West Virginia — WVCCPA (ch. 46A, art. 2) + Collection Agency Act (ch. 47, art. 16) + SOL

Authority

West Virginia regulates collection conduct through the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act ("WVCCPA"), W. Va. Code ch. 46A. Its debt-collection provisions — §§46A-2-122 through 46A-2-129a — bind "any person or organization engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection" with no first-party creditor carve-out, and the remedies section itself is written against "a creditor or debt collector." Remedies are in art. 5 (private action, $1,000-per-violation penalty, CPI adjustment, fee-shifting, exclusive venue, a 45-day pre-suit right-to-cure). Enforcement is by the Attorney General's Consumer Protection and Antitrust Division (art. 7) and by private civil action (§46A-5-101).

The entry gate is separate and sits in the tax code: the Collection Agency Act of 1973, W. Va. Code ch. 47, art. 16, requires a business registration certificate from the State Tax Commissioner (which "shall be deemed the collection agency's license"), a $5,000 surety bond per office filed with the Tax Commissioner, and — unusually — a physical office inside West Virginia.

Statute of limitations for suit on a debt: §55-2-6 (10 years written / 5 years everything else), §46-3-118 for negotiable notes (five years — non-uniform, cut from six in 2024), revival by signed writing only under §55-2-8.

Verification note — source path and two traps

code.wvlegislature.gov is the Legislature's official code site and serves cleanly to a browser-UA curl (no WAF, no JS shell). Section pages follow https://code.wvlegislature.gov/<article-section>/ (e.g. /46A-2-125/). Everything quoted below was pulled from that host on 2026-08-12, with operative changes cross-checked against the Legislature's own enrolled signed-bill PDFs at code.wvlegislature.gov/signed_bills/<year>/<file>.pdf and the bill-status system at www.wvlegislature.gov/bill_status/.

Two things worth recording for the next verification:

1. The code site supports exact-phrase full-Code search — ?s=%22<phrase>%22&q=all (the q=all parameter is required; without it the search silently scopes to no chapter and returns 0). Unquoted queries are OR-matched and cap at 200 junk results, so they are useless; quoted queries are reliable. This is the method used for the verified negatives below. Sanity-checked against a phrase known to exist ("deadbeat lists" → 3 hits, all correct).
2. The "Bill History" block on a section page lists bills that proposed to amend the section, not only those that passed. A section can show a recent bill and still be unamended. Enacted amendments are the ones that also carry a signed_bills/... PDF link. Both live examples are on this page (2025 SB 124 and 2026 HB 4382 — neither is law).

Operative text

Scope — §46A-2-122 (the WVCCPA reaches first-party creditors)

For the purposes of this section and sections one hundred twenty-three, one hundred twenty-four, one hundred twenty-five, one hundred twenty-six, one hundred twenty-seven, one hundred twenty-eight, one hundred twenty-nine and one hundred twenty-nine-a of this article, the following terms shall have the following meanings: (a) "Consumer" means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt and includes any duly appointed personal representative of the estate of a natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt. (b) "Claim" means any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property, insurance or service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or household purposes, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment. (c) "Debt collection" means any action, conduct or practice of soliciting claims for collection or in the collection of claims owed or due or alleged to be owed or due by a consumer. (d) "Debt collector" means any person or organization engaging directly or indirectly in debt collection. The term includes any person or organization who sells or offers to sell forms which are, or are represented to be, a collection system, device or scheme, and are intended or calculated to be used to collect claims. The term excludes attorneys representing creditors provided the attorneys are licensed in West Virginia or otherwise authorized to practice law in the state of West Virginia and handling claims and collections in their own name as an employee, partner, member, shareholder or owner of a law firm and not operating a collection agency under the management of a person who is not a licensed attorney. — W. Va. Code §46A-2-122 (as amended by 2025 HB 3162, eff. July 11, 2025)

The definition has no "originally owed to another" limitation — the FDCPA's structural exclusion of creditors collecting their own debts has no counterpart here. The remedies section confirms the reach on its face:

(1) If a creditor or debt collector has violated the provisions of this chapter applying to … any prohibited debt collection practice … — W. Va. Code §46A-5-101(1) (emphasis added)

"Claim" is also not limited to credit. It covers any consumer obligation "arising out of a transaction … primarily for personal, family or household purposes" — so medical bills, utility arrears, and retail balances are inside the conduct rules even though no credit was extended. The 2025 amendment added the personal-representative clause, so the estate of a deceased consumer is a "consumer" and the cause of action survives death.

Only one carve-out applies to the conduct rules: attorneys licensed in WV handling claims in their own name and not fronting a lay-managed collection agency.

Chapter-level exclusions — §46A-1-105

(a) This chapter does not apply to: (1) Extensions of credit to government or governmental agencies or instrumentalities; (2) The sale of insurance by an insurer, except as otherwise provided in this chapter; (3) The obligation of a property owner, lot owner, or homeowner in a planned community containing no more than 12 units which is not subject to any development rights or a planned community that provides in its declaration that the annual average common expense liability of all units restricted to residential purposes, exclusive of optional user fees and any insurance premiums paid by the association, may not exceed $300 as adjusted pursuant to §36B-1-114 of this code, or the efforts of property owners' associations or homeowners' associations to collect the same to pay dues, assessments, costs, or fees of any kind to a property owners' association or homeowners' association; (4) Transactions under public utility or common carrier tariffs if a subdivision or agency of this state or of the United States regulates the charges for the services involved, the charges for delayed payment, and any discount allowed for early payment; or (5) Licensed pawnbrokers. — W. Va. Code §46A-1-105(a)

Two of these matter operationally: small-HOA assessment collection is outside the whole chapter (subdiv. (3)), and tariffed utility charges are outside it where the charges are rate-regulated (subdiv. (4)).

