Mississippi — no collection statute, no license; a flat 3-year SOL that **extinguishes the debt**

Authority

Mississippi has no mini-FDCPA, no collection-agency licensing or registration, no bond, no call cap, no call-time window, no validation overlay, and no time-barred-debt disclosure. It goes further than most silent states: § 97-29-45, the criminal telephone-harassment statute that would otherwise be the one state hook on collection calls, expressly exempts calls covered by the FDCPA. Federal law is not merely the floor in Mississippi — for third-party collectors it is close to the whole of the conduct rules.

What Mississippi does have, and what makes it one of the most collector-hostile SOL states in the country, is Title 15 chapter 1:

1. A flat three-year limitations period on essentially all consumer debt — § 15-1-49(1) (catch-all) and § 15-1-29 (open/stated accounts and unwritten contracts). There is no longer written-contract period to fall back on.
2. § 15-1-3(1): expiry extinguishes the right, not just the remedy. The debt itself ceases to exist. Mississippi is one of a handful of states (with NY, TX, WI) where this is true.
3. A six-year period for notes only — § 75-3-118(a) (negotiable) and § 15-1-81 (nonnegotiable, added 2010, effective 2012). This is the single place the flat 3 does not apply.
4. Judgments at seven years (§ 15-1-43), renewable — but a foreign judgment against a person who is a Mississippi resident when suit is filed gets three (§ 15-1-45).

Conduct enforcement, such as it is, runs through the Mississippi Consumer Protection Act (§ 75-24-1 et seq.), whose general unfairness clause is Attorney-General-only by its own terms.

Verification note — read before relying on a quote

Mississippi's official Code of 1972 is published only through LexisNexis; there is no Mississippi equivalent of Texas's tcss.legis.texas.gov file server, and the old free mscode.com mirror is dead (404 live and in Internet Archive captures). Every quote on this page was therefore pulled from one of two official Mississippi state publishers:

• billstatus.ls.state.ms.us — the Mississippi Legislature's own bill/session-law server. It reproduces code sections verbatim, either as enacted (…SG.htm, "As Sent to Governor") or under the Legislature's "brought forward as follows" device, which prints the section's then-current text unaltered. Its TLS chain is incomplete, so automated fetch fails with "unable to verify the first certificate" — fetch with curl -k. For a bill that amends a section, inserted text is wrapped in <u> tags and deletions are printed as * * *; the current text is what remains after stripping <u> content. Where a quote below came from an amending bill, the page says so and the <u> spans were stripped.
• courts.ms.gov — the Mississippi Judiciary's official opinion server, for sections no bill in the searchable era reproduces (§§ 15-1-29, 15-1-43, 15-1-45, 15-1-73, 75-3-118). Fetches cleanly with curl; opinion text extracted with pdftotext -layout.

Currency method. billstatus exposes a per-code-section index at https://billstatus.ls.state.ms.us/<year>/pdf/code_sections/<TTT>/<CCCCSSSS>.xml, listing every bill in that session touching the section (200 = touched, 404 = untouched). Checked for the 2016, 2018, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025 and 2026 sessions: §§ 15-1-3, 15-1-73, 15-1-81 and 75-3-118 were untouched in every one; § 15-1-29 was touched only by HB291 (2018, Died In Committee); § 15-1-49 only by bills that all died (HB1257/2016, HB1162/2024 Died On Calendar, SB2318/2025 Died In Committee). The 2025 squatters act (HB1200) as introduced would have appended a sentence to § 15-1-3(2), but the enacted version (HB1200SG.htm) drops the § 15-1-3 amendment entirely. So the § 15-1-3 text below is current.

UNVERIFIED items are listed in Traps / edge cases; the two that matter are the absence-from-state tolling statute and the precise amendment date of § 15-1-3.

