Virginia — no collection-agency act; SOL (§8.01-246) + Medical Debt Protection Act

Authority

Virginia has no mini-FDCPA and no collection-agency licensing statute. Collection conduct in Virginia is governed by federal law (FDCPA / Reg F) plus a scattered set of Virginia provisions: the limitations chapter (Va. Code tit. 8.01 ch. 4, principally §8.01-246), the Medical Debt Protection Act (Va. Code §§59.1-611 to -613, 2025, c. 692), a flat ban on credit-reporting medical debt (§59.1-444.4, 2024, c. 751), the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (§§59.1-196 to -207, enforced by the Attorney General under §59.1-203 and by private action under §59.1-204), and a criminal prohibition on simulated legal process (§18.2-213). Negotiable and non-negotiable notes run on the UCC clock in §8.3A-118.

Do not confuse the "Virginia Debt Collection Act" with a consumer statute. Under the Code's own Popular Names index that name belongs to Va. Code §2.2-4800 et seq., which governs how state agencies collect the Commonwealth's own accounts receivable:

This chapter establishes the policy of the Commonwealth as it relates to the accounting for, management and collection of all accounts receivable due to the Commonwealth. It shall be the policy of the Commonwealth that all state agencies and institutions shall take all appropriate and cost-effective actions to aggressively collect all accounts receivable. — Va. Code §2.2-4800, via the official Popular Names entry "Virginia Debt Collection Act"

It has nothing to do with private collection agencies.

Verification note. All statute text below was pulled directly from law.lis.virginia.gov (the Virginia General Assembly's official Code site, published by the Division of Legislative Automated Systems) on 2026-08-12; the pages carry the LIS date stamp 8/12/2026. Two caveats: (1) the LIS full-text search is a JavaScript application and could not be driven by automated fetch, so the licensing negative below was established by enumerating official chapter listings and the regulator's own page rather than by a keyword sweep — method disclosed in that section. (2) The current-session bill text on lis.virginia.gov is likewise a JS app and the legacy legp604.exe act-text server no longer serves the 2025 session, so the enactment clause of 2025, c. 692 could not be read verbatim — see the UNVERIFIED note under the Medical Debt Protection Act.

Operative text

Statute of limitations on contracts — §8.01-246

A. Subject to the provisions of § 8.01-243 regarding injuries to person and property and of § 8.01-245 regarding the application of limitations to fiduciaries, and their bonds, actions founded upon a contract, other than actions on a judgment or decree, shall be brought within the following number of years next after the cause of action shall have accrued:

1. In actions or upon a recognizance, except recognizance of bail in a civil suit, within 10 years; and in actions or motions upon a recognizance of bail in a civil suit, within three years, omitting from the computation of such three years such time as the right to sue out such execution shall have been suspended by injunction, supersedeas or other process;

2. In actions on any contract that is not otherwise specified and that is in writing and signed by the party to be charged thereby, or by his agent, within five years whether such writing be under seal or not;

3. In actions by a partner against another for settlement of the partnership account or in actions upon accounts concerning the trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant, their factors, or servants, within five years from the cessation of the dealings in which they are interested together;

4. In actions upon (i) any contract that is not otherwise specified and that is in writing and not signed by the party to be charged, or by his agent, or (ii) any unwritten contract, express or implied, within three years. — Va. Code §8.01-246(A) (emphasis added)

Medical-debt limitations period — §8.01-246(B) (2024, c. 800)

B. In any action, including those brought by the Commonwealth, upon any contract under subdivision A 2 or 4 to collect medical debt, such an action is barred if not commenced within three years from the due date applicable to the final invoice for a health care service unless the contract with a hospital or health care provider is for a payment plan that allows for a longer period of time for the collection of debt by the hospital or health care provider. In the event of breach of a payment plan, an action is barred if not commenced within three years from the date of breach by the debtor. For the purposes of this subsection, "medical debt" means a debt arising directly from the receipt of a health care service and originally owed directly to a health care service provider. The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to medical debt arising from services paid for under programs administered by the Department of Medical Assistance Services. — Va. Code §8.01-246(B)

Sales-of-goods contracts are carved out to the UCC:

C. In the case of any action to which § 8.2-725 of the Uniform Commercial Code is applicable, that section shall be controlling except that in products liability actions for injury to person and for injury to property, other than the property subject to contract, the limitation prescribed in § 8.01-243 shall apply. — Va. Code §8.01-246(C)

Notes and instruments — §8.3A-118

(a) Except as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date.