Entry gate — Collection Agency Act of 1973 (ch. 47, art. 16)

The article is short — §§47-16-1 through 47-16-5, confirmed complete from the official article index. Who needs the license:

(b) "Collection agency" means and includes all persons, firms, corporations and associations: (1) Directly or indirectly engaged in the business of soliciting from or collecting for others any account, bill or indebtedness originally due or asserted to be owed or due another and all persons, firms, corporations and associations directly or indirectly engaged in asserting, enforcing or prosecuting those claims; (2) which, in attempting to collect or in collecting his or her or its own accounts or claims uses a fictitious name or names other than his or her or its own name; (3) which attempts to or does give away or sell to others any system or series of letters or forms for use in the collection of accounts or claims which assert or indicate directly or indirectly that the claims or accounts are being asserted or collected by any person, firm, corporation or association other than the creditor or owner of the claim or account; or (4) directly or indirectly engaged in the business of soliciting, or who holds himself or herself out as engaged in the business of soliciting, debts of any kind owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due, to any solicited person, firm, corporation or association for fee, commission or other compensation.

The term "collection agency" shall not mean or include: (1) Regular employees of a single creditor or of a collection agency licensed hereunder; (2) banks; (3) trust companies; (4) savings and loan associations; (5) building and loan associations; (6) industrial loan companies; (7) small loan companies; (8) abstract companies doing an escrow business; (9) duly licensed real estate brokers or agents when the claims or accounts being handled by such broker or agent are related to or in connection with such brokers' or agents' regular real estate business; (10) express and telegraph companies subject to public regulation and supervision; (11) attorneys-at-law handling claims and collections in their own names and not operating a collection agency under the management of a layman; (12) any person, firm, corporation or association acting under the order of any court of competent jurisdiction; or (13) any person collecting a debt owed to another person only where: (A) Both persons are related by wholly-owned, common ownership or affiliated by wholly-owned corporate control; (B) the person collecting the debt acts only on behalf of persons related as described in paragraph (A) of this subdivision; and (C) debt collection is not the principal business of the person collecting the debt. — W. Va. Code §47-16-2(b)

No person, firm, corporation or association shall establish or conduct within this state a collection agency except as authorized by this article. — W. Va. Code §47-16-3

The gate itself — license, bond, and an in-state office:

(a) License. -- No person, firm, corporation or association shall conduct within this state a collection agency without having first applied for and obtained a business franchise registration certificate pursuant to section two, article twelve, chapter eleven of this code, nor shall any person, firm, corporation or association establish or operate a collection agency or the business of a collection agency, unless such person, firm, corporation or association maintains an office within the State of West Virginia. The business franchise registration certificate shall be deemed the collection agency's license. A license is required for each collection agency, including each principal office and all branch offices thereof.

(b) Bond. -- Each applicant shall file with the commissioner a continuing surety bond executed by a corporation which is licensed to transact the business of fidelity and surety insurance in the State of West Virginia to run concurrently with the registration tax period, which bond must be filed with, and approved by, said commissioner before the license herein provided may be issued. A separate bond shall be filed for each collection agency including each principal office and all branch offices thereof. Each bond shall be in the amount of $5,000 payable to the State of West Virginia, and conditioned that any such person will pay all damages to the state or a private person resulting from any unlawful act or action by such person or his or its agent in connection with the conduct of the business of the collection agency. This continuing bond shall be filed with the Tax Commissioner. … The license of any licensee shall be void upon termination of the bond of the surety company, unless, prior to such termination, a new bond has been filed with the commissioner. — W. Va. Code §47-16-4(a)–(b) (emphasis added)

"Commissioner" is the tax authority, not a financial regulator:

(c) "Commissioner" means the State Tax Commissioner or his or her agent. — W. Va. Code §47-16-2(c)

Trust-account and remittance duties (§47-16-4(c)) are part of the same gate: separate bank trust account for customers' funds, no commingling, records kept six years from last entry and held at the in-state principal place of business, open to the Commissioner's inspection, and net proceeds remitted to the customer within 30 days after the close of each calendar month (deferrable up to 90 days only where the net is under $5 and monthly statements are sent).

The Act is still live and cross-referenced from the current tax code:

(a) Registration required. — No person shall, without a business registration certificate, engage in or prosecute, in the State of West Virginia, any business activity without first obtaining a business registration certificate from the Tax Commissioner of the State of West Virginia. Additionally, before beginning business in this state, such person: … (2) If a collection agency, shall comply with the provisions of §47-16-1 et seq. of this code. — W. Va. Code §11-12-3(a)

Cost and term of the certificate:

(b) Tax levied. — The business registration tax hereby levied shall be $15 for each annual business registration certificate: Provided, That for registration periods beginning on or after July 1, 1999, the business registration tax shall be $30, except as otherwise provided in this article: Provided, however, That after June 30, 2010, the business registration tax shall be $30.00 for each business registration certificate … (1) A separate business registration certificate is required for each fixed business location … — W. Va. Code §11-12-3(b)

… any certificate of registration granted on or after July 1, 2010, shall not be subject to the foregoing requirement that it be renewed, but shall be permanent until cessation of the business for which the certificate of registration was granted or until it is suspended, revoked or canceled by the Tax Commissioner. — W. Va. Code §11-12-5(a)

Penalty for operating without it:

(a) Any person, firm, corporation or association violating any of the provisions of this article shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $1,000. (b) Any person, firm, corporation or association violating any of the provisions of this article shall, in addition to any civil liability arising by virtue of such violation, also be civilly liable as otherwise provided by law. — W. Va. Code §47-16-5

Prohibited practices — §§46A-2-123 to 46A-2-129a

Six conduct sections, each a general prohibition followed by a non-exhaustive "the following conduct is deemed to violate this section" list. Quoted here are the provisions that add to or differ from federal law.

§46A-2-123 — practice of law by debt collectors (no federal analog):

Unless a licensed attorney in this state, no debt collector shall engage in conduct deemed the practice of law. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is deemed the practice of law: (a) The performance of legal services, furnishing of legal advice or false representation, direct or by implication, that any person is an attorney; (b) Any communication with consumers in the name of an attorney or upon stationery or other written matter bearing an attorney's name; and (c) Any demand for or payment of money constituting a share of compensation for services performed or to be performed by an attorney in collecting a claim. — W. Va. Code §46A-2-123

§46A-2-124 — threats or coercion. Note (c), which reaches credit-reporting conduct, and (e)(2), which requires an affirmative explanation whenever garnishment is mentioned:

(c) False accusations made to another person, including any credit reporting agency, that a consumer is willfully refusing to pay a just debt, or the threat to so make false accusations; (d) The threat to sell or assign to another the obligation of the consumer with an attending representation or implication that the result of such sale or assignment would be that the consumer would lose any defense to the claim or would be subjected to harsh, vindictive or abusive collection attempts; (e) The threat that nonpayment of an alleged claim will result in the: (1) Arrest of any person; or (2) Garnishment of any wages of any person or the taking of other action requiring judicial sanction, without informing the consumer that there must be in effect a judicial order permitting such garnishment or such other action before it can be taken; and (f) The threat to take any action prohibited by this chapter or other law regulating the debt collector's conduct. — W. Va. Code §46A-2-124

§46A-2-126 — unreasonable publication. Broader than FDCPA §1692c(b) in places (third-party disclosure to non-cohabiting relatives is enumerated) and narrower in others (a 2015 safe harbor for self-identification):

No debt collector shall unreasonably publicize information relating to any alleged indebtedness or consumer. For purposes of this section, a debt collector does not unreasonably publicize information relating to any alleged indebtedness by identifying themselves to the debtor by name, identifying the debt collector's employer by name, if expressly requested by the debtor, or by providing a telephone number or other contact information to the debtor. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is deemed to violate this section: (a) The communication to any employer or his agent before judgment has been rendered of any information relating to an employee's indebtedness other than through proper legal action, process or proceeding; (b) The disclosure, publication or communication of information relating to a consumer's indebtedness to any relative or family member of the consumer if such person is not residing with the consumer, except through proper legal action or process or at the express and unsolicited request of the relative or family member; (c) The disclosure, publication or communication of any information relating to a consumer's indebtedness to any other person other than a credit reporting agency, by publishing or posting any list of consumers, commonly known as "deadbeat lists", except lists to prevent the fraudulent use of credit accounts or credit cards, by advertising for sale any claim to enforce payment thereof, or in any manner other than through proper legal action, process or proceeding; and (d) The use of any form of communication to the consumer, which ordinarily may be seen by any other persons, that displays or conveys any information about the alleged claim other than the name, address and phone number of the debt collector.

Nothing in this chapter shall prohibit a creditor or debt collector from communicating with any person other than the consumer for the purpose of acquiring or confirming the consumer's location information provided they do so in a manner consistent with the provisions of 15 U. S. C. § 1692b, as the same may be amended from time to time. For purposes of this section, "communication" or "communicating" or any derivation of those terms shall not include the filing of a complaint or other document, pleading or filing with any court. — W. Va. Code §46A-2-126

§46A-2-127 — fraudulent, deceptive or misleading representations. Subsection (c) is a West-Virginia-specific disclosure obligation attached to every demand for money, and (g) is the fee-misrepresentation rule:

(c) The failure to clearly disclose the name and full business address of the person to whom the claim has been assigned for collection, or to whom the claim is owed, at the time of making any demand for money; … (g) Any representation that an existing obligation of the consumer may be increased by the addition of attorney's fees, investigation fees, service fees or any other fees or charges when in fact such fees or charges may not legally be added to the existing obligation; and (h) Any false representation or false impression about the status or true nature of or the services rendered by the debt collector or his business. — W. Va. Code §46A-2-127

§46A-2-129a — deceptive or oppressive telephone calls (added 1994 SB 36):

No debt collector shall place a telephone call or otherwise communicate by telephone with a consumer or third party, at any place, including a place of employment, falsely stating that the call is "urgent" or an "emergency". — W. Va. Code §46A-2-129a

§46A-2-129 additionally makes any written communication that "violates or fails to conform to United States postal laws and regulations" a per-se violation.

Call-frequency cap and call-time window — §46A-2-125(d)

West Virginia has an express numeric frequency cap in statute. This is the single biggest state-law overlay on the federal baseline:

No debt collector shall unreasonably oppress or abuse any person in connection with the collection of or attempt to collect any claim alleged to be due and owing by that person or another. Without limiting the general application of the foregoing, the following conduct is deemed to violate this section: (a) The use of profane or obscene language or language that is intended to unreasonably abuse the hearer or reader; (b) Engaging any person in telephone conversation without disclosure of the caller's identity and with the intent to annoy, harass or threaten any person at the called number; (c) Causing expense to any person in the form of long distance telephone tolls, telegram fees or other charges incurred by a medium of communication, by concealment of the true purpose of the communication; and (d) Calling any person more than thirty times per week or engaging any person in telephone conversation more than ten times per week, or at unusual times or at times known to be inconvenient, with intent to annoy, abuse, oppress or threaten any person at the called number. In determining whether a debt collector's conduct violates this section, the debt collector's conduct will be evaluated from the standpoint of a reasonable person. In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a consumer is after eight o'clock antemeridian and before nine o'clock postmeridian, local time at the consumer's location. — W. Va. Code §46A-2-125 (subsec. (d) as amended by 2015 SB 542, eff. June 12, 2015; emphasis added)

Verified against the enrolled act: Enr. Com. Sub. for S.B. 542 (2015) carries the "more than thirty times per week … more than ten times per week" language verbatim.

The call-time window (8 a.m.–9 p.m. local at the consumer's location) is stated in the state statute, not merely inherited from the FDCPA — but as a rebuttable assumption about convenience rather than a flat prohibition.

Attorney-representation cutoff and fee rules — §46A-2-128(c)–(e)

(c) The collection or the attempt to collect from the consumer all or any part of the debt collector's fee or charge for services rendered: Provided, That attorney's fees, court costs and other reasonable collection costs and charges necessary for the collection of any amount due upon delinquent educational loans made by any institution of higher education within this state may be recovered when the terms of the obligation so provide. Recovery of attorney's fees and collection costs may not exceed thirty-three and one-third percent of the amount due and owing to any such institution …

(d) The collection of or the attempt to collect any interest or other charge, fee or expense incidental to the principal obligation unless such interest or incidental fee, charge or expense is expressly authorized by the agreement creating or modifying the obligation and by statute or regulation;

(e) Any communication with a consumer made more than three business days after the debt collector receives written notice from the consumer or his or her attorney that the consumer is represented by an attorney specifically with regard to the subject debt. To be effective under this subsection, such notice must clearly state the attorney's name, address and telephone number and be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the debt collector's registered agent, identified by the debt collector at the office of the West Virginia Secretary of State or, if not registered with the West Virginia Secretary of State, then to the debt collector's principal place of business. Communication with a consumer is not prohibited under this subsection if the attorney fails to answer correspondence, return phone calls or discuss the obligation in question, or if the attorney consents to direct communication with the consumer. Regular account statements provided to the consumer and notices required to be provided to the consumer pursuant to applicable law shall not constitute prohibited communications under this section; and — W. Va. Code §46A-2-128(c)–(e) (emphasis added)

Subsection (d) is the conjunctive fee rule: an incidental fee needs both contract authorization and a statute or regulation permitting it. That is stricter than FDCPA §1692f(1) and stricter than the Texas analog (§392.303(a)(2)), which accept "expressly authorized by the agreement … or permitted by law."

