its face.
• Source B — govinfo.gov (USCOURTS): opinions of the U.S. District and Bankruptcy Courts for the Northern and Middle Districts of Georgia and the Eleventh Circuit, which quote the current O.C.G.A. text verbatim. Dates range from 2015 to 2021.

Where a section's Source-A text and a modern Source-B quotation match word-for-word, the section is treated as verified current (that match also proves the section is unamended across the span). Sections resting on Source A alone are flagged ARCHIVE-ONLY inline. sos.ga.gov is Cloudflare-blocked to automated fetching; rules.sos.ga.gov (the official Rules and Regulations of the State of Georgia) is reachable with a browser user-agent.

Operative text

Statute of limitations — the four tracks

Written contracts — 6 years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, quoted in full by the Middle District of Georgia:

For simple contracts in writing, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24 provides, "All actions . . . shall be brought within six years after the same become due and payable. However, this Code section shall not apply to actions for the breach of contracts for the sale of goods under Article 2 of Title 11 or to negotiable instruments under Article 3 of Title 11." — Malone v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 1:14-cv-00193 (M.D. Ga.), quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24

Verified current: identical word-for-word to the 2003 Georgia General Assembly text, and the first sentence is quoted the same way again in 2021:

However, because Plaintiff and Jay-Z's supposed contract was for a period of 20 years … Georgia law provides, "All actions upon simple contracts in writing shall be brought within six years after the same become due and payable." O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. — Gotel v. Carter, No. 5:21-cv-00388 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2021)

Open accounts, oral contracts, implied promises — 4 years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25:

For breach of an oral contract, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25 provides, "All actions upon open account, or for the breach of any contract not under the hand of the party sought to be charged, or upon any implied promise or undertaking shall be brought within four years after the right of action accrues." — Gotel v. Carter, No. 5:21-cv-00388 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2021), quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25

The 2003 Georgia General Assembly text is identical and adds a second sentence:

However, this Code section shall not apply to actions for the breach of contracts for the sale of goods under Article 2 of Title 11. — O.C.G.A. § 9-3-25, 2d sentence (ARCHIVE-ONLY)

Sealed instruments — 20 years. This is Georgia's sleeper provision and it is quoted with the same words in 2003 and in 2014:

And for sealed instruments, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-23 reads, "Actions . . . shall be brought within 20 years after the right of action has accrued. No instrument shall be considered under seal unless so recited in the body of the instrument." — Malone v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., No. 1:14-cv-00193 (M.D. Ga.), quoting O.C.G.A. § 9-3-23

The full 2003 text opens "Actions upon bonds or other instruments under seal …". The Malone court went on to describe what makes an instrument sealed:

A sealed instrument must contain "both a recital in the body of the instrument of an intention to use a seal and the affixing of the seal or scroll after the signature." … The "affixing of the seal" may simply be the word "seal" written next to a signor's signature. — Malone, quoting Chastain v. L. Moss Music Co., 64 S.E.2d 205, 206 (Ga. Ct. App. 1951)

Catch-all contracts — 4 years. O.C.G.A. § 9-3-26 (ARCHIVE-ONLY):

All other actions upon contracts express or implied not otherwise provided for shall be brought within four years from the accrual of the right of action. However, this Code section shall not apply to actions for the breach of contracts for the sale of goods under Article 2 of Title 11. — O.C.G.A. § 9-3-26

Negotiable instruments — Georgia's UCC 3-118 analog, 6 years (ARCHIVE-ONLY). Because § 9-3-24 expressly excludes negotiable instruments, a promissory note runs on this section, not on the general written-contract statute:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (e) of this Code section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date. (b) Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e) of this Code section, if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of ten years. (c) … an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within three years after dishonor of the draft or ten years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first. (d) An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller's check, cashier's check, or traveler's check must be commenced within three years after demand for payment is made … (g) … an action (i) for conversion of an instrument, for money had and received, or like action based on conversion; (ii) for breach of warranty; or (iii) to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this article and not governed by this Code section, must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. — O.C.G.A. § 11-3-118

