South Carolina — Consumer Protection Code (Title 37) + SOL

Authority

South Carolina has no standalone debt-collection statute and no collection-agency license. Collection conduct is regulated inside the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code (Title 37) — the state's UCCC enactment — principally through §37-5-108, whose "unconscionable debt collection" provision carries an embedded FDCPA-style factor list, a private right of action, and a mandatory 30-day pre-suit filing with the regulator. The regulator is the South Carolina Department of Consumer Affairs ("the administrator," §37-6-103), with the State Board of Financial Institutions licensing supervised lenders (§37-3-502).

Statute of limitations on a debt: S.C. Code §15-3-530(1) — three years, with no written/oral distinction. Negotiable notes run six years under §36-3-118(a), and contracts for the sale of goods run six under South Carolina's non-uniform §36-2-725(1).

Verification note: scstatehouse.gov serves the official code as server-rendered HTML at https://www.scstatehouse.gov/code/t<TT>c<CCC>.php (e.g. t15c003.php). The pages are directly fetchable with an ordinary browser user-agent; no archive fallback was needed. All text below was pulled from those files on 2026-08-11. Two provisions (§15-3-120's second sentence and the full enumerations of §15-3-520 and §15-3-530) are truncated by summarizing fetchers — they must be read from the raw HTML, and the §15-3-120 sentence that gets dropped is the one that decides South Carolina's entire revival rule.

Operative text

Statute of limitations — the general three-year period

SECTION 15-3-530. Three years. Within three years: (1) an action upon a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied, excepting those provided for in Section 15-3-520; (2) an action upon a liability created by statute other than a penalty or forfeiture; … — S.C. Code §15-3-530

Editor's Note The limitations period was reduced from 6 to 3 years in 1988. — editor's note following S.C. Code §15-3-530 (see 1988 Act No. 432, §1)

South Carolina draws no written/oral axis at all: item (1) is a single bucket for "a contract, obligation, or liability, express or implied." There is no open-account or store-account statute anywhere in ch. 15-3.

The twenty-year section — and its money-note carve-out

SECTION 15-3-520. Within twenty years. Within twenty years: (a) an action upon a bond or other contract in writing secured by a mortgage of real property; (b) an action upon a sealed instrument, other than a sealed note and personal bond for the payment of money only whereon the period of limitation is the same as prescribed in Section 15-3-530, except that a sealed contract for sale or an offer to buy or sell goods whereon the period of limitation is the same as prescribed in Section 36-2-725. — S.C. Code §15-3-520

Negotiable instruments — §36-3-118 (six years)

(a) Except as provided in Subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date. (b) Except as provided in Subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of 10 years. — S.C. Code §36-3-118 (HISTORY: … 2008 Act No. 204, SECTION 2, eff July 1, 2008)

Sale of goods — §36-2-725 (SIX years, non-uniform)

(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued. — S.C. Code §36-2-725

Revival — payment IS a writing (§15-3-120)

SECTION 15-3-120. Effect of new promises in writing or part payments. No acknowledgment or promise shall be sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract whereby to take the case out of the operation of this chapter unless it be contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby. But payment of any part of principal or interest is equivalent to a promise in writing. — S.C. Code §15-3-120

SECTION 15-3-130. Suits on causes saved from bar of statute by part payment or written acknowledgment. All actions upon causes of action which would be barred by the statute of limitations but for part payment or a written acknowledgment shall be brought on the original cause of action and the part payment or written acknowledgment shall be evidence to prevent the bar of the statute of limitations. — S.C. Code §15-3-130

Accrual, commencement, tolling, and the anti-shortening rule

(A) Civil actions may only be commenced within the periods prescribed in this title after the cause of action has accrued, except when, in special cases, a different limitation is prescribed by statute. (B) A civil action is commenced when the summons and complaint are filed with the clerk of court if actual service is accomplished within one hundred twenty days after filing. — S.C. Code §15-3-20