Subsection (c) is a flat ban on passing the collector's own fee to the consumer, with a single carve-out for delinquent higher-education loans capped at 33⅓%.

Time-barred debt — MANDATORY disclosure in every written communication (§46A-2-128(f))

(f) When the debt is beyond the statute of limitations for filing a legal action for collection, failing to provide the following disclosure informing the consumer in all written communication with such consumer that:

(1) When collecting on a debt that is not past the date for obsolescence provided for in Section 605(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U. S. C. 1681c: "The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, (INSERT OWNER NAME) cannot sue you for it. If you do not pay the debt, (INSERT OWNER NAME) may report or continue to report it to the credit reporting agencies as unpaid"; and

(2) When collecting on debt that is past the date for obsolescence provided for in Section 605(a) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U. S. C. 1681c: "The law limits how long you can be sued on a debt. Because of the age of your debt, (INSERT OWNER NAME) cannot sue you for it and (INSERT OWNER NAME) cannot report it to any credit reporting agencies." — W. Va. Code §46A-2-128(f)

Added by 2014 HB 4360, eff. June 6, 2014 (verified in the enrolled act), reenacted without substantive change by 2015 SB 542 and 2017 SB 563.

Three features make this stricter than the Texas and Connecticut analogs:

• It attaches to "all written communication", not just the initial communication.
• It binds every debt collector — which, per §46A-2-122(d), includes original creditors — not only debt buyers or licensed agencies.
• There is no type-size or conspicuousness requirement in the statute (unlike Tex. Fin. Code §392.307(f)'s 12-point rule or Conn. Gen. Stat. §36a-805(a)(13)'s 10-point rule), so the compliance obligation is purely about presence and wording.

Remedies — §46A-5-101 (private action, $1,000/violation, $175,000 cap, 4-year SOL)

(1) If a creditor or debt collector has violated the provisions of this chapter applying to collection of excess charges, security in sales and leases, disclosure with respect to consumer leases, receipts, statements of account and evidences of payment, limitations on default charges, assignment of earnings, authorizations to confess judgment, illegal, fraudulent or unconscionable conduct, any prohibited debt collection practice, or restrictions on interest in land as security … the consumer has a cause of action to recover: (a) Actual damages; and (b) a right in an action to recover from the person violating this chapter a penalty of $1,000 per violation: Provided, That the aggregate amount of the penalty awarded shall not exceed the greater of $175,000 or the total alleged outstanding indebtedness: Provided, however, That in a class action the aggregate limits on the amount of the penalty set forth above shall be applied severally to each named plaintiff and each class member such that no named plaintiff nor any class member may recover in excess of the greater of $175,000 or the total alleged outstanding indebtedness. With respect to violations arising from consumer credit sales, consumer leases or consumer loans, or from sales as defined in article six of this chapter, no action pursuant to this subsection may be brought more than four years after the violations occurred … — W. Va. Code §46A-5-101(1) (as amended by 2015 SB 542 eff. 2015-06-12 and 2017 SB 563 eff. 2017-07-04; emphasis added)

Two statutory defenses sit in the same section:

(7) A creditor or debt collector has no liability for a penalty under subsection (1) or (4) of this section if, after discovering an error and prior to the institution of an action under this section or the receipt of written notice of the error, the creditor notifies the person concerned of the error and corrects the error: (a) Within fifteen days if the error affects no more than two persons; or (b) within sixty days if the error affects more than two persons. … (8) If the creditor or debt collector establishes by a preponderance of evidence that a violation is unintentional or the result of a bona fide error of fact notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such violation or error, no liability is imposed under subsections (1), (2) and (4) of this section and the validity of the transaction is not affected. — W. Va. Code §46A-5-101(7)–(8)

And a rule that keeps the debt alive notwithstanding a violation:

(5) Except as otherwise provided, a violation of this chapter does not impair rights on a debt. — W. Va. Code §46A-5-101(5)

The penalty is $1,000, not an inflation-indexed figure baked into the statute. The CPI uplift is discretionary and separate:

In any claim brought under this chapter applying to illegal, fraudulent or unconscionable conduct or any prohibited debt collection practice, the court may adjust the damages awarded pursuant to section one hundred one of this article to account for inflation from 12:01 a.m. on September 1, 2015, to the time of the award of damages in an amount equal to the consumer price index. Consumer price index means the last consumer price index for all consumers published by the United States Department of Labor. — W. Va. Code §46A-5-106 (emphasis added)

Debt cancellation for willful violations:

If a creditor has willfully violated the provisions of this chapter applying to illegal, fraudulent or unconscionable conduct or any prohibited debt collection practice, in addition to the remedy provided in section one hundred one of this article, the court may cancel the debt when the debt is not secured by a security interest. — W. Va. Code §46A-5-105

Fee-shifting runs both ways (§46A-5-104): the court "may award reasonable attorney's fees and expenses to the consumer" on a twelve-factor analysis, and may award fees to the defendant on "a finding by the court that a claim brought under this chapter was brought in bad faith and for the purposes of harassment."

