Alabama — no collection statute, no collector license; a revenue stamp and a contested 3-vs-6 SOL

Authority

Alabama has no mini-FDCPA, no collection-agency licensing act, and no debt-collection statute of any kind. Nothing in the Code of Alabama regulates collection conduct as such — no license, no bond, no call caps, no call-time window, no validation overlay, no mini-Miranda, no time-barred-debt disclosure. Four bodies of law do all of the work:

1. Statutes of limitation — Ala. Code §§ 6-2-33, 6-2-34 and 6-2-37 (contracts and accounts), § 7-3-118 (negotiable instruments), with revival governed by § 6-2-16 and tolling by §§ 6-2-3, 6-2-8, 6-2-9 and 6-2-10, plus a borrowing statute at § 6-2-17. This is where Alabama actually changes a collection operation's behavior, and the single highest-stakes question — whether a credit card runs three years or six — is not resolved by the statute and is litigated case by case on the facts.
2. A privilege license tax, Ala. Code § 40-12-80 — a revenue measure, not a conduct gate, but one with criminal teeth for non-payment (§ 40-12-9).
3. Alabama Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Ala. Code § 8-19-1 et seq. ("ADTPA") — the general UDAP statute, enforced by the Attorney General and district attorneys (§§ 8-19-8, 8-19-11) and by private action (§ 8-19-10). It is a weak collection hook: it has no collection-specific prohibition, it bars class actions outright, and its exemption clause appears on its face to carve out FDCPA violations entirely.
4. § 13A-11-8 (harassing communications) — a criminal misdemeanor with an express legitimate-business-communications carve-out, so it is not a frequency standard.

Verification note — read before relying on a quote

alison.legislature.state.al.us — the Alabama Legislature's own site and the official publisher of the Code of Alabama — serves the Code through a Next.js JavaScript application. Fetching …/code-of-alabama?section=6-2-34 returns only the site shell; no statutory text is present in the HTML, so ordinary automated fetching sees nothing. The legacy alisondb.legislature.state.al.us host that older references point at no longer resolves (DNS ENOTFOUND).

There is, however, no Lexis handoff here and no need for archive captures. The JS app is backed by the Legislature's own GraphQL data server at https://alison.legislature.state.al.us/graphql, which serves the Code text directly — the functional equivalent of Texas's tcss.legis.texas.gov file server. Every statutory quote on this page was pulled from that endpoint on 2026-08-12 using the app's own codeOfAlabamaSection query:

POST https://alison.legislature.state.al.us/graphql
{"query":"query codeOfAlabamaSection($displayId:String!){ codesOfAlabama(
   where:{type:{eq:Section},displayId:{eq:$displayId}}, versions:true
 ){ data{ codeId displayId title content history effectiveDate } } }",
 "variables":{"displayId":"6-2-34"}}

The same endpoint exposes searchCodeOfAlabama (full-text search across the whole Code, used below for the structural negatives), codeOfAlabamaTitles (the complete title/chapter outline), and an instruments query carrying each act's effectiveDateOther — which is how Act 2021-349's 8/1/21 effective date in the frontmatter was confirmed officially rather than from a summary.

Corroboration. The load-bearing limitations text is independently confirmed against federal courts sitting in Alabama that quote the current Code verbatim — Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. McDonald (N.D. Ala. 2013) on govinfo for §§ 6-2-37(1), 6-2-34(4)–(5) and 7-3-118(a), and In re Jones (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015) on govinfo for §§ 6-2-37, 6-2-34 and 6-2-16. Nothing on this page is ARCHIVE-ONLY and nothing rests on a secondary source.

Operative text

Statute of limitations — the tracks

General rule.