SECTION 15-3-30. Exceptions where defendant is out of State. If when a cause of action shall accrue against any person he shall be out of the State, such action may be commenced within the terms in this chapter respectively limited after the return of such person into this State. And if, after such cause of action shall have accrued, such person shall depart from and reside out of this State or remain continuously absent therefrom for the space of one year or more, the time of his absence shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of such action. — S.C. Code §15-3-30

SECTION 15-3-140. Contract provision shortening statutory period. No clause, provision or agreement in any contract of whatsoever nature, verbal or written, whereby it is agreed that either party shall be barred from bringing suit upon any cause of action arising out of the contract if not brought within a period less than the time prescribed by the statute of limitations, for similar causes of action, shall bar such action … — S.C. Code §15-3-140

Scope — "debt collector" includes original creditors

(28) "Debt collector" means any person who collects, attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts due or asserted to be owed or due another. The term also includes a creditor who collects, attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, his own debts. — S.C. Code §37-1-301(28)

Territorial reach of the collection rules is broader than the rest of Title 37:

(3) The subdivision on limitations on creditors' remedies (Part 1) of the chapter on remedies and penalties (Chapter 5) applies to actions or other proceedings brought in this State to enforce rights arising from consumer credit transactions or extortionate extensions of credit, wherever made. — S.C. Code §37-1-201(3)

Unconscionable debt collection — §37-5-108(2) (the private right of action)

(2) With respect to a consumer credit transaction, if the court as a matter of law finds that a person has engaged in, is engaging in, or is likely to engage in unconscionable conduct in collecting a debt arising from that transaction, the court may grant an injunction. In addition, the consumer has a cause of action to recover actual damages and, in an action other than a class action, a right to recover from the person violating this section a penalty in the amount determined by the court of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars. — S.C. Code §37-5-108(2)

The embedded mini-FDCPA — §37-5-108(5) factors

(5) In applying subsection (2), consideration shall be given to each of the following factors, among others, as applicable: (a) using or threatening to use force, violence, or criminal prosecution against the consumer or members of his family, including harm to the physical person, reputation, or property of any person; (b) communicating with the consumer or a member of his family at frequent intervals during a twenty-four hour period or at unusual hours or under other circumstances so that it is a reasonable inference that the primary purpose of the communication was to harass the consumer. The term "communication" means the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium. A creditor or debt collector may not: (i) communicate with a consumer at any unusual time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer. In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, it may be assumed that a convenient time to communicate with a consumer is between 8 a.m. and 9 p.m.; or (ii) communicate with a consumer who is represented by an attorney when such fact is known to the creditor or debt collector unless the attorney consents to direct communication or fails to respond within ten days to a communication; (iii) contact a consumer at his place of employment after the consumer or his employer has requested in writing that no contacts be made at such place of employment or except as may be otherwise permitted by statute or to verify the consumer's employment; (iv) communicate with anyone other than the consumer, his attorney, a consumer reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the attorney of the creditor or debt collector, unless the consumer or a court of competent jurisdiction has given prior direct permission; (v) use obscene or profane language or language the natural consequence of which is to abuse the hearer or reader; (vi) publish a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency; (vii) cause a telephone to ring repeatedly during a twenty-four hour period or engage any person in a telephone conversation with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number; (viii) advertise for sale any debt to coerce payment of the debt; (ix) communicate with a consumer regarding a debt by postcard; (x) deposit or threaten to deposit any postdated check or other postdated payment instrument requested by the creditor prior to the date on such check or instrument; (xi) take or threaten to take any nonjudicial action to effect dispossession or disablement of property if: (aa) there is no present right to possession of the property claimed as collateral through an enforceable security interest or other ownership interest; (bb) there is no present intention to take possession of the property; or (cc) the property is exempt by law from such dispossession or disablement; or (xii) cause charges to be incurred by any person for communications to the consumer by concealment of the true purpose of the communication, such charges include, but are not limited to, collect telephone calls and telegram fees. — S.C. Code §37-5-108(5)(a)–(b)