Venue is consumer-favorable and exclusive:

Any civil action or other proceeding brought by a consumer to recover actual damages or a penalty, or both, from creditor or a debt collector, founded upon illegal, fraudulent or unconscionable conduct, or prohibited debt collection practice, or both, shall be brought either in the circuit court of the county in which the plaintiff has his or her legal residence at the time of the civil action, the circuit court of the county in which the plaintiff last resided in the state of West Virginia, or in the circuit court of the county in which the creditor or debt collector has its principal place of business or, if the creditor or debt collector is an individual, in the circuit court of the county of his or her legal residence. With respect to causes of action arising under this chapter, the venue provisions of this section shall be exclusive of and shall supersede the venue provisions of any other West Virginia statute or rule. — W. Va. Code §46A-5-107

Right to cure — §46A-5-108 (45-day pre-suit gate, and it tolls the SOL)

(a) An action may not be brought pursuant to this article and §46A-2-1 et seq., §46A-3-1 et seq., §46A-4-1 et seq., and §46A-6-1 et seq. of this code until 45 days after the consumer has informed the creditor, debt collector, seller, or lessor in writing and by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the creditor's, debt collector's, seller's, or lessor's registered agent identified by the creditor, debt collector, seller, or lessor at the Office of the West Virginia Secretary of State or, if not registered with the West Virginia Secretary of State, then to the creditor's, debt collector's, seller's, or lessor's principal place of business, of the alleged violation and the factual basis for the violation. Upon receiving the notice of alleged violation, the creditor, debt collector, seller, or lessor 45 days from receipt by the agent or at the principal place of business referenced in this subsection of the notice of violation but 20 days in the case a cause of action has already been filed to make a cure offer, which shall be provided to the consumer's counsel or, if unrepresented, to the consumer by certified mail, return receipt requested: Provided, That the consumer has 20 days from receipt of the cure offer to accept the cure offer or it is deemed refused and withdrawn. … (b) If a cure offer is accepted, the creditor, debt collector, seller, or lessor has 20 days to begin effectuating the agreed upon cure and the cure must be completed within a reasonable time. (c) Any applicable statute of limitations is tolled for the 45-day period set forth in subsection (a) of this section or for the period the effectuation of the cure offer is being performed, whichever is longer. … (e) Where an action is brought under this article or §46A-2-1 et seq. … it is a complete defense that a cure offer was made, accepted, and the agreed upon cure was performed. If the court determines that the cure offer was accepted and the agreed upon cure performed, the creditor, debt collector, seller, or lessor is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees and costs attendant to defending the action. (f) A cure offer is not admissible in any proceeding initiated pursuant to the provisions of this article, except that if the cure offer is timely delivered … the cure offer may be introduced in a proceeding before the court to determine an award of attorney's fees and expenses, if any, following entry of a judgment. The creditor, debt collector, seller, or lessor is not liable for the consumer's attorney's fees and court costs incurred following delivery of the cure offer unless the actual damages, civil penalties, and any other monetary or equitable relief … exceed the value of the cure offer. — W. Va. Code §46A-5-108 (current form from 2021 SB 5, eff. June 16, 2021; emphasis added)

AG enforcement — §46A-7-111 (and the §46A-7-102 safe harbor)

(2) The Attorney General may bring a civil action against a creditor or other person to recover a civil penalty for willfully violating this chapter, and if the court finds that the defendant has engaged in a course of repeated and willful violations of this chapter, it may assess a civil penalty of no more than $5,000 for each violation of this chapter. No civil penalty pursuant to this subsection may be imposed for violations of this chapter occurring more than four years before the action is brought. — W. Va. Code §46A-7-111(2) (emphasis added)

The AG also holds rulemaking authority (§46A-7-102(1)(e)), and conformity with an AG rule or a published AG opinion is a defense:

(2) Except for refund of an excess charge, no liability is imposed under this chapter for an act done or omitted in conformity with a rule of the Attorney General or commissioner … (3) Except for refund of an excess charge, in any action brought pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, it shall be a defense that the act or omission complained of was in conformity with a published opinion of the Attorney General issued in compliance with section one, article three, chapter five of this code … — W. Va. Code §46A-7-102(2)–(3)

Article 7 also supplies administrative enforcement orders (§46A-7-106), assurances of discontinuance (§46A-7-107), and injunctions (§§46A-7-108 to -110).

Backstop UDAP, applying to any "trade or commerce":

Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful. — W. Va. Code §46A-6-104

Statute of limitations — §55-2-6 (10 years written / 5 years everything else)

Every action to recover money, which is founded upon an award, or on any contract other than a judgment or recognizance, shall be brought within the following number of years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, that is to say: If the case be upon an indemnifying bond taken under any statute, or upon a bond of an executor, administrator or guardian, curator, committee, sheriff or deputy sheriff, clerk or deputy clerk, or any other fiduciary or public officer, within ten years; if it be upon any other contract in writing under seal, within ten years; if it be upon an award, or upon a contract in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by his agent, but not under seal, within ten years; and if it be upon any other contract, express or implied, within five years, unless it be an action by one party against his copartner for a settlement of the partnership accounts, or upon accounts concerning the trade or merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors or servants, where the action of account would lie, in either of which cases the action may be brought until the expiration of five years from a cessation of the dealings in which they are interested together, but not after. — W. Va. Code §55-2-6 (emphasis added)

The load-bearing words are "signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by his agent." West Virginia's ten-year bucket is not "written contract" in the loose sense — it is a writing bearing the debtor's signature (or a sealed instrument, which is its own ten-year clause). Everything that is not a signed writing, a sealed writing, or a statutory/fiduciary bond falls into the residual five-year clause for "any other contract, express or implied."

The merchant-account clause (five years from "a cessation of the dealings") is expressly limited to partnership accountings and merchant-to-merchant trade accounts — it is not a general consumer open-account rule.

Accrual is stated only as "next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued"; the section contains no discovery rule and no last-payment rule. (The 2025 bill that would have added a discovery rule died — see the pending-legislation section.)

Negotiable notes — §46-3-118: FIVE years, cut from six in 2024

(a) Except as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within five years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within five years after the accelerated due date. An action to enforce the obligation of a demand, savings, or time deposit, including a deposit that is automatically renewable, brought more than 10 years after the initial date of the maturity shall be presumed to have been paid and redeemed absent evidence of: (1) Owner consent in a record on file with the holder to renewal at or about the time of renewal pursuant to §36-8-2 of this code; or (2) Escheatment to the state pursuant to §36-8-1 et seq. of this code.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within five years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if: (1) Neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of 10 years; (2) The bank, pursuant to §31A-4-35 of this code, is no longer required to retain records relating to the note and actually no longer has such records; or (3) The note has, in accordance with §36-8-1 et seq. of this code, been presumed abandoned; reported to the State Treasurer; and paid, delivered, or caused to be paid or delivered to the State Treasurer.