Credit cards — which bucket

Georgia allocates credit-card debt to the 6-year written-contract statute, not the 4-year open- account statute. The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Georgia stated the holding, then issued a corrective order making the period explicit:

The Georgia Court of Appeals recently held that a credit card debt based on contractual agreement is subject to the … statute of limitations set forth in O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24. Phoenix Recovery Group, Inc. v. Mehta, 663 S.E.2d 290, 291 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008). — In re Tarpley, No. 08-50669 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. June 23, 2009)

It has come to the Court's attention that the opinion contains a clerical error. … the opinion states that credit card debt is "subject to the four-year statute of limitations." It should properly read, "subject to the six-year statute of limitations." Although this error does not change the outcome of the case, and the opinion cites to the correct applicable statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-3-24, it may create confusion regarding the state of the law. — In re Tarpley, No. 08-50669 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Sept. 28, 2011) (corrective order)

Revival — Georgia requires a writing, and a payment alone is not enough

This is the provision that most often gets modeled backwards. Georgia does not follow the common "last payment restarts the clock" rule.

A new promise, in order to renew a right of action already barred or to constitute a point from which the limitation shall commence running on a right of action not yet barred, shall be in writing, either in the party's own handwriting or subscribed by him or someone authorized by him. — O.C.G.A. § 9-3-110 (2003 text; the operative clause is quoted identically in Cooper v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. 4:18-cv-00082 (M.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2018))

A payment entered upon a written evidence of debt by the debtor or upon any other written acknowledgment of the existing liability shall be equivalent to a new promise to pay. — O.C.G.A. § 9-3-112 (2003 text; quoted verbatim in Cooper (2018) and in In re Seltzer, No. 13-51318 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2015))

A new promise shall revive or extend the original liability; it shall not create a new one. — O.C.G.A. § 9-3-113 (2003 text; quoted in In re Seltzer (2015))

The Bankruptcy Court broke § 9-3-112 into its elements:

Thus, to "revive" a time-barred debt under this statute, two elements must be shown: (1) a payment by the debtor on the time-barred debt, which is entered upon (2) written evidence or other written acknowledgement of the debt by the debtor. — In re Seltzer (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2015)

Both elements must come from the debtor or the debtor's authorized agent, and the writing has to be an unequivocal admission of a presently-owed debt:

In cases interpreting the predecessors of O.C.G.A. § 9-3-112, courts have recognized that the written evidence or acknowledgment must be "such an absolute and unqualified admission of it as an existing indebtedness that the law would imply a promise to pay the same." … Put another way, the acknowledgment should "contain an unqualified admission of a present subsisting debt which the party is liable to pay, and not merely that the debt was once due." — In re Seltzer (2015), quoting Cleveland Lumber Co. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1088, 1093 (N.D. Ga. 1975), and Kelly v. Strouse, 43 S.E. 280, 281 (Ga. 1903)

The Middle District added the practical form the writing usually takes, and confirmed a Georgia time-barred debt is not extinguished — only the remedy is barred:

The Georgia courts have held that when payment to a creditor is accompanied by some notation sufficient to identify the debt being paid, that payment and notation constitute a new promise to pay which renews the running of the limitations [period] … — Cooper v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc. (M.D. Ga. 2018)

[A debt] is not extinguished by the statute of limitations even if an action to recover it is time-barred. Martin v. Mayer, 11 S.E.2d 218, 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1940). — Cooper (M.D. Ga. 2018)

Two related sections, ARCHIVE-ONLY:

No promise made after discharge in bankruptcy to pay a debt provable in bankruptcy from the liability of which the debtor has been discharged shall be valid or binding upon the debtor or promisor unless the same is made in writing and signed by the party making the same … — O.C.G.A. § 9-3-111

In cases of joint or joint and several contracts, a new promise by one of the contractors shall operate only against the promisor. — O.C.G.A. § 9-3-114

Tolling — absence from the state

Unless otherwise provided by law, if a defendant removes from this state, the time of his absence from the state until he returns to reside shall not be counted or estimated in his favor. — O.C.G.A. § 9-3-94 (2003 text; quoted with the same operative words in Winston v. Walsh, No. 5:19-cv-00070 (M.D. Ga. July 12, 2019))