(c) using fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations in connection with the collection of a consumer credit transaction. Such false representations shall include: (i) the character, amount, or legal status of any debt; (ii) any services rendered or fees which may be received, unless such fees are expressly authorized by law; (iii) a claim of an individual that he is an attorney or that any communication is from an attorney; (iv) any claim or implication that nonpayment of any debt will result in arrest, imprisonment, garnishment, seizure, or attachment unless the remedy is legally permitted to the creditor and the claim or implication is not used for the purpose of harassment or abuse of process; (v) a claim or implication that the consumer committed any crime or other conduct to disgrace the consumer; or (vi) any written communication which simulates or appears to be a document authorized, issued, or approved by any state or federal agency or court or creates a false impression as to its source; (d) causing or threatening to cause injury to the consumer's reputation or economic status by disclosing information affecting the consumer's reputation for creditworthiness with knowledge or reason to know that the information is false; communicating with the consumer's employer before obtaining a final judgment against the consumer, except as permitted by statute or to verify the consumer's employment; disclosing to a person, with knowledge or reason to know that the person does not have a legitimate business need for the information, or in any way prohibited by statute, information affecting the consumer's credit or other reputation; or disclosing information concerning the existence of a debt known to be disputed by the consumer without disclosing that fact; — S.C. Code §37-5-108(5)(c)–(d)

The 30-day pre-suit administrator filing — §37-5-108(6)

(6) No action at law claiming unconscionable debt collection may be commenced in any court until at least thirty days after the facts and circumstances of any claim of unconscionable conduct in collecting a debt arising out of a consumer credit transaction has been filed in writing with the administrator of the Department of Consumer Affairs. … A creditor or debt collector may only take such action as is authorized by law to protect its collateral during the thirty-day state agency review period. … If in an action, properly filed after the thirty-day state agency review period … the court finds unconscionability pursuant to subsection (1) or (2), the court shall award reasonable fees to the attorney for the consumer or debtor. If the court does not find unconscionability and the consumer or debtor claiming unconscionability has brought or maintained an action he knew to be groundless, the court may award reasonable fees to the attorney for the party against whom the claim is made. — S.C. Code §37-5-108(6)

No wage garnishment

SECTION 37-5-104. No garnishment. With respect to a debt arising from a consumer credit sale, a consumer lease, a consumer loan, or a consumer rental-purchase agreement, regardless of where made, the creditor may not attach unpaid earnings of the debtor by garnishment or like proceedings. — S.C. Code §37-5-104

The regulator's own consumer publication states the exceptions:

Wage garnishment is prohibited in South Carolina EXCEPT if: 1. Money is owed to the government; 2. Money is owed for child support; 3. A garnishment order has been entered in another state while the consumer was a resident there but the consumer later moves to South Carolina. — SCDCA, A Guide for Dealing with Debt Collection (consumer.sc.gov)

Right-to-cure — a pre-acceleration gate (§§37-5-110, 37-5-111)

(1) With respect to a secured or unsecured consumer credit transaction payable in two or more installments, after a consumer has been in default for ten days for failure to make a required payment and has not voluntarily surrendered possession of goods that are collateral, a creditor may give the consumer the notice described in this section. — S.C. Code §37-5-110(1)

(1) … after a default consisting only of the consumer's failure to make a required payment, a creditor, because of that default, may neither accelerate maturity of the unpaid balance of the obligation, nor take possession of or otherwise enforce a security interest in goods that are collateral until twenty days after a notice of the consumer's right to cure (Section 37-5-110) is given. … Cure restores the consumer to his rights under the agreement as though the defaults had not occurred. (2) With respect to defaults on the same obligation … after a creditor has once given notice of consumer's right to cure … this section gives the consumer no right to cure … For the purpose of this section, in credit extended pursuant to a revolving charge or revolving loan account, the obligation is the unpaid balance of the account and there is no right to cure and no limitation on the creditor's rights with respect to a default that occurs within twelve months after an earlier default as to which a creditor has given a notice of consumer's right to cure. — S.C. Code §37-5-111

Suit mechanics — venue and default judgment (§§37-5-113, 37-5-114)

An action by a creditor against a consumer arising from a consumer credit transaction shall be brought in the county of the consumer's residence … If the initial papers offered for filing in the action on their face show noncompliance with this section, the clerk of court shall not accept them. — S.C. Code §37-5-113