(a) All civil actions must be commenced after the cause of action has accrued within the period prescribed in this article and not afterwards, unless otherwise specifically provided for in this code. — Ala. Code § 6-2-30(a)

Six years — contracts, written and oral, and stated accounts. Alabama does not split written from oral contracts. Both land in § 6-2-34:

The following must be commenced within six years: … (4) Actions founded on promises in writing not under seal; (5) Actions for the recovery of money upon a loan, upon a stated or liquidated account or for arrears of rent due upon a parol demise; … (9) Actions upon any simple contract or speciality not specifically enumerated in this section. — Ala. Code § 6-2-34 (Code 1852, §2477 … Code 1940, T. 7, §21)

Subdivisions (4) and (5) are quoted the same way by the Northern District of Alabama:

the court looks to the statutes of limitations that apply to "a normal contract arrangement": §§ 6-2-34(4) and (5), setting a six-year statute to "[a]ctions founded on promises in writing not under seal" and to "[a]ctions for the recovery of money upon a loan, [or] upon a stated or liquidated account . . ." — Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. McDonald, No. 2:13-cv-00831-KOB (N.D. Ala. Oct. 18, 2013)

Three years — open or unliquidated accounts only. Note that the statute carries its own accrual rule, which no other bucket does:

The following must be commenced within three years: (1) Actions to recover money due by open or unliquidated account, the time to be computed from the date of the last item of the account or from the time when, by contract or usage, the account is due; and (2) Proceedings in any court of this state to disbar any attorney authorized to practice law in this state. — Ala. Code § 6-2-37 (Code 1852, §2480 … Code 1940, T. 7, §24)

Confirmed verbatim, with the court stressing how narrow the category is:

Section 6-2-37(1) of the Alabama Code sets a three year statute of limitations for "[a]ctions to recover money due by open or unliquidated account . . ." ALA. CODE § 6-2-37(1) (emphasis added). The individual Defendants' argument conveniently leaves out the important prepositional phrase in this statute—"by open or unliquidated account"—that drastically limits its scope … — BB&T v. McDonald (N.D. Ala. 2013)

Under Alabama law, an "open or unliquidated account" is one where "a provision of the contract is left open for further negotiations." Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Anniston Dev. Co., 853 So. 2d 218, 221 (Ala. 2002) … see also N. Ala. Ry. Co. v. Wilson Mercantile Co., 63 So. 34, 35 (Ala. Ct. App. 1913) ("A demand cannot be regarded as an open account where there is a contract certain and fixed in all its terms, which is the foundation of the claim."). — BB&T v. McDonald (N.D. Ala. 2013)

Ten years — anything under seal. Alabama's sleeper provision:

The following actions must be commenced within 10 years: (1) Actions founded upon any contract or writing under seal. (2) Actions for the recovery of lands, tenements or hereditaments, or the possession thereof, except as otherwise provided in this article. (3) Motions and other actions brought by or on behalf of the State of Alabama, a county, a municipality, or another political subdivision of the state against sheriffs, coroners, constables, and other public officers for nonfeasance, misfeasance, or malfeasance in office. — Ala. Code § 6-2-33 (… Acts 1996, No. 96-513, p. 657, §1)

What makes an Alabama instrument "sealed":

In Alabama, for an instrument to be "under seal," "[t]here must be an intention on the part of the maker, recited in the body of the instrument, to the effect that the instrument is sealed." Crane v. Pringle, 378 So. 2d 721, 723 (Ala. 1979). — BB&T v. McDonald (N.D. Ala. 2013) (n.2)

Six years — negotiable instruments (Alabama's UCC 3-118). Alabama adopted Revised Article 3 in 1995:

(a) Note payable at a definite time. Except as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date. (b) Note payable on demand. Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of 10 years. (c) Unaccepted draft. … must be commenced within three years after dishonor of the draft or 10 years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first. (d) Certified check, teller's check, cashier's check and traveler's check. … within three years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor or issuer … (e) Certificate of deposit. … within six years after demand for payment is made to the maker … (f) Accepted draft. … within six years after the due date or dates stated in the draft or acceptance … or … within six years after the date of the acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable on demand. (g) Conversion, breach of warranty and other Article 3 actions. … must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. — Ala. Code § 7-3-118 (Acts 1995, No. 95-668, p. 1381, §1)