(c) Except as provided in subsection (d), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within three years after dishonor of the draft or 10 years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first. (d) An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller's check, cashier's check, or traveler's check must be commenced within three years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor or issuer … (e) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to a certificate of deposit to pay the instrument must be commenced within five years after demand for payment is made to the maker … (f) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an accepted draft, other than a certified check, must be commenced (i) within five years after the due date or dates stated in the draft or acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable at a definite time or (ii) within five years after the date of the acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable on demand. (g) Unless governed by other law regarding claims for indemnity or contribution, an action (i) for conversion of an instrument, for money had and received, or like action based on conversion, (ii) for breach of warranty, or (iii) to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this article and not governed by this section must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. — W. Va. Code §46-3-118 (emphasis added)

This is a 2024 change and it runs against the uniform text. The original Revised Article 3 adoption said six years:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date. — Enr. Com. Sub. for H.B. 2494 (1993 R.S.), §46-3-118(a), enrolled signed bill (emphasis added)

The current five-year text was enacted by Com. Sub. for H.B. 4837 (2024 R.S.), whose own enacting clause states the change and the effective date:

[Passed March 8, 2024; in effect ninety days from passage.] AN ACT to amend and reenact §31A-4-35 of the Code of West Virginia, 1931, as amended; and to amend and reenact §46-3-118 of said code, all relating to duties of banks to retain records and limiting liability; providing uniformity between statute of limitations, presumption of abandonment, and duty of banks to retain records; limiting liability of banks based on the destruction of records as permitted by law; providing a presumption of payment by the bank on demand, savings, or time deposits; and modifying statute of limitations on notes, certificates of deposit, and drafts. — Enr. C.S. for H.B. 4837 (2024 R.S.) (emphasis added)

The Legislature's bill-status record gives the operative date: completed legislative action March 8, 2024; approved by the Governor March 27, 2024; "Effective Ninety Days from Passage - (June 6, 2024)."

So West Virginia is a notes-collapse state in the downward direction: a negotiable note runs five years, shorter than both the ten-year signed-writing period in §55-2-6 and the six-year uniform UCC figure that most states use. Any model-knowledge default of "six years for notes" is wrong for West Virginia, and has been wrong since June 6, 2024.

Revival — §55-2-8 (signed writing required; post-expiry revival IS available)

If any person against whom the right shall have so accrued on an award, or on any such contract, shall by writing signed by him or his agent promise payment of money on such award or contract, the person to whom the right shall have so accrued may maintain an action or suit for the moneys so promised within such number of years after such promise as it might originally have been maintained within upon the award or contract, and the plaintiff may either sue on such a promise, or on the original cause of action, and in the latter case, in answer to a plea under the sixth section, may, by way of replication, state such promise, and that such action was brought within such number of years thereafter; but no promise, except by writing as aforesaid, shall take any case out of the operation of the said sixth section, or deprive any party of the benefit thereof. An acknowledgment in writing as aforesaid, from which a promise of payment may be implied, shall be deemed to be such promise within the meaning of this section. — W. Va. Code §55-2-8 (emphasis added)

§55-2-8 carries no modern bill history on the official code site — it descends from the 1931 Code and has not been amended in the electronic-record era.

Two structural points come straight off the face of the statute:

• A qualifying writing starts a new full limitations period ("within such number of years after such promise as it might originally have been maintained within"), not a resumption of the remainder.
• The statute contemplates taking a case "out of the operation of the said sixth section" — i.e. rescuing a claim that §55-2-6 would otherwise bar. West Virginia therefore does allow post-expiry revival, by signed writing.

A written acknowledgment counts if a promise to pay can be implied from it; an oral promise never does.

Payment alone — UNVERIFIED, attorney review before any auto-re-aging. §55-2-8 speaks only to promises and written acknowledgments; it says nothing about the effect of a bare part payment, and it does not say part payment is excluded either. Its exclusivity clause ("no promise, except by writing as aforesaid, shall take any case out of the operation of the said sixth section") is a strong textual signal that an unwritten act cannot defeat limitations, but that is interpretation, not statutory text, and the question is squarely one of West Virginia common law. Secondary finding aids point to a 1985 Supreme Court of Appeals decision (Greer Limestone Co. v. Nestor) reported to hold that part payment alone does not affect the running of the statute while a payment accompanied by a sufficient writing — such as a notation on the debtor's check — does satisfy §55-2-8. That holding could not be verified against an official source: the West Virginia Judiciary's opinion archive at courtswv.gov does not reach 1985, its site search is metadata-keyed rather than full-text (a query for "55-2-8" returns a 2011 mineral-rights case whose docket number is 35528), and the govinfo USCOURTS search API is key-gated. Treat the 1985 case as a lead for counsel, not authority, and do not encode a payment-restarts rule for West Virginia until it is confirmed.

Tolling and the borrowing statute — §§55-2-15, 55-2-17, 55-2-21, 55-2-22

West Virginia's absence rule is not a general "defendant out of state" toll. It requires prior residence plus obstruction, and the same section carries the borrowing statute:

Where any such right as is mentioned in this article shall accrue against a person who had before resided in this state, if such person shall, by departing without the same, or by absconding or concealing himself or by any other indirect ways or means, obstruct the prosecution of such right, or if such right has been or shall be hereafter obstructed by war, insurrection or rebellion, the time that such obstruction may have continued shall not be computed as any part of the time within which the said right might or ought to have been prosecuted. But if another person be jointly or severally liable with the person so obstructing the prosecution of such right, and no such obstruction exist as to him the exception contained in this section as to the person so absconding shall not apply to him in any action or suit brought against him to enforce such liability. And upon a contract which was made and was to be performed in another state or country, by a person who then resided therein, no action shall be maintained after the right of action thereon is barred either by the laws of such state or country or by the laws of this state. — W. Va. Code §55-2-17 (emphasis added)

The final sentence is the borrowing statute, and it is narrow: it applies only where the contract was both made in and to be performed in the other state, by a person then residing there. Where it applies, the shorter of the two states' periods governs.