The statute reads broadly but has been narrowed hard by the courts:

The provision applies only if the removal makes it impossible to perfect service on the defendant. It has generally been held that if process could be lawfully served on the defendant, thus enabling the plaintiff to proceed with his action, the period of the defendant's absence from the state is not to be excluded from the period of limitation, and the statute continues to run during the absence. — Winston v. Walsh (M.D. Ga. 2019)

Fair Business Practices Act — Georgia's only conduct hook

(a) The purpose of this part shall be to protect consumers and legitimate business enterprises from unfair or deceptive practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce in part or wholly in the state. It is the intent of the General Assembly that such practices be swiftly stopped, and this part shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies. (b) It is the intent of the General Assembly that this part be interpreted and construed consistently with interpretations given by the Federal Trade Commission in the federal courts pursuant to Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. Section 45(a)(1)), as from time to time amended. — O.C.G.A. § 10-1-391 (2003 text; both subsections quoted the same way in Georgia ex rel. Carr v. Elite Integrated Med., LLC, No. 1:20-cv-04946 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 12, 2021))

(a) Unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of consumer transactions and consumer acts or practices in trade or commerce are declared unlawful. (b) By way of illustration only and without limiting the scope of subsection (a) of this Code section, the following practices are declared unlawful: … — O.C.G.A. § 10-1-393 (2003 text; subsection (a) quoted verbatim in Eason v. Covington Credit, No. 1:17-cv-01830 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 13, 2017), and the (b) preamble in Nickens v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, No. 1:13-cv-00333 (N.D. Ga.))

Note what § 10-1-393(b) is not: it is a list of advertising, origin-of-goods and marketplace deceptions. No paragraph of it addresses debt collection. There is no Georgia analogue to the Texas TDCA's §§ 392.301–392.306 or Florida's § 559.72.

The exemption that matters (ARCHIVE-ONLY — confirm before relying on it defensively):

Nothing in this part shall apply to: (1) Actions or transactions specifically authorized under laws administered by or rules and regulations promulgated by any regulatory agency of this state or the United States; … — O.C.G.A. § 10-1-396(1)

AG enforcement. The Attorney General is the FBPA "administrator" and can act without any consumer having been misled:

unlike with a private action, the state enforcement scheme allows the Attorney General to take action "whether or not any person has actually been misled." O.C.G.A. § 10-1-397(b). — Georgia ex rel. Carr v. Elite Integrated Med., LLC (N.D. Ga. 2021)

The administrator's toolkit, per the 2003 text (dollar amounts ARCHIVE-ONLY — treat as a floor, not a current figure): cease-and-desist orders; an administrative civil penalty "up to a maximum of $2,000.00 per violation" for willful violations (§ 10-1-397(a)(1)(B)); and, in superior court, injunctive relief, a civil penalty "up to a maximum of $5,000.00 per violation", declaratory judgment, restitution, and appointment of a receiver (§ 10-1-397(a)(2)).

Private right of action — and its 30-day pre-suit gate:

(a) Any person who suffers injury or damages as a result of … consumer acts or practices in violation of this part … may bring an action individually, but not in a representative capacity, against the person or persons engaged in such violations … to seek equitable injunctive relief and to recover his general and exemplary damages sustained as a consequence thereof …; provided, however, exemplary damages shall be awarded only in cases of intentional violation. … A claim under this Code section may also be asserted as a defense, setoff, cross-claim, or counterclaim or third-party claim … (b) At least 30 days prior to the filing of any such action, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered, shall be delivered to any prospective respondent. Any person receiving such a demand for relief who, within 30 days of the delivering of the demand for relief, makes a written tender of settlement which is rejected by the claimant may, in any subsequent action, file the written tender and an affidavit concerning this rejection and thereby limit any recovery to the relief tendered if the court finds that the relief tendered was reasonable in relation to the injury actually suffered … The demand requirements of this subsection shall not apply if the prospective respondent does not maintain a place of business or does not keep assets within the state. — O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399 (2003 text)