Applied by the federal court, which routed a commercial note to § 7-3-118(a) and away from § 6-2-37:

Under such circumstances, this Note cannot be considered an open or unliquidated account; therefore, the individual Defendants' proposed three-year statute of limitations does not apply. The most relevant statute of limitations for Count 1 is the six-year statute of limitations found in § 7-3-118(a). — BB&T v. McDonald (N.D. Ala. 2013)

Credit cards — the 3-vs-6 fight, and why the statute does not settle it

This is the highest-stakes cell in the Alabama row, and Alabama law does not give a clean answer. The two statutes are mirror images — § 6-2-37(1) covers the "open or unliquidated" account at three years; § 6-2-34(5) covers the "stated or liquidated" account at six — so the whole fight is over which characterization the paper supports. Both federal courts that have squarely confronted it framed it exactly that way:

The complaint alleges that the Defendant's claim #5 is based on a common law open account cause of action. Under Alabama law, the statute of limitations for an open account cause of action is three years. CODE OF ALA. § 6-2-37 (1975). The Defendant argues that claim #5 is based on an account stated cause of action. Under Alabama law, the statute of limitations for an account stated claim is six years. CODE OF ALA. § 6-2-34 (1975). — Oliver v. Quantum3 Group, LLC, Adv. Proc. 14-00075 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. Dec. 22, 2014)

The elements of an account stated, as the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals states them:

An account stated is a post-transaction agreement. It is not founded on the original liability, but is a new agreement between parties to an original account that the statement of the account with the balance struck is correct and that the debtor will pay that amount. It is as if a promissory note had been given for the amount due. A prima facie case on an account stated is made when the plaintiff proves (1) a statement of the account between the parties is balanced and rendered to the debtor; (2) there is a meeting of the minds as to the correctness of the statement; and (3) the debtor admits liability. The debtor's admission of correctness of the statement and to his liability thereon can be express or implied. An account rendered, and not objected to within reasonable time becomes an account stated, and failure to object will be regarded as an admission of correctness of the account. — University of South Alabama v. Bracy, 466 So. 2d 148 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985), quoted in Oliver (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2014) and In re Jones, No. 12-42349-JJR13 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2015)

The Southern District's bankruptcy court reads a credit card as an open account (3 years) and is openly skeptical of the account-stated workaround:

In credit card arrangements at least one term of the contract is open: the amount of credit a borrower will actually use. The timing of future transactions is also unascertained. Based on the plain meaning of "open account," credit card arrangements appear to be open accounts. — Oliver v. Quantum3 Group, LLC (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2014)

Applying a common law account stated theory to credit card debt is a new trend. Alabama cases apply the account stated theory primarily in buyer-seller transactions. … Despite this case law, the Court is not convinced that the account stated theory is a proper one for dealing with accounts based on typical credit card transactions and the mailing of credit card statements. … A typical credit card statement is mailed while the account is still open and credit card users can continue making transactions on the account after the statement has been printed and mailed. Therefore, a typical credit card statement is not a "full and final" settlement of the account. It is, at most, a "full and final" settlement of past billings. — Oliver (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2014) (n.1)

The Northern District's bankruptcy court went the other way on medical paper, and — decisively for operational purposes — put the burden on the debtor:

Creditors' counsel countered that the debtors' attorney's statement regarding the possibility of converting an open account into an account stated, by rendering a statement showing the charges and receiving no objection to those charges, was, in fact, an accurate pronouncement of Alabama law, and the court agrees. — In re Jones, No. 12-42349-JJR13 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2015)

The court finds that the debtors have not met their burden of proving that the medical debts were open accounts, and therefore barred by the statute of limitations when the cases were filed. … Therefore, as to the nature of the medical debts, the court finds those debts are not open accounts but are accounts stated, and are not barred by the applicable six-year statute of limitations. — In re Jones (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015)