Operative text

Entry gate — there is none (verified negative)

The Mississippi Department of Banking and Consumer Finance's Consumer Finance Division publishes the complete list of license types it issues. Collection agencies are not on it:

Money Transmitter — Money Transmitters Act 75-15-1, et seq. · Consumer Loan Broker — Consumer Loan Broker Act 81-19-1, et seq. · Insurance Premium Finance — Insurance Premium Finance Law 81-21-1, et seq. · Small Loan — Small Loan Regulatory Law 75-67-101, et seq. · Motor Vehicle Sales Finance — Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Law 63-19-1, et seq. · Pawnbroker — Mississippi Pawnshop Act 75-67-301, et seq. · Title Pledge — Mississippi Title Pledge Act 75-67-401, et seq. · Check Casher — Mississippi Check Cashers Act 75-67-501, et seq. · Debt Management Service Provider — Mississippi Debt Management Services Act 81-22-1, et seq. · Credit Availability — Mississippi Credit Availability Act 75-67-601, et seq. — DBCF, Consumer Finance Division licence roster, dbcf.ms.gov/consumer-finance/

The one adjacent regime, the Debt Management Services Act (ch. 81-22 — credit counselling and debt-settlement providers, $50,000 bond, DBCF-licensed), affirmatively forbids its licensees from collecting:

81-22-19. A debt management service provider may not: … (d) Debt collector. Operate as a debt collector in this state; … — Miss. Code § 81-22-19(d), brought forward verbatim by HB1265, 2026 Reg. Sess. (As Sent to Governor), eff. July 1, 2026

The negative is also verified from the legislative record. A "Mississippi Consumer Collection Practices Act" — which would have created exactly the missing registration-plus-prohibited- practices regime — has been introduced in at least six sessions and has never passed:

AN ACT TO CREATE THE "MISSISSIPPI CONSUMER COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT"; TO DEFINE CERTAIN TERMS; TO REQUIRE REGISTRATION OF CONSUMER COLLECTION AGENCIES ENGAGING IN BUSINESS IN MISSISSIPPI; TO PROHIBIT CERTAIN PRACTICES BY CONSUMER COLLECTION AGENCIES WHEN COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS; … — SB2259, 2011 Reg. Sess.: "1 01/10 (S) Referred To Business and Financial Institutions;Judiciary, Division A · 2 02/01 (S) Died In Committee". Identical bill SB2420, 2012 Reg. Sess.: "2 03/06 (S) Died In Committee". Same act also introduced as SB2347 (1997), SB2194 (2003), SB2187 (2007), SB2473 (2010).

Conduct — § 97-29-45 and its FDCPA carve-out

Mississippi's only telephone-conduct statute is criminal, and subsection (5) removes debt collectors from it:

97-29-45. (1) It shall be unlawful for any person or persons: (a) To make any comment, request, suggestion or proposal by means of telecommunication or electronic communication which is obscene, lewd or lascivious with intent to abuse, threaten or harass any party to a telephone conversation, telecommunication or electronic communication; (b) To make a telecommunication or electronic communication with intent to terrify, intimidate or harass, and threaten to inflict injury or physical harm to any person or to his property; (c) To make a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, without disclosing his identity and with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass any person at the called number; (d) To make or cause the telephone of another repeatedly or continuously to ring, with intent to harass any person at the called number; (e) To make repeated telephone calls, during which conversation ensues, solely to harass any person at the called number; or (f) Knowingly to permit a computer or a telephone of any type under his control to be used for any purpose prohibited by this section. … (5) The provisions of this section do not apply to a person or persons who make a telephone call that would be covered by the provisions of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 USCS Section 1692 et seq. — Miss. Code § 97-29-45(1), (5), reproduced in SB2324, 2025 Reg. Sess. (bill Died In Committee; <u> insertions stripped, so the text above is current law)

Penalties for a non-exempt violator: ≤$500 / ≤6 months for a first offense, ≤$1,000 / ≤1 year for a second within five years, felony with ≤$2,000 / ≤2 years for a third (§ 97-29-45(2)–(4)).

Call frequency and call-time window — none

No Mississippi statute caps collection-call frequency or restricts calling hours. Nothing in the DBCF roster, ch. 81-22, ch. 75-24, or § 97-29-45 does so, and no collection statute exists to house such a rule. Reg F's 7-in-7 presumption and the FDCPA/Reg F 8am–9pm window are the operative limits in Mississippi. (Negative established by the same method as the entry gate: the DBCF roster, the failed CCPA bills, and § 97-29-45's FDCPA carve-out — there is no state instrument to carry a cap.)