(1) In an action brought by a creditor against a consumer arising from a consumer credit transaction, the complaint shall allege the facts of the consumer's default, the amount to which the creditor is entitled, an indication of how that amount was determined, and either that the notice to cure required by Sections 37-5-110 and 37-5-111 has been given or is not required. (2) A default judgment may not be entered in the action in favor of the creditor unless the complaint is verified by the creditor or sworn testimony, by affidavit or otherwise, is adduced showing that the creditor is entitled to the relief demanded. — S.C. Code §37-5-114

Entry gate 1 — SCDCA notification (an in-state-office filing, not a license)

SECTION 37-6-201. Applicability. This part applies to a person engaged in this State in making consumer credit sales, consumer leases, consumer loans, or consumer rental-purchase agreements and to a person having an office or place of business in this State who takes assignments of and undertakes direct collection of payments from or enforcement of rights against debtors arising from these sales, leases, or loans. — S.C. Code §37-6-201

(1) Persons subject to this part shall file notification with the administrator within thirty days after commencing business in this State, and, thereafter, on or before January thirty-first of each year. — S.C. Code §37-6-202(1)

A person required to file notification shall pay on or before January thirty-first of each year to the administrator an annual fee of one hundred twenty dollars for that year, for each address in this State listed in the notification. The fee for any one person must be not less than one hundred twenty dollars. A person who does not extend credit pursuant to written contracts and a person whose annual gross volume of business does not exceed one hundred fifty thousand dollars is exempt from any fee and from the notification requirements of Section 37-6-202. — S.C. Code §37-6-203

Penalty for skipping it:

(3) A person who wilfully engages in the business of making consumer credit sales, consumer leases, or consumer loans, or of taking assignments of rights against debtors arising therefrom and undertakes direct collection of payments or enforcement of these rights, without complying with the provisions of this title concerning notification (Section 37-6-202) or payment of fees (Section 37-6-203), is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars. — S.C. Code §37-5-301(3)

Entry gate 2 — supervised-lender license reaches debt buyers of high-rate loans

Unless a person is a supervised financial organization or has first obtained a license from the State Board of Financial Institutions authorizing him to make supervised loans, he shall not engage in the business of (1) making supervised loans; or (2) taking assignments of and undertaking direct collection of payments from or enforcement of rights against debtors arising from supervised loans. — S.C. Code §37-3-502

(1) "Supervised loan" means a consumer loan in which the rate of the loan finance charge exceeds twelve percent per year … (2) "Supervised lender" means a person authorized to make or take assignments of supervised loans. — S.C. Code §37-3-501

(2) A person, other than a supervised financial organization, who wilfully engages in the business of making loans without a license, where a license is required, is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. — S.C. Code §37-5-301(2)

§37-3-502 is also on §37-5-202(1)'s list of provisions whose violation gives the consumer actual damages plus a $100–$1,000 penalty in a non-class action, with mandatory costs and attorney's fees on a finding of violation (§37-5-202(8)).

Maximum rate schedule — assignees expressly excluded

(1) Every creditor (Section 37-1-301(13)), other than an assignee of a credit obligation, making supervised or restricted consumer loans (Section 37-3-104) in this State shall … file a rate schedule with the Department of Consumer Affairs and … post in one conspicuous place in every place of business … — S.C. Code §37-3-305(1)