Oliver also flagged the evidentiary price of the six-year theory:

To bring an account stated claim in good faith the Defendant would have to have evidence of the underlying credit card agreement, a rendering of the closed and stated account to the debtor, and the assignment of the account to Quantum3. — Oliver (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2014)

Revival — § 6-2-16, and the timing trap that inverts the industry default

No act, promise, or acknowledgment is sufficient to remove the bar to an action created by the provisions of this chapter, nor is such evidence of a new and continuing contract, except a partial payment, made upon the contract by the party sought to be charged before the bar is complete or an unconditional promise in writing signed by the party to be charged thereby. — Ala. Code § 6-2-16 (Code 1852, §2490 … Code 1940, T. 7, §40)

Read the placement of "before the bar is complete" carefully — it modifies the partial-payment branch, and the Northern District's bankruptcy court held exactly that, calling the point dispositive:

Under the unambiguous language of § 6-2-16, a partial payment must be made "before the bar is complete" in order to remove the bar. … What has been lost in the creditors' argument is that partial payments made after the bar of the statute of limitations is in place do not remove the bar. Chapman v. Barnes, 93 Ala. 433, 9 So. 589 (Ala. 1891). This critical statutory provision regarding the timing of the payments at issue … is fatal to the creditors' argument on this ground as to the indisputably stale claims. — In re Jones (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015)

And the surviving post-expiry route — an unconditional written promise — is a high bar. An express written acknowledgment of the debt, its amount, a stated willingness to pay, and a proposed payment plan were all held insufficient:

In the case of Chapman v. Barnes, supra, the Supreme Court of Alabama examined letters written and signed by the parties to be charged in which they acknowledged the debt, were specific as to amount, and expressed a desire and expectation to pay the debt, further showing a desire and a willingness to pay the debt after a time and containing a proposal for how the payment could be accomplished. … However, despite specifically acknowledging the debt and a willingness to pay it along with a future payment proposal, the letters did not rise to the level of an unconditional promise to pay the debt, and did not "import the written absolute undertaking to pay the debt required to a removal of the bar of the statute." — In re Jones (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015), discussing Chapman v. Barnes, 9 So. 589, 590 (Ala. 1891)

Accrual and tolling

Absence from the state — broad on its face:

When any person is absent from the state during the period within which an action might have been commenced against him, the time of such absence must not be computed as a portion of the time necessary to create a bar under this chapter. — Ala. Code § 6-2-10

Fraud — discovery rule with a two-year tail:

In actions seeking relief on the ground of fraud where the statute has created a bar, the claim must not be considered as having accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the fact constituting the fraud, after which he must have two years within which to prosecute his action. — Ala. Code § 6-2-3

Minority / incapacity — with a 20-year outer cap:

(a) If anyone entitled to commence any of the actions enumerated in this chapter … is, at the time the right accrues, below the age of 19 years, or insane, he or she shall have three years, or the period allowed by law for the commencement of an action if it be less than three years, after the termination of the disability to commence an action … No disability shall extend the period of limitations so as to allow an action to be commenced … after the lapse of 20 years from the time the claim or right accrued. — Ala. Code § 6-2-8(a)

Claims against a decedent's estate are suspended once presented:

Where a claim against the estate of a decedent has been duly presented, the limitation for the commencement of an action thereon is suspended until the personal representative, heir, or devisee of such decedent shall, by notice in writing, dispute the validity of such claim in whole or in part. — Ala. Code § 6-2-9

Borrowing statute — a foreign bar is imported:

When the statute of limitations of another state or foreign country has created a bar to an action upon a contract made or act done in such state or country while the party sought to be charged thereby was a resident of such state or country, the bar thus created is effectual in this state against any action commenced thereon in the same manner it would have been in the state or country where the act was done or contract made. — Ala. Code § 6-2-17