Statute of limitations — the flat three years

The catch-all, and the reason Mississippi has no long written-contract period:

15-1-49. (1) All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. (2) In actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involve latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. (3) The provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall apply to all pending and subsequently filed actions. — Miss. Code § 15-1-49, brought forward verbatim by HB1162, 2024 Reg. Sess. (As Passed the House), § 3

Open accounts, stated accounts and unwritten contracts — also three:

Except as otherwise provided in the Uniform Commercial Code, actions on an open account or account stated not acknowledged in writing, signed by the debtor, and on any unwritten contract, express or implied, shall be commenced within three (3) years next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after, except that an action based on an unwritten contract of employment shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the cause of such action accrued, and not after. — Miss. Code § 15-1-29 (Rev. 2003), quoted verbatim in Kersey v. Fernald, No. 2004-CA-01297-COA (Miss. Ct. App.), ¶ 8

The same opinion states the practical consequence for a consumer-debt claim, which is why the open-account/catch-all fight that matters in other states is a non-issue here:

Under either Mississippi Code Annotated Section 15-1-29 or 15-1-49, the statute of limitations does not allow for recovery on claims filed more than three years after the cause of action accrued. — ibid., ¶ 8

Notes — six years, not three

Negotiable instruments run on Mississippi's UCC 3-118:

Except as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six (6) years after the accelerated due date. — Miss. Code § 75-3-118(a) (Rev. 2016), quoted verbatim in Rhea v. Career General Agency, Inc., No. 2021-CA-00580-COA (Miss. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2022), ¶ 16

Mississippi then closed the gap that non-negotiable paper would otherwise fall through, enacting a parallel six-year statute in 2010 (effective 2012) and saying in terms that the two should match:

15-1-81. Actions on nonnegotiable promissory notes. (1) An action to enforce the obligations of a party to pay a nonnegotiable promissory note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the promissory note, or if a due date is accelerated, within six (6) years after the accelerated date. (2) If demand for payment is made to the maker of a nonnegotiable promissory note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the promissory note must be commenced within six (6) years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the promissory note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the promissory note has been paid for a continuous period of ten (10) years. (3) For purposes of this section, a "nonnegotiable promissory note" is an unconditional written undertaking to pay absolutely and in any event a fixed amount of money signed by the person undertaking to pay the money that is not an "instrument" under Section 75-3-104(b). Nonnegotiable promissory notes for purposes of this section include, but are not limited to, promissory notes that: (a) bear a variable rate of interest or provide for interest by reference to information not contained in the promissory note; (b) provide for interest after default; (c) are nonrecourse to the person undertaking to pay the money; or (d) qualify as "instruments" under Section 75-9-102(a)(47). (4) This section shall not apply to negotiable promissory notes, drafts, checks, certificates of deposit or any other instrument or item for which Section 75-3-118 provides the applicable statute of limitations. Neither a lease nor a security agreement is a promissory note for purposes of this section. A promissory note is not … writings that evidence a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card. It is the intention of this section that a "note," as defined in Section 75-3-104(e), and nonnegotiable promissory notes, as defined in this section, shall have the same statutes of limitations. (5) This section shall not apply to obligations arising from retail installment contracts. For purposes of this section, a "retail installment contract" is a contract for the sale of goods under which the buyer makes periodic payments and the seller retains a security interest in the goods. … (6) This section takes effect on July 1, 2012, and shall apply to all nonnegotiable promissory notes for which the statute of limitations in effect immediately prior to that date has not run. This section shall have no application to promissory notes for which the statute of limitations has run prior to July 1, 2012. — Miss. Code § 15-1-81, as enacted by SB2419, 2010 Reg. Sess. (As Sent to Governor), § 2

Note the two express carve-outs in (4) and (5): credit-card receivables and retail installment contracts are NOT notes in Mississippi. Card debt goes back to the three-year bucket.