Disability savings, with a hard outer limit:

(b) If any person to whom the right accrues to bring any personal action other than an action described in subsection (a) of this section, suit, or scire facias, or any bill to repeal a grant, shall be, at the time the same accrues, an infant or insane, the same may be brought within the like number of years after his or her becoming of full age or sane that is allowed to a person having no such impediment to bring the same after the right accrues, or after such acknowledgment as is mentioned in §55-2-8 of this code, except that it shall in no case be brought after 20 years from the time when the right accrues. — W. Va. Code §55-2-15(b) (emphasis added)

Bankruptcy tolling is statutory here (many states leave it to federal law alone):

The running of any statute of limitation shall be tolled for any claim or cause of action for which the prosecution of the same within the period of limitation has been stayed by the provisions of the United States bankruptcy code or by an order entered in a bankruptcy proceeding pending the duration of the stay or the effective period of the order and for a period thereafter of the remaining period of limitation or for one year, whichever is longer. — W. Va. Code §55-2-22 (emphasis added)

Counterclaim tolling — relevant because WVCCPA claims are usually raised defensively against a collection suit:

(a) After a civil action is commenced, the running of any statute of limitation is tolled for, and only for, the pendency of that civil action as to any claim that has been or may be asserted in the civil action by counterclaim, whether compulsory or permissive, or cross-claim: Provided, That if a permissive counterclaim would be barred but for the provisions of this section, the permissive counterclaim may be asserted only in the action tolling the statute of limitations under this section. … — W. Va. Code §55-2-21(a)

The residual catch-all period, for completeness — it does not reach contract debt, which §55-2-6 covers:

Every personal action for which no limitation is otherwise prescribed shall be brought: (a) Within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued, if it be for damage to property; (b) within two years next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for damages for personal injuries; and (c) within one year next after the right to bring the same shall have accrued if it be for any other matter of such nature that, in case a party die, it could not have been brought at common law by or against his personal representative. — W. Va. Code §55-2-12

Verified negatives

Each checked by exact-phrase search across the entire Code (code.wvlegislature.gov/?s=%22<phrase>%22&q=all) on 2026-08-12, plus the targeted reads noted:

Item	Result	Method
Debt-buyer statute	None. "debt buyer" → 0 results Code-wide	phrase search; also confirmed ch. 46A art. 2 and ch. 47 art. 16 contain no purchased-debt provisions on full read
Medical-debt collection statute	None. "medical debt", "medical creditor", "health care debt", "hospital debt" → 0 results each	phrase search; "charity care" returns only §8-23-3a and §16-29D-3, neither a collection rule
Express bar on suing on time-barred debt	None found. "time-barred" → 2 results, both unrelated (§55-7G-9 asbestos, §56-1-1 venue)	phrase search; §46A-2-128(f) regulates the disclosure, not the filing
Debt-buyer pleading/documentation requirements	None	no ch. 46A or Rules-of-Civil-Procedure analog located; not enacted
Stricter-than-federal validation notice	None	ch. 46A art. 2 read in full; no state validation-notice section exists
Separate financial-regulator collector license	None. Collection agencies are licensed via the Tax Commissioner's business registration certificate, not a banking/financial regulator	§§47-16-2(c), 47-16-4(a); §11-12-3(a)(2)

A parallel set of collection rules exists in ch. 46B art. 4 (§§46B-4-3 to -9) for rent-to-own agreements; the language mirrors §§46A-2-123 to -129 almost verbatim. Out of scope here but relevant if GetPaid ever touches RTO paper.

Pending and failed legislation — both matter

2025 S.B. 124 — would have gutted the SOL; passed the Senate, died in the House. Committee Substitute for S.B. 124 (2025 R.S.), reported from Senate Judiciary Feb. 26, 2025, was titled "reducing time within which to bring actions to recover on written and oral contracts, certain bonds, and recognizances; and clarifying that the discovery rule applies to the affected statutes of limitations." Its amendatory text struck the current numbers and inserted new ones — written/sealed/bond: ten → five years; "any other contract, express or implied": five → two years — and would have added:

Provided, That the limitations set forth in this section do not begin to run until either the right to a cause of action accrues or until the person with a right to a cause of action knows or reasonably should know that their right to bring a cause of action has accrued, whichever is later. — C.S. for S.B. 124 (2025 R.S.), proposed §55-2-6 proviso — NOT LAW

Status: Passed Senate (Roll No. 50) 03/03/25, introduced in the House 03/04/25, referred to House Judiciary, last action "H Markup Discussion 04/09/25." It did not complete legislative action and is not law; §55-2-6 stands unchanged. Because it cleared one chamber, this is a live re-introduction risk — check §55-2-6 every legislative session.

Re-check 2026-08-12: the re-introduction happened and died. 2026 S.B. 27 (Barrett, co-sponsor Oliverio; "Reducing statute of limitations on actions to recover on oral and written contracts," amending §§55-2-6, -7, -11; similar bill S.B. 85) was introduced 01/14/26, referred to Senate Judiciary the same day, and never moved again — died in committee at adjournment of the 2026 regular session. (The number "S.B. 124" was reused in 2026 for an unrelated education bill — do not track by bill number across sessions.) §55-2-6 still stands unchanged; the compiled 10/5/5/5 figures remain good. Watch for a 2027 re-introduction.

2026 H.B. 4382 — 30-day pre-garnishment notice; passed the House, left in Senate Judiciary. Summary of record: "Require collection agencies to provide a 30 day notice prior to wage garnishments," amending §47-16-4. Passed House (Roll No. 53) 02/06/26; introduced in Senate 02/09/26; last action "S To Judiciary 02/09/26." Not law as of 2026-08-12 — re-checked 2026-08-12: no action after the 02/09/26 Senate Judiciary referral, so it died in committee at adjournment of the 2026 regular session. Because it cleared the House, re-introduction in 2027 is likely; if enacted it would add a pre-garnishment notice obligation to the entry-gate section — the first substantive amendment to §47-16-4 since 1973.