Entry gate — a revenue stamp, not a license

Alabama's only collection-specific entry requirement is a privilege license tax:

Each collection agency shall pay the following license tax: In towns and cities of 20,000 or more inhabitants, $100; in towns and cities of less than 20,000 inhabitants, $25. Each person who shall employ agents to solicit claims for collection from persons, firms, or corporations in the state shall be deemed a collection agency within the meaning of this section. This section shall not apply to any person who is excluded from the definition of the term "debt collector" under the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). — Ala. Code § 40-12-80 (Acts 1935, No. 194 … Act 2001-454, p. 595, §1)

There is no application, no regulator, no character-and-fitness review, no bond, no examination and no revocation power attached to it. It is paid to the county probate judge / license commissioner or the Department of Revenue, and a county surcharge equal to 50% of the state amount rides on top:

(a) Before any person, firm, or corporation shall engage in or carry on any business or do any act for which a license by law is required, he, they, or it, except as otherwise provided, shall pay to the judge of probate of the county in which it is proposed to engage in or carry on such business … the amount required for such license … (c) Whenever a license is levied in this title, there shall be collected both a state and county license for each place of business, except as specifically otherwise provided. (e) There is hereby levied for the use and benefit of and to be paid to the county in which the license is issued, in addition to all license taxes levied under the provisions of Article 2 of this chapter … a sum equal to 50 percent of the amount levied for state purposes … — Ala. Code § 40-12-2

Non-payment is nevertheless a crime:

(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to engage in or carry on any business, or do any act for which a license is required now or may hereafter be by law, without having first paid for and taken out a license therefor in the manner in this title provided. Any person who is convicted of failing to take out and pay for the license required shall be fined not less than the amounts of all licenses required of him and, if convicted for refusing to take out the license shall, on conviction, be fined not less than the amount of the state and county license due by him and not more than $100 in addition thereto, and may be sentenced to hard labor for the county for not more than six months … — Ala. Code § 40-12-9(a)

Structural proof that no collection-agency license exists. Verified two ways against the Legislature's own full-text search rather than by a negative citation:

• A full-text search of the entire Code of Alabama for the phrase "debt collector" returns exactly one section — § 40-12-80, the tax provision quoted above. There is no other occurrence anywhere in the Code.
• A search for "collection agency" returns 38 sections; apart from § 40-12-80, every one is a tax-collection provision (county sales-tax administration under Title 45, and § 12-17-225.7 on district attorneys contracting out worthless-check collection). None licenses consumer debt collectors.
• Title 34 (Professions and Businesses), pulled in full from the official codeOfAlabamaTitles outline, runs … Ch. 5 Barbers · Ch. 5A Behavior Analysts · Ch. 6 Billiard Rooms · Ch. 7 Cosmetologists · Ch. 8 Contractors · Ch. 8A Counselors · Ch. 8B Court Reporters · Ch. 9 Dentists … A collection-agency chapter would sit in that run. There is none, and no chapter anywhere in Title 34 covers debt collection.

Conduct — the ADTPA, and why it is a weak hook

The ADTPA contains no collection-specific prohibition. Its 27 enumerated practices (§ 8-19-5) are advertising, origin-of-goods, odometer, pyramid-scheme and telephone-fraud provisions; the only clause a collection claim can run on is the catch-all:

(27) Engaging in any other unconscionable, false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice in the conduct of trade or commerce. — Ala. Code § 8-19-5(27) (as amended by Act 2021-349, eff. 8/1/21)

Scope is broad on its face —

(14) TRADE or COMMERCE. Includes, but is not limited to, the advertising, buying, offering for sale, sale or distribution or performance of any service or goods, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value wherever situated and shall include any trade or commerce affecting the people of this state. — Ala. Code § 8-19-3(14)

— but the exemptions do most of the work:

Nothing in this chapter shall apply to: … (3) Any person or activity which is subject to the provisions of the Alabama Insurance Code, Title 27, as amended, or any bank or affiliate of a bank which is regulated by the State Banking Department of Alabama, the Comptroller of the Currency of the United States, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System … (4) Any violation of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq.); … (6) For purposes of this section, the burden of proving exemption from the provisions of this chapter shall be upon the person claiming the exemption. — Ala. Code § 8-19-7

Private right of action, with a 15-day pre-suit demand and a flat class-action ban:

(a) Any person who commits one or more of the acts or practices declared unlawful under this chapter and thereby causes monetary damage to a consumer … shall be liable to each consumer or other person for: (1) Any actual damages sustained by such consumer or person, or the sum of $100, whichever is greater; or (2) Up to three times any actual damages, in the court's discretion. … and (3) In the case of any successful action or counterclaim … the costs of the action or counterclaim, together with a reasonable attorney's fee. On a finding by the court that an action or counterclaim under this section was frivolous or brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment, the court shall award to the defendant … reasonable attorney's fees and costs. (e) At least 15 days prior to the filing of any action under this section, a written demand for relief, identifying the claimant and reasonably describing the unfair or deceptive act or practice relied upon and the injury suffered, shall be communicated to any prospective respondent … (f) A consumer or other person bringing an action under this chapter may not bring an action on behalf of a class. The limitation in this subsection is a substantive limitation … (g) Notwithstanding the limitation in subsection (f), only the office of the Attorney General or district attorney shall have the right and authority to bring action in a representative capacity … In any such representative action … the court shall not award minimum damages or treble damages, but recovery shall be limited to actual damages suffered by the person or persons, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs. — Ala. Code § 8-19-10

A short and unusual limitations period for the ADTPA claim itself:

No action may be brought under this chapter more than one year after the person bringing the action discovers or reasonably should have discovered the act or practice which is the subject of the action, but in no event may any action be brought under this chapter more than four years from the date of the transaction giving rise to the cause of action unless the contract or warranty is for more than three years. … — Ala. Code § 8-19-14

Election of remedies — the ADTPA and common-law fraud are mutually exclusive:

(a) The civil remedies provided herein and the civil remedies available at common law, by statute or otherwise, for fraud, misrepresentation, deceit, suppression of material facts or fraudulent concealment are mutually exclusive. An election to pursue the civil remedies prescribed in this chapter shall exclude and be a surrender of all other rights and remedies available at common law … — Ala. Code § 8-19-15(a)

Public enforcement. The AG or a district attorney may sue for injunctive relief (§ 8-19-8(a)), and — notably — may ask a court to "suspend or revoke any license or certificate authorizing that person to engage in business in this state" on a showing of "continuous and willful violations" (§ 8-19-8(c)). Civil penalties: up to $25,000 per violation for violating an injunction (§ 8-19-11(a)) and up to $2,000 per violation for knowing violations of § 8-19-5 (§ 8-19-11(b)), with a reasonable-procedures safe harbor at § 8-19-11(d).

Call frequency and call times — no state rule

There is no Alabama call-frequency cap and no Alabama call-time window. The nearest provision is criminal, and it expressly excludes ordinary business calls:

(b)(1) HARASSING COMMUNICATIONS. A person commits the crime of harassing communications if, with intent to harass or alarm another person, he or she does any of the following: a. Communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telegraph, mail, or any other form of written or electronic communication, in a manner likely to harass or cause alarm. b. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication. c. Telephones another person and addresses to or about such other person any lewd or obscene words or language. Nothing in this section shall apply to legitimate business telephone communications. (2) Harassing communications is a Class C misdemeanor. — Ala. Code § 13A-11-8(b)

The Alabama Telemarketing Act (§ 8-19A) does not reach collection calls, because its trigger is a sales purpose:

(17) TELEMARKETING or TELEPHONE SOLICITATION. A voice communication over a telephone line for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or investment in property, goods, or services … — Ala. Code § 8-19A-3(17)

Wage garnishment — a flat 75% exemption

(a) The wages, salaries, or other compensation of laborers or employees, residents of this state, for personal services, shall be exempt from levy under writs of garnishment or other process for the collection of debts contracted or judgments entered in tort in an amount equal to 75 percent of such wages, salaries, or other compensation due or to become due to such laborers or employees, and the levy as to such percentage of their wages, salaries, or other compensation shall be void. … — Ala. Code § 6-10-7(a)

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• There is no Alabama collection statute. No license, no bond, no registration, no state prohibited-practices list, no mini-Miranda, no state validation rules, no time-barred-debt disclosure. For collection conduct, the FDCPA and Reg F are simultaneously the floor and the ceiling in Alabama.
• The "entry gate" is a tax stamp. § 40-12-80 is a privilege license tax — $100 in a town/city of 20,000+, $25 below that, plus a 50% county add-on under § 40-12-2(e) — with no regulator and no conduct conditions. It should never be modeled as a licensing gate. It does, however, carry criminal exposure under § 40-12-9 for operating without it, and it tracks the FDCPA "debt collector" definition, so an entity outside 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (typically a first-party creditor collecting its own paper in its own name) owes nothing.
• Written and oral contracts both run six years. Alabama is one of the few states with no written/oral split: § 6-2-34(4) covers written promises not under seal and § 6-2-34(9) sweeps in every other "simple contract," which is where an oral agreement lands. (That an oral contract is a "simple contract" under (9) is the natural reading of the statutory text — no Alabama holding was pulled for it in this pass; treat as interpretation.)
• Anything under seal runs ten years (§ 6-2-33(1)), and Alabama's test is strict: the body of the instrument must recite an intention to seal (Crane v. Pringle).
• Negotiable notes run six years under § 7-3-118(a), from the stated or accelerated due date — not under § 6-2-34. Demand notes have no clock until demand, then six years, with a hard 10-year no-payment backstop (§ 7-3-118(b)).
• The credit-card answer is genuinely contested, and three years is the defensible default. § 6-2-37(1) gives an "open or unliquidated account" three years; § 6-2-34(5) gives a "stated or liquidated account" six. Oliver (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2014) reads a credit card as an open account on the plain meaning and doubts the account-stated theory fits card debt at all. But In re Jones (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2015) accepted that rendering a statement and receiving no objection converts an open account into an account stated, and placed the burden of proving "open account" on the debtor. Both are federal bankruptcy courts; no Alabama appellate holding squarely resolving credit cards was located. This is a labeled interpretation, not settled law.
• Open accounts have their own accrual anchor. § 6-2-37(1) runs "from the date of the last item of the account or from the time when, by contract or usage, the account is due" — a statutory rule, and a different anchor from the general accrual rule in § 6-2-30(a).
• Revival is time-sensitive in a way most models get wrong. Under § 6-2-16 a partial payment removes the bar only if made before the limitations period has already run. A payment made after expiry does nothing (In re Jones; Chapman v. Barnes). After expiry the only route is an "unconditional promise in writing signed by the party to be charged," and Alabama reads that strictly — acknowledging the debt, its amount, a willingness to pay, and proposing a payment plan was held not to be an unconditional promise.
• The ADTPA is a poor collection hook in both directions. No collection-specific prohibition (only the § 8-19-5(27) catch-all), no class actions (§ 8-19-10(f)), a 15-day pre-suit demand (§ 8-19-10(e)), a one-year-from-discovery / four-year-outside limitations period (§ 8-19-14), election of remedies against common-law fraud (§ 8-19-15), and a reasonable-procedures safe harbor against penalties (§ 8-19-11(d)). Upside for a plaintiff is $100 minimum, discretionary treble damages and fees.
• No call cap, no call window, no state medical-debt rule. Reg F's 7-in-7 presumption and the FDCPA's 8am–9pm rule govern unmodified.