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• The SOL is three years for essentially every ordinary consumer debt, and South Carolina genuinely has no written/oral split — §15-3-530(1) is one bucket covering contracts "express or implied." A credit card, a medical bill, an oral loan, and a signed installment contract all sit in the same three-year bucket, so the produce-the-cardholder-agreement fight that drives outcomes in Georgia, Virginia, and Utah has no effect in South Carolina. The period was six years until 1988.
• Three exceptions run longer, and two of them matter commercially:
  • a negotiable promissory note payable at a definite time: six years (§36-3-118(a));
  • a contract for the sale of goods: six years (§36-2-725(1)) — South Carolina replaced the uniform four-year UCC period with six;
  • a written contract secured by a real-property mortgage, or a sealed instrument: twenty years (§15-3-520).
• The twenty-year seal rule does not rescue a money note. §15-3-520(b) carves "a sealed note and personal bond for the payment of money only" back down to §15-3-530's three years. This is the opposite of Georgia, North Carolina, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, where affixing a seal to a note lengthens the period. In South Carolina, sealing a money note buys nothing.
• South Carolina is a payment-revives state, and payment needs no writing. §15-3-120's first sentence looks like the strict written-acknowledgment rule; its second sentence — "But payment of any part of principal or interest is equivalent to a promise in writing" — converts a bare part payment into the statutory equivalent of a signed writing. A partial payment therefore restarts the clock. Any tooling that assumes a Texas- or New-York-style never-revives rule is wrong for South Carolina in the most dangerous direction.
• There is no collection-agency license in South Carolina. Neither a third-party agency nor a debt buyer needs one to collect here. Two narrower gates do exist: an annual SCDCA notification ($120 per South Carolina address) if the collector has an office or place of business in the state and takes assignments plus collects on them; and a State Board of Financial Institutions supervised-lender license if the paper being bought and collected is a consumer loan bearing over 12% per year.
• Collection conduct is regulated, just not where you would look for it. §37-5-108(5) is a full FDCPA-shaped prohibition list — attorney representation, workplace contacts, third-party disclosure, obscene language, repeated ringing, postdated checks, false statements about a debt's "character, amount, or legal status" — sitting inside an unconscionability factor list rather than in a debt-collection act. It reaches original creditors, because §37-1-301(28) defines "debt collector" to include a creditor collecting its own debts.
• No numeric call-frequency cap and no stricter call window. §37-5-108(5)(b) uses an intent-to-harass standard, and (5)(b)(i) states the same 8 a.m.–9 p.m. assumption as federal law. Reg F's 7-in-7 presumption and the federal time window are the operative limits in South Carolina.
• No mandatory time-barred-debt disclosure. Nothing in Title 37 or ch. 15-3 requires a notice on an out-of-stat debt. Misrepresenting a debt's "legal status" under §37-5-108(5)(c)(i) is the only hook, and it needs a misrepresentation.
• Wages cannot be garnished for consumer credit debt (§37-5-104), which removes the primary post-judgment remedy and makes a South Carolina judgment substantially less collectible than in most states.