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• The WVCCPA is one of the broadest state collection statutes in the country, and it reaches original creditors. "Debt collector" is anyone who engages directly or indirectly in debt collection, with only a narrow attorney carve-out, and §46A-5-101 is written against "a creditor or debt collector." A creditor collecting its own paper in West Virginia is fully exposed to §§46A-2-123 through -129a.
• "Claim" is not limited to credit. Any consumer obligation for personal, family, or household purposes counts — medical, utility, retail — so the conduct rules apply well beyond the consumer-credit transactions the rest of ch. 46A addresses.
• The entry gate is a tax registration, not a financial-services license, and it comes with a genuine physical-presence requirement: a collection agency must maintain an office within West Virginia, hold a business registration certificate from the Tax Commissioner ($30, one per fixed location, permanent until cancelled since 2010), and file a $5,000 surety bond per office with the Tax Commissioner. Operating without it is a misdemeanor, fine up to $1,000, plus whatever civil liability otherwise attaches.
• West Virginia has a real numeric call cap: more than 30 call attempts per week or more than 10 completed conversations per week is enumerated oppression under §46A-2-125(d) — but only "with intent to annoy, abuse, oppress or threaten," judged from a reasonable person's standpoint. It is a per-person weekly figure, not Reg F's per-debt 7-in-7. Reg F is the stricter constraint in ordinary operation; the WV cap is the outer wall.
• The 8 a.m.–9 p.m. window is in the state statute, framed as an assumption a collector must make absent knowledge to the contrary — same clock as the FDCPA, different mechanism.
• Time-barred debt requires a verbatim state disclosure in every written communication, from every collector including original creditors, with the wording turning on whether the debt is still credit-reportable under FCRA §605(a). This is broader than the federal Reg F regime and broader than the Texas and Connecticut analogs, which limit their notices to the initial written communication and to debt buyers / licensed agencies respectively.
• Fees need belt and suspenders: an incidental charge must be authorized by the agreement and by statute or regulation. And the collector may never pass on its own fee, except on delinquent higher-education loans (33⅓% cap).
• A consumer must send a certified-mail notice and wait 45 days before suing under the chapter, and that window tolls the limitations period. A performed cure offer is a complete defense and shifts fees to the defendant.
• SOL: 10 years only for a writing the debtor actually signed (or a sealed instrument); 5 years for everything else; 5 years for negotiable notes since June 6, 2024.
• Revival requires a signed writing — and it works even after expiry, restarting a full new period. West Virginia is therefore not a no-revival state. Whether a bare payment does anything is an open question here; see the flag above.

Traps / edge cases

• Do not import the FDCPA's first-party exemption. The most common West Virginia mistake is assuming an original creditor is outside the collection rules. It is not, and §46A-5-101's $1,000-per-violation penalty applies to it.
• The ten-year period is a signature rule, not a writing rule. §55-2-6's ten-year clause covers "a contract in writing, signed by the party to be charged." A typical revolving credit-card account has no debtor signature on the governing agreement, which is why the five-year residual clause ("any other contract, express or implied") is the operative period for card debt. This classification is labeled interpretation — §55-2-6 does not name credit cards or open accounts, and the outcome turns on what writing a plaintiff can actually produce. Where a signed agreement or a signed application incorporating the terms exists, the ten-year period is in play. Treat any ten-year assertion on consumer revolving debt as a litigated question, not a settled input.
• The merchant-account clause is not an open-account rule. §55-2-6's "cessation of the dealings" language is confined to partnership accountings and accounts "between merchant and merchant." Do not apply it to consumer accounts.
• Notes are five years, and this is recent. §46-3-118(a) was cut from six to five effective June 6, 2024 by H.B. 4837 — a bank-records bill whose SOL effect is easy to miss. Any data source compiled before mid-2024, or any model default of "UCC 3-118 = six years," is wrong for West Virginia. The demand-note backstop is also unusual: no demand means the action is barred once neither principal nor interest has been paid for ten years, or once the bank has lawfully destroyed its records, or once the note has escheated.
• The borrowing statute is narrow and easy to over-apply. §55-2-17's last sentence needs the contract to have been made in and performable in the other state, by someone residing there at the time. It is not a general "use the shorter of the two states' periods" rule.
• Absence from the state does not automatically toll. §55-2-17's first clause requires prior West Virginia residence plus obstruction (departing, absconding, concealment, or other indirect means). A debtor who simply moved away has not necessarily tolled anything.
• The 45-day right-to-cure runs both ways in the SOL math. §46A-5-108(c) tolls "any applicable statute of limitations" during the notice period — which includes the four-year WVCCPA period, and, read literally, the limitations period on the underlying debt claim too. Attorney review before relying on either direction.
• The four-year WVCCPA limitations period has a scope qualifier. §46A-5-101(1) attaches its four years to "violations arising from consumer credit sales, consumer leases or consumer loans, or from sales as defined in article six." A prohibited-practice violation arising from a consumer claim that is none of those (a medical bill, say — which §46A-2-122(b) plainly covers) has no expressly stated period in that sentence. UNVERIFIED / FLAGGED — do not encode "WVCCPA claims expire in 4 years" as universal; counsel should resolve which residual period applies.
• The penalty is $1,000 per violation, not ~$1,500. The larger figures that circulate come from applying §46A-5-106's discretionary CPI adjustment (base date September 1, 2015) to the statutory $1,000. Do not present an inflation-adjusted number as the statutory penalty. The aggregate cap is the greater of $175,000 or the total alleged outstanding indebtedness, applied severally to each named plaintiff and each class member.
• Venue is exclusive and supersedes every other WV venue rule (§46A-5-107) — consumer's current residence, last WV residence, or the collector's principal place of business.
• Cure-offer mechanics have a trap for the collector too: the offer must go out within 45 days of receipt (20 days if suit is already filed), the consumer has 20 days to accept or it is deemed refused, and the complete defense in §46A-5-108(e) requires the cure to have been accepted and performed — a made-but-refused offer only limits post-offer fee exposure.
• HOA and tariffed-utility collections may be outside the chapter entirely (§46A-1-105(a)(3), (4)) — check before applying WVCCPA conduct rules to that paper.
• Section pages on the official code site list proposed bills in "Bill History." Two sections central to this page (§55-2-6, §47-16-4) show recent bills that never became law. Confirm any apparent amendment against a signed_bills/ enrolled PDF before treating it as current.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md · ../federal/fdcpa/harassment-abuse.md
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md — contrast the per-debt 7-in-7 presumption with §46A-2-125(d)'s per-person 30/10 weekly cap
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md — contrast with §46A-2-128(f)'s mandatory verbatim disclosure in all written communications
• ./tx.md · ./ct.md — the other two states with statutory time-barred-debt disclosures; both are narrower than West Virginia's
• ./va.md · ./md.md · ./oh.md · ./pa.md · ./_matrix.md