Traps / edge cases

• Do not model the § 40-12-80 privilege license as a licensing gate. It has no regulator, no approval step, and no revocation. Treating Alabama as a "licensed state" in a matrix is wrong in kind; treating it as "no requirement at all" misses a criminal exposure under § 40-12-9. It is a tax registration row, payable per county / per place of business (§ 40-12-2(c)), which means a multi-office Alabama operation owes it more than once.
• The 3-vs-6 credit-card split is a burden-allocation problem, not a lookup. In re Jones put the burden on the debtor to prove the account was open. A calculator that prints a flat "3 years — time-barred" for an Alabama card may be telling a user a claim is dead that a court would treat as live at six years on an account-stated theory — and the reverse error (printing 6) risks encouraging suit on paper Oliver would call stale. Alabama needs a contested-range output, not a number.
• The account-stated theory has an evidentiary price. Per Oliver, a good-faith account-stated claim needs the underlying cardholder agreement, proof the closed and stated account was rendered to the debtor, and the assignment chain. A debt buyer without that file cannot honestly claim the six-year period.
• Post-expiry payments revive nothing — and this is the exact inverse of the default model. Systems that set "SOL clock = last payment date" unconditionally will silently re-age dead Alabama paper. The rule is two-state: before expiry a partial payment restarts the clock; after expiry it is legally inert.
• A written payment arrangement is probably not an "unconditional promise." Chapman v. Barnes rejected letters that acknowledged the debt, stated the amount, expressed willingness to pay, and proposed how. Do not treat a signed hardship/settlement letter on out-of-stat Alabama paper as reviving it without counsel.
• § 8-19-7(4) appears to carve FDCPA violations out of the ADTPA entirely. The exemption covers "[a]ny violation of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §1601 et seq.)," and the FDCPA is Title VIII of that Act — 15 U.S.C. § 1692 is codified from "Pub. L. 90–321, title VIII, §802, as added Pub. L. 95–109, Sept. 20, 1977" (uscode.house.gov). Labeled interpretation: no Alabama decision applying § 8-19-7(4) to a collection claim was located. It is a defense worth attorney review, not a rule to rely on. § 8-19-7(3) separately exempts banks regulated by the State Banking Department, OCC, FDIC or the Federal Reserve — so a first-party bank creditor is outside the ADTPA regardless.
• The 10-year seal track is live for old paper. Retail-installment contracts, notes and security instruments that recite a seal in the body get ten years, not six. A tool offering only 3/6 will call such a debt time-barred with years left to run.
• § 6-2-10 tolling reads very broadly and was not narrowed here. Unlike Georgia's § 9-3-94, no Alabama case narrowing § 6-2-10 to cases where service was impossible was retrieved in this pass. UNVERIFIED — do not apply automatic tolling for out-of-state Alabama debtors without counsel, and do not assume the broad reading either.
• § 6-2-17 imports a foreign bar. If the contract was made or the act done in another state while the debtor lived there, that state's expired limitations period bars the Alabama suit too. For a national portfolio this is a genuine defense, and it runs in the debtor's favor.
• The ADTPA's own SOL is one year from discovery, capped at four years from the transaction (§ 8-19-14) — much shorter than the limitations period on the underlying debt. Together with the flat class-action ban, it caps Alabama state-law exposure well below FDCPA class risk.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md — the operative conduct rules in Alabama, since the state supplies none
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md — 7-in-7 governs unmodified in AL
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md — AL has no state time-barred disclosure
• ./ga.md — closest analogue: no collection statute, no license, SOL is the whole story; contrast Georgia's written-revival rule with Alabama's timing-based § 6-2-16
• ./tx.md — contrast: TX bars debt-buyer suit and forbids revival outright; AL allows revival but only pre-expiry by payment or post-expiry by unconditional writing
• ./_matrix.md