Both subsections are confirmed current by modern federal courts — § 10-1-399(a)'s damages clause in Carlisle v. National Commercial Services, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-00515 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 22, 2017) ("O.C.G.A. § 10-1-399(a) provides that an GFBPA cause of action can be brought 'to recover . . . general and exemplary damages sustained as a consequence thereof'"), and § 10-1-399(b)'s notice clause in Brown v. Hyundai Motor Am., No. 2:18-cv-11249 (D.N.J. Aug. 30, 2019), quoting Alvear v. Sandy Springs Toyota, Inc., 775 S.E.2d 172, 177 (Ga. Ct. App. 2015).

The FBPA's public-marketplace filter is what usually kills a collection claim:

Georgia law clearly holds that the FBPA does not apply to "essentially private transactions." … "[U]nless it can be said that the defendant's actions had . . . potential harm for the consumer public[,] the act or practice cannot be said to have impact on the consumer marketplace." … If the acts or practices could have no effect on the consumer marketplace, they are not regulated by the FBPA. — Gilmore v. Account Mgmt., Inc., No. 1:08-cv-01388 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 31, 2009) (default judgment against a collection agency denied on the FBPA count while the FDCPA count was granted), quoting Borden v. Pope Jeep-Eagle, 200 Ga. App. 176, 178 (1991)

Applied to collection calls specifically:

The Magistrate Judge also held that the FBPA does not apply in this situation since the Defendant's alleged conduct — harassing calls to a [single consumer] … — Eason v. Covington Credit (N.D. Ga. 2017)

But it is not a blanket exclusion. In Carlisle, a collection agency's FDCPA violations (no § 1692g notice, misstated balance, failure to mark the account disputed) did support an FBPA recovery of general damages for mental distress — while the FCRA-based theories did not.

Harassing phone calls — criminal only, no civil hook

(a) A person commits the offense of harassing phone calls if such person telephones another person repeatedly, whether or not conversation ensues, for the purpose of annoying, harassing, or molesting another person or the family of such other person; uses over the telephone language threatening bodily harm; telephones and intentionally fails to hang up or disengage the connection; or knowingly permits any telephone under such person's control to be used for any purpose prohibited by this subsection. (b) Any person who commits the offense of harassing phone calls shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. — O.C.G.A. § 16-11-39.1 (ARCHIVE-ONLY, and known to be superseded in form — this 2003 text predates the electronic-communication amendments; re-verify before quoting)

It creates no private remedy:

The criminal statutes upon which Plaintiff purports to bring claims for theft, harassment, and criminal trespass do not provide for a civil remedy and a civil remedy cannot be implied to arise from a violation of a criminal statute in Georgia. See O.C.G.A. §§ … 16-11-39.1; Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc., 697 S.E.2d 166, 171-72 (Ga. 2010). — Goia v. CitiFinancial Auto, No. 1:10-cv-02405 (N.D. Ga.)

Entry gate — no collector license, but two statutes that void Georgia paper

No collection-agency license or registration exists. Verified structurally rather than by a negative citation: the Georgia General Assembly's own code index orders Title 43 (Professions and Businesses) alphabetically, and the sequence runs Public Accountancy (43-3) → Architects (43-4) → Athletic Trainers (43-5) → Auctioneers (43-6) → Barbers (43-7) → Housing/Building (43-8) → Chiropractic (43-9) → Cosmetology (43-10) → Dentists (43-11). A "Collection Agency" chapter would fall between 43-9 and 43-10; there is none. Title 7 (Banking and Finance) likewise runs Financial Institutions Code (7-1), Credit Unions (7-2), Georgia Installment Loan Act (7-3), Interest and Usury (7-4), Credit Card and Credit Card Bank Act (7-5), credit discrimination (7-6), Loan Brokers (7-7), remote service terminals (7-8) — no collection chapter. The Department of Banking and Finance's own live licensee roster covers banks, credit unions, mortgage brokers/lenders/originators, installment lenders, money service businesses and litigation financiers — no debt-collector category.