Judgments — seven years, but three against a Mississippi resident

All actions founded on any judgment or decree rendered by any court of record in this state, shall be brought within seven years next after the rendition of such judgment or decree, and not after, and an execution shall not issue on any judgment or decree after seven years from the date of the judgment or decree. — Miss. Code § 15-1-43 (1995), quoted verbatim in Trustmark National Bank v. Pike County National Bank, No. 97-CA-00184-SCT (Miss. June 18, 1998), ¶ 29

A judgment may be renewed before it expires, which resets the seven years:

a judgment may be renewed, so long as "the existing judgment or decree has not expired," and the seven-year time clock is reset since "the lien of the renewal of such judgment continues from the date of the enrollment of the existing judgment." Miss. Code Ann. § 15-1-43. — Unifund CCR Partners v. Estate of Frances Jordan, No. 2021-CA-00761-COA (Miss. Ct. App. May 17, 2022), ¶ 19

Foreign judgments are the trap:

All actions founded on any judgment or decree rendered by any court of record without this state shall be brought within seven years after the rendition of such judgment or decree, and not after. However, if the person against whom such judgment or decree was or shall be rendered, was, or shall be at the time of the institution of the action, a resident of the state, such action, founded on such judgment or decree, shall be commenced within three years next after the rendition thereof, and not after. — Miss. Code § 15-1-45 (Rev. 2019), quoted verbatim in Coleman v. WGST, LLC, No. 2019-CA-01740-COA (Miss. Ct. App.), ¶ 7

Extinguishment and revival — § 15-1-3 and § 15-1-73

This is the section that makes Mississippi different in kind, not degree:

15-1-3. (1) The completion of the period of limitation prescribed to bar any action, shall defeat and extinguish the right as well as the remedy. However, the former legal obligation shall be a sufficient consideration to uphold a new promise based thereon. (2) In any case founded on a debt, when any part of the debt shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same shall have been made, the statute of limitations not having run, an action may be brought in such case within the period prescribed for the same, with the said period to begin after such payment, acknowledgment or promise. — Miss. Code § 15-1-3(1)–(2), reproduced verbatim in HB1200, 2025 Reg. Sess. (As Introduced), § 7 (the bill's <u>-marked squatters sentence is stripped; the enacted HB1200 dropped the § 15-1-3 amendment entirely — see the Verification note)

Any acknowledgment or promise that is to have limitations effect must be written and signed:

In actions founded upon any contract, an acknowledgment or promise shall not be evidence of a new or continuing contract whereby to take any case out of the operation of the provisions of this chapter or to deprive any party of the benefit thereof, unless such acknowledgment or promise be made or contained by or in some writing signed by the party chargeable thereby. Where there shall be two or more joint contractors, one or more of them shall not lose the benefit of the provisions of this chapter so as to be chargeable, by reason only of an acknowledgment or promise made or signed by any other or others of them. In actions against joint contractors, if the plaintiff be barred as to one or more of the defendants but be entitled to recover against any other or others of them, by virtue of a new acknowledgment or promise, or otherwise, judgment shall be given for the plaintiff as to any of the defendants against whom he is entitled to recover, and for the other defendants against the plaintiff. — Miss. Code § 15-1-73 (Rev. 1995), quoted verbatim in Smith v. Star Services, Inc. of Delaware, No. 94-CA-00335-COA (Miss. Ct. App. July 1, 1997). Caveat: that opinion is marked "NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION AND MAY NOT BE CITED, PURSUANT TO M.R.A.P. 35-B" — it is used here only as an official Mississippi Judiciary reproduction of the statutory text, never as precedent. No published Mississippi opinion reproducing § 15-1-73 in full was located; re-verify the text against the official Code when a Lexis session is available.

Borrowing statute — § 15-1-65

When a cause of action has accrued outside of this state, and by the laws of the place outside this state where such cause of action accrued, an action thereon cannot be maintained by reason of lapse of time, then no action thereon shall be maintained in this state; provided, however, that where such a cause of action has accrued in favor of a resident of this state, this state's law on the period of limitation shall apply. — Miss. Code § 15-1-65 (Rev. 2019), quoted verbatim in Coleman v. WGST, LLC, No. 2019-CA-01740-COA (Miss. Ct. App.), ¶ 13

Consumer Protection Act — AG-first by design

The general unfairness clause routes enforcement to the Attorney General on its face:

75-24-5. (1) Unfair methods of competition affecting commerce and unfair or deceptive trade practices in or affecting commerce are prohibited. Action may be brought under Section 75-24-5(1) only under the provisions of Section 75-24-9. (2) Without limiting the scope of subsection (1) of this section, the following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive trade practices or acts in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby prohibited: (a) Passing off goods or services as those of another; … (q) Violating any of the provisions of Sections 1 through 7 of this act. — Miss. Code § 75-24-5, as amended by HB1126, 2024 Reg. Sess. (As Sent to Governor), § 8, eff. July 1, 2024. None of § 75-24-5(2)(a)–(q)'s enumerated practices addresses debt collection.