Traps / edge cases

• The revival rule is invisible to summarizing fetchers. Every fetcher tested against t15c003.php returned §15-3-120 truncated at the first sentence — which reads as a strict written-acknowledgment-only rule and inverts the actual answer. The controlling sentence ("But payment of any part of principal or interest is equivalent to a promise in writing") only appears in the raw HTML. §15-3-520 and §15-3-530 truncate the same way. Read this chapter raw.
• Whether a payment made AFTER the three years have already run revives the claim is UNVERIFIED. §15-3-130 speaks of causes "which would be barred by the statute of limitations but for part payment or a written acknowledgment," which reads as contemplating a saved-from-the-bar claim, but neither §15-3-120 nor §15-3-130 says in terms whether the payment must precede expiry. No official source resolves it. Attorney review — do not encode a post-expiry re-age either way.
• The 30-day pre-suit filing under §37-5-108(6) cuts both ways. It is a genuine gate on consumer suits, but it also means SCDCA receives written notice of every unconscionable-collection claim before it is filed, and the statute directs the administrator to forward the complaint to the collector and to investigate. Treat an SCDCA complaint forward as a litigation-imminent signal, not routine correspondence. Attorney's fees to the consumer are mandatory on a finding of unconscionability.
• Venue is jurisdictional in practice. §37-5-113 requires suit in the consumer's county of residence and directs the clerk not to accept facially noncompliant papers. A collection suit filed in the wrong county is refused at the counter.
• Default judgments need a verified complaint or sworn proof (§37-5-114(2)), and the complaint must affirmatively plead that the right-to-cure notice was given or was not required. This is an anti-robosigning provision with teeth for debt buyers whose files lack origination documents.
• The right-to-cure clock is per-obligation, not per-default. One notice per obligation for closed-end paper; for revolving accounts, no further right to cure for a default occurring within twelve months of an earlier noticed default (§37-5-111(2)). A repossession in violation of §37-5-111 is void and the creditor is liable for conversion (§37-5-111(7)).
• §37-1-201(3) exports the collection rules. Chapter 5 Part 1 — which contains §37-5-108, §37-5-104's garnishment ban, and the right-to-cure sections — applies to any action brought in South Carolina on a consumer credit transaction "wherever made." Out-of-state origination does not escape it.
• Contractual shortening of the SOL is void (§15-3-140), the reverse of Pennsylvania's §5501(a). A cardholder agreement's shorter limitations clause does not bind in South Carolina.
• Absence tolling is broad: absent at accrual, the clock does not start until return; and any later departure plus out-of-state residence, or continuous absence of a year or more, is excluded from the period (§15-3-30). Whether this applies to a defendant amenable to long-arm service is a constitutional question this page does not resolve — attorney review.
• Commencement is filing, not service (§15-3-20(B)), but only if service lands within 120 days. A filing that misses the service window loses its commencement date.
• No borrowing statute was located. A full read of ch. 15-3 turned up no provision applying another state's period to a foreign-accrued claim (grep for "another state" / "other state" / "accrued in" returned nothing responsive). Absent one, South Carolina courts would apply the forum's three years — but the negative is stated from the chapter's text, not from an affirmative authority, so treat cross-border accrual as attorney-review territory.
• §15-3-110 excludes bank paper: "This chapter shall not affect actions to enforce the payment of bills, notes or other evidences of debt issued by moneyed corporations or issued or put in circulation as money." Rarely relevant to consumer collections, but it is a live carve-out from the whole limitations chapter.
• Healthcare debt has a pre-reporting notice: a health care services provider must give twenty days' prior notice before submitting a debt to a credit bureau or filing a lien, with a fine of not less than $100 per occurrence (§37-5-117). This binds the provider, not necessarily its assignee — an untested distinction.

Verification of the negatives

Gaps are never filled from memory, so the "no collection-agency license" finding was established by enumeration rather than assumed:

1. Title 40 (Professions and Occupations) — full chapter list fetched (title40.php); 60+ chapters from Accountants to the State Athletic Commission, with no collection-agency, debt-collector, or collection-bureau chapter.
2. Title 37 — chapters 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 fetched in full; the only licensing provisions reaching collection activity are §37-3-502 (supervised lenders) and the §37-6-201 notification. A case-insensitive search for "collection agency" and "debt buyer" across all five chapters returns nothing.
3. SCDCA's own licensing page (consumer.sc.gov/business-resourceslaws/licensing) enumerates the fourteen industries the Department licenses or registers — athlete agents, continuing care retirement communities, credit counselors, discount medical plan organizations, earned wage access providers, mortgage brokers, motor clubs, motor vehicle dealers, pawnbrokers, physical fitness service providers, preneed funeral contract providers, prepaid legal, professional employer organizations, and registered creditors. Debt collectors are not among them.
4. S.C. Code of Regulations ch. 28 (SCDCA's regulations, current through State Register vol. 50 issue 3, eff. March 27, 2026) — full PDF read; Reg. 28-8 implements the §37-6-202 notification and there is no collection-agency licensing or collection-conduct regulation anywhere in the chapter.
5. H.3383 (2011–2012), the "Debt Collection Agency Licensing Act" — a bill that would have created exactly such a license. Its legislative history shows two actions only: introduced and read first time 1/20/2011, referred to the Committee on Labor, Commerce and Industry 1/20/2011. No further action; it died in committee. Web searches surface this bill's text and can misreport its proposed licensing language as current South Carolina law — it is not.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md
• ./nc.md — the other flat-three-year state, but with a ten-year seal rule and a debt-buyer collection bar South Carolina lacks
• ./ga.md — the inverted revival rule (payment alone never revives) and a live twenty-year seal period
• ./tx.md · ./_matrix.md