Servicing Georgia installment loans DOES require a DBF license. The regulator's own definition sweeps in servicers of third-party paper:

"Installment lender" or "lender" means any person that advertises, solicits, offers, or makes installment loans or services installment loans made by others, excluding loans made by affiliated entities. — Ga. Dep't of Banking and Finance, How Do I Apply for an Installment Lender License? (dbf.georgia.gov)

Gate mechanics, from DBF's official pages: applications go through NMLS; $750 license fee ($300 per branch approval); minimum surety bond $25,000 plus $5,000 per branch, capped at $100,000 total; the bond must be specific to the installment-loan business and cannot be shared with the company's other DBF licenses; any lapse triggers a Cease and Desist Order and license expiry. Rules live at Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. ch. 80-14 (fees at ch. 80-5), on rules.sos.ga.gov.

Unlicensed small-dollar paper is void, and payday paper is uncollectible. From DBF's official consumer guidance:

As of July 1, 2020, regulation and enforcement of the Georgia Installment Loan Act (the "Act") was transferred to the Department of Banking and Finance ("Department"). O.C.G.A. § 7-3-2. Generally, any entity making loans of $3,000.00 or less to individuals must be licensed with the Department as an installment lender unless the entity falls into a specified exemption. See e.g., O.C.G.A. § 7-3-4. Licensees may offer installment loans for up to 36 months and 15 days, may charge interest at a rate not to exceed 10 percent per annum of the face amount of the contract … — DBF, Consumer Guidance on Unlicensed Installment Lending and Payday Lending (Jan. 27, 2021)

Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 7-3-50, any loan for under $3,000.00 that is made by an entity which is required to be licensed by the Act but who is not licensed is void. Further, in many instances, these loans will be considered payday loans. Entities that make payday loans are prohibited from the collection of indebtedness created by these loans. O.C.G.A. § 16-17-3. This means that an unlicensed entity making payday loans has no right to collect, receive, or retain any principal, finance charges, or other fees in connection with such loans. — DBF, Consumer Guidance on Unlicensed Installment Lending and Payday Lending (Jan. 27, 2021)

O.C.G.A. § 16-17-2(a) provides that it is unlawful for a person to "engage in any business in whatever form transacted, including, but not limited to, by mail, electronic means, the Internet, or telephonic means, which consists in whole or in part of making, offering, arranging, or acting as an agent in the making of loans of $3,000.00 or less" unless the person falls into a specified exemption. — DBF, Consumer Guidance (Jan. 27, 2021), quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-17-2(a)

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• There is no Georgia collection statute. No license, no bond, no registration, no state prohibited-practices list, no mini-Miranda, no state validation rules, no time-barred-debt disclosure. For collection conduct, the FDCPA and Reg F are not a floor in Georgia — they are the entire ceiling and floor.
• No call-frequency cap and no call-time window. Nothing in Georgia law is stricter than Reg F's 7-in-7 presumption or the FDCPA's 8am–9pm rule; those federal rules govern unmodified. The nearest Georgia provision, § 16-11-39.1, is a criminal intent-to-annoy misdemeanor with no private right of action, so it does not function as a frequency standard.
• SOL is where Georgia actually differs, and it is paper-driven. Written contract 6 years (§ 9-3-24); open account / oral / implied promise 4 years (§ 9-3-25); anything else contractual 4 years (§ 9-3-26); promissory note 6 years but under § 11-3-118, not § 9-3-24; anything under seal 20 years (§ 9-3-23).
• Credit cards are 6-year written-contract debt when the cardholder agreement is in play (Phoenix Recovery Group v. Mehta, as stated and corrected in In re Tarpley). This is the opposite of the "credit card = open account = 4 years" default that many state matrices assume.
• Revival runs backwards from the industry default. A partial payment by itself does not restart a Georgia clock. § 9-3-110 requires the new promise to be in writing and in (or subscribed by) the debtor's hand; § 9-3-112 revives only where a payment is coupled with the debtor's written acknowledgment of the existing liability. In practice that means a payment with a notation identifying the debt. And § 9-3-113 means revival extends the original liability — it does not manufacture a new one.
• A time-barred Georgia debt is not extinguished (Martin v. Mayer), so it remains collectable by non-litigation means, subject to Reg F's time-barred-debt rules.
• The FBPA is a weak collection hook, in both directions. A plaintiff must clear the public-marketplace-impact filter, which routinely defeats single-consumer harassment claims, and must serve a 30-day written demand before suing. But Carlisle shows that FDCPA-grade violations by an agency can carry an FBPA general-damages award on top, plus exemplary damages for intentional violations.
• The real Georgia entry risk is the paper, not the license. Sub-$3,000 Georgia consumer loan paper originated by an unlicensed lender is void (§ 7-3-50); payday paper is affirmatively uncollectible (§ 16-17-3). And anyone servicing Georgia installment loans made by others needs a DBF installment lender license, whether or not they call themselves a collector.