75-24-9. Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person is using, has used, or is about to use any method, act or practice prohibited by Section 75-24-5, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, he may bring an action in the name of the state against such person to restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use of such method, act or practice. The action shall be brought in the chancery or county court of the county in which such person resides or has his principal place of business, or, with consent of the parties, may be brought in the chancery or county court of the county in which the State Capitol is located. … — Miss. Code § 75-24-9, brought forward verbatim by HB1123, 2023 Reg. Sess. (As Introduced), § 12

75-24-11. The court may make such additional orders or judgments, including restitution, as may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any monies or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of any practice prohibited by this chapter, including the appointment of a receiver or the revocation of a license or certificate authorizing that person to engage in business in this state, or both. — Miss. Code § 75-24-11, brought forward verbatim by HB1123, 2023 Reg. Sess., § 13

The private right of action is narrow, gated, and class-action-proof:

75-24-15. (1) In addition to all other statutory and common law rights, remedies and defenses, any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by the seller, lessor, manufacturer or producer of a method, act or practice prohibited by Section 75-24-5 may bring an action at law in the court having jurisdiction in the county in which the seller, lessor, manufacturer or producer resides, or has his principal place of business or, where the act or practice prohibited by Section 75-24-5 allegedly occurred, … (2) In any private action brought under this chapter, the plaintiff must have first made a reasonable attempt to resolve any claim through an informal dispute settlement program approved by the Attorney General. (3) In any action or counterclaim under this section of this chapter, a prevailing defendant may recover in addition to any other relief that may be provided in this section costs and a reasonable attorney's fee, if in the opinion of the court, said action or counterclaim was frivolous or filed for the purpose of harassment or delay. (4) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to permit any class action or suit, but every private action must be maintained in the name of and for the sole use and benefit of the individual person. — Miss. Code § 75-24-15, brought forward verbatim by HB1123, 2023 Reg. Sess., § 15. SB2784 (2025) and SB2362 (2026) would have deleted the (2) exhaustion requirement; SB2362 Died In Committee 02/10/26, so (2) remains law.

Civil penalties are AG-side only:

75-24-19. (1) Civil remedies. (a) Any person who violated the terms of an injunction issued under Section 75-24-9 shall forfeit and pay to the state a civil penalty in a sum not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) per violation … (b) In any action brought under Section 75-24-9, if the court finds from clear and convincing evidence, that a person knowingly and willfully used any unfair or deceptive trade practice, method or act prohibited by Section 75-24-5, the Attorney General, upon petition to the court, may recover on behalf of the state a civil penalty in a sum not to exceed Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) per violation. … The Attorney General may also recover, in addition to any other relief that may be provided in this section, investigative costs and a reasonable attorney's fee. — Miss. Code § 75-24-19(1), brought forward verbatim by HB1123, 2023 Reg. Sess., § 17

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• Nothing to license, register, or bond. A third-party agency can work Mississippi paper without a state credential. The only DBCF-licensed adjacent business, a debt management service provider, is forbidden to collect (§ 81-22-19(d)).
• Conduct = FDCPA/Reg F, full stop. Mississippi wrote debt collectors out of its own harassment crime (§ 97-29-45(5)). There is no state overlay on frequency, hours, validation, disclosures, or fees. Reg F's 7-in-7 and 8am–9pm are the operative rules.
• Three years on everything consumer, six on notes only. Credit cards, retail installment paper, medical bills, open accounts, and written consumer contracts are all three years — § 15-1-81(4)–(5) says card receivables and retail installment contracts are not notes, so they cannot borrow the six. Only a real promissory note, negotiable or not, gets six.
• When the three years run, the debt is gone — not just unsuable. § 15-1-3(1) extinguishes the right. This is a substantive death, not a procedural defence, and it is why Mississippi belongs in the no-revival group.
• But "no revival" needs splitting into two rules, and they are different rules:
  • Before expiry: § 15-1-3(2) restarts the full three (or six) years from a part payment, an acknowledgment, or a promise to pay. Mississippi is an aggressive re-aging state while the clock is alive. Under § 15-1-73 an acknowledgment or promise counts only if it is in writing signed by the debtor — but note that § 15-1-3(2) lists part payment separately from acknowledgment and promise, so a bare payment appears to restart the clock without any writing.
  • After expiry: the right is extinguished, so there is nothing to revive. § 15-1-3(1)'s second sentence still allows the dead obligation to serve as consideration for a new promise — that creates a fresh contract, not a revived old one, and § 15-1-73 requires it to be written and signed. A phone call, a recorded "I'll pay," or a post-expiry payment does not resurrect the barred debt.
• The MCPA is not a collections remedy. § 75-24-5(1) is AG-only by its own text; the private action in § 75-24-15 reaches only buyers/lessees suing a "seller, lessor, manufacturer or producer" — a debt collector is none of those — and even then the plaintiff must first attempt an AG-approved informal dispute settlement, and no class action is permitted.
• Judgments: seven years, renewable before expiry. A sister-state judgment enrolled against someone who is a Mississippi resident when the enforcement action is filed drops to three.