Traps / edge cases

• The 20-year seal trap. If the contract recites an intention to use a seal in its body and the word "seal" appears next to a signature, Georgia gives it 20 years, not 6. Older retail-installment contracts, notes and security deeds frequently carry seals. A GetPaid SOL tool that offers only 4/6-year answers will tell Georgia users a debt is time-barred when it has fourteen more years to run.
• Notes are not "written contracts" in Georgia. § 9-3-24 expressly excludes negotiable instruments. Both routes land on 6 years for a definite-time note, so the answer is usually the same — but the accrual rule differs (§ 11-3-118(a) runs from the stated or accelerated due date; § 9-3-24 from when the debt "become[s] due and payable"), and a demand note has no fixed clock at all until demand, with a hard 10-year backstop of non-payment under § 11-3-118(b). Citing § 9-3-24 for a Georgia note is a citation error even when the number is right.
• "Open account" ≠ "credit card." § 9-3-25's 4 years genuinely applies to open accounts. The 6-year credit-card result depends on there being a written agreement to sue on. Where a buyer cannot produce the cardholder agreement, the § 9-3-25 track ("any contract not under the hand of the party sought to be charged, or … any implied promise") is the natural fallback at 4 years — this fallback is our reading of the two quoted statutes, not a holding we located in official text; treat it as interpretation and get counsel before litigating on it.
• Do not re-age Georgia accounts on payment activity. A payment with no accompanying debtor writing revives nothing. Systems that default to "SOL clock = last payment date" will systematically overstate Georgia collectability and can push an operator into suing on out-of-stat paper.
• A payment made through a third party may not count at all. In re Seltzer held Chapter 13 trustee payments were not the debtor's payments for § 9-3-112 purposes; the payment must come from the debtor or an authorized agent. (In re Tarpley, by contrast, let payments routed through a credit-counseling service support the creditor — the two are reconcilable on agency, but the point is that the payer's identity is litigable.)
• § 9-3-94 tolling is far narrower than it reads. Absence from Georgia tolls only where the removal made service impossible. If the defendant was servable, the clock kept running. Do not apply automatic tolling for out-of-state debtors.
• FBPA § 10-1-396(1) may exempt federally-regulated conduct from the FBPA entirely. That is a defense worth attorney review for a collector already operating under the FDCPA/Reg F, but the section is ARCHIVE-ONLY here and its scope in collection cases was not resolved from official text.
• FBPA claims cannot be brought in a representative capacity (§ 10-1-399(a)) — no FBPA class actions. This meaningfully caps Georgia state-law exposure relative to FDCPA class risk.
• Servicing ≠ safe. DBF's installment-lender definition covers a person that "services installment loans made by others." An outsourced servicer or a debt buyer that services its own Georgia sub-$3,000 loan paper should assume it is in DBF's licensing perimeter until counsel says otherwise.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md — the operative conduct rules in Georgia, since the state supplies none
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md — 7-in-7 governs unmodified in GA
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md — GA debts are barred but not extinguished
• ../federal/fdcpa/legal-actions.md · ../federal/fdcpa/harassment-abuse.md
• ./tx.md — contrast: TX bars debt-buyer suit and forbids revival by statute; GA bars suit but allows written revival
• ./fl.md · ./ca.md · ./ny.md · ./ma.md · ./_matrix.md