Traps / edge cases

• Notes-collapse (the big data bug). Mississippi looks like a flat-3 state and is not: § 75-3-118(a) and § 15-1-81 both give six years for notes. A three-year figure for notes is wrong.
• § 15-1-81's effective-date fence. It "shall have no application to promissory notes for which the statute of limitations has run prior to July 1, 2012." Very old nonnegotiable paper that was already time-barred under the old three-year rule did not get resurrected by the 2010 act — consistent with § 15-1-3(1), which had already extinguished it.
• Demand notes have no clock until demand, then six years — with an absolute ten-year no-payment backstop (§ 75-3-118(b) and § 15-1-81(2)).
• Pre-expiry re-aging is real and is the opposite of the post-expiry rule. Treating Mississippi as simply "no revival" will under-count the limitations period on live accounts where a payment or a signed acknowledgment has occurred. The two rules must be modelled separately.
• Part payment vs. acknowledgment. § 15-1-3(2) restarts on "any part of the debt … paid" without the § 15-1-73 writing requirement on its face, while acknowledgments and promises need a signed writing. Interpretation, not statute text — the interaction of § 15-1-3(2) and § 15-1-73 on bare part payment is not resolved on the face of either section. Attorney review before automating a payment-triggered re-age.
• Unwritten employment contracts get one year, not three (§ 15-1-29) — relevant only if an agency ever places wage/commission claims.
• Foreign-judgment residents get three years, not seven (§ 15-1-45). A judgment-enforcement product that hard-codes seven for out-of-state judgments will be wrong for every Mississippi-resident debtor.
• The borrowing statute cuts both ways (§ 15-1-65): a claim that accrued elsewhere and is dead there is dead in Mississippi, unless it accrued in favour of a Mississippi resident, in which case Mississippi's own (short) periods apply.
• § 97-29-45's FDCPA carve-out is not a safe harbour for first-party creditors. The exemption is for calls "covered by the provisions of the federal [FDCPA]." An original creditor collecting its own debt is generally outside the FDCPA's "debt collector" definition, so whether its calls are "covered" is genuinely open. Interpretation / UNVERIFIED — no Mississippi authority located construing § 97-29-45(5) as to first-party callers. First-party clients working Mississippi should not assume the carve-out protects them.
• UNVERIFIED — absence-from-state tolling. Mississippi is generally understood to toll limitations while a defendant is absent from the state, but no official text of the governing section (commonly cited as § 15-1-63) could be located through either the legislature's bill server or the judiciary's opinion server. Excluded rather than guessed. Do not model absence tolling for MS until this is verified.
• UNVERIFIED — § 15-1-3's amendment date. The section is unamended across the 2016–2026 sessions (verified by the code-section index), but the date subsection (2) entered the code was not established from an official source. effective_date on this page is therefore pinned to § 75-24-5's 2024 amendment, the latest datable authority here.
• No time-barred-debt disclosure, no medical-debt statute, no debt-buyer statute. Searches of the legislature's bill server for 2025 and 2026 medical-debt / credit-reporting measures returned nothing enacted. Reg F § 1006.26 is the only time-barred-suit rule that applies in Mississippi.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md
• ./ga.md — the other "no collection statute, SOL is the whole story" state
• ./tx.md · ./_matrix.md