(b) Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of ten years.

…

(h) Notwithstanding the provisions of § 8.01-246, this section shall apply to negotiable and non-negotiable notes and certificates of deposit. — Va. Code §8.3A-118(a), (b), (h) (emphasis added)

Revival — new promise must be in writing (§8.01-229(G))

G. Effect of new promise in writing.

1. If any person against whom a right of action has accrued on any contract, other than a judgment or recognizance, promises, by writing signed by him or his agent, payment of money on such contract, the person to whom the right has accrued may maintain an action for the money so promised, within such number of years after such promise as it might be maintained if such promise were the original cause of action. An acknowledgment in writing, from which a promise of payment may be implied, shall be deemed to be such promise within the meaning of this subsection.

2. The plaintiff may sue on the new promise described in subdivision 1 or on the original cause of action, except that when the new promise is of such a nature as to merge the original cause of action then the action shall be only on the new promise. — Va. Code §8.01-229(G) (emphasis added)

Companion limits on who can be bound, and on promises not to plead the statute:

A. Whenever the failure to enforce a promise, written or unwritten, not to plead the statute of limitations would operate as a fraud on the promisee, the promisor shall be estopped to plead the statute. In all other cases, an unwritten promise not to plead the statute shall be void, and a written promise not to plead such statute shall be valid and enforceable to prevent assertion of the defense of the statute only when (i) the written promise is made to avoid or defer litigation pending settlement of any cause of action that has accrued in favor of the promisee against the promisor, (ii) the written promise is signed by the promisor or his agent, and (iii) the promisee commences an action asserting such cause of action within the earlier of (a) the applicable limitations period running from the date the written promise is made or (b) any shorter time as may be provided in the written promise. …

B. No acknowledgment or promise by any personal representative of a decedent shall charge the estate of the decedent, revive a cause of action otherwise barred, or relieve the personal representative of his duty to defend under § 64.2-1415 …

C. No acknowledgment or promise by one of two or more joint contractors shall charge any of such contractors in any case in which but for such acknowledgment another contractor would have been protected under a statute of limitations. — Va. Code §8.01-232(A)–(C) (emphasis added)

Tolling and procedural rules

D. Obstruction of filing by defendant. — When the filing of an action is obstructed by a defendant's (i) filing a petition in bankruptcy or filing a petition for an extension or arrangement under the United States Bankruptcy Act or (ii) using any other direct or indirect means to obstruct the filing of an action, then the time that such obstruction has continued shall not be counted as any part of the period within which the action must be brought. — Va. Code §8.01-229(D)

1. Except as provided in subdivision 3, if any action is commenced within the prescribed limitation period and for any cause abates or is dismissed without determining the merits, the time such action is pending shall not be computed as part of the period within which such action may be brought, and another action may be brought within the remaining period. …
2. If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit as prescribed in § 8.01-380, the statute of limitations with respect to such action shall be tolled by the commencement of the nonsuited action … and the plaintiff may recommence his action within six months from the date of the order entered by the court, or within the original period of limitation, or within the limitation period as provided by subdivision B 1, whichever period is longer. — Va. Code §8.01-229(E)(1), (3)

Borrowing statute — Virginia takes whichever bar hits first:

No action shall be maintained on any contract which is governed by the law of another state or country if the right of action thereon is barred either by the laws of such state or country or of this Commonwealth. — Va. Code §8.01-247

Limitations is an affirmative defense only — never jurisdictional:

The objection that an action is not commenced within the limitation period prescribed by law can only be raised as an affirmative defense specifically set forth in a responsive pleading. No statutory limitation period shall have jurisdictional effects and the defense that the statutory limitation period has expired cannot be set up by demurrer. … — Va. Code §8.01-235

Savings clause for pre-recodification claims (closes the historical sealed-instrument question):

… If a cause of action, as to which no action, suit, scire facias, or other proceeding is pending, exists before October 1, 1977, then this chapter shall not apply and the limitation as to such cause of action shall be the same, if any, as would apply had this chapter not been enacted. Any new limitation period imposed by this chapter … shall apply only to causes or rights of action accruing on or after October 1, 1977. — Va. Code §8.01-256

Entry gate — none (negative finding, with method)

Virginia licenses, registers, and bonds nothing for consumer debt collection. There is no collection-agency license, no debt-buyer license, no registration, no bond, and no state regulator of collection conduct. Method used to establish the negative, all against official sources:

1. Code Popular Names index (law.lis.virginia.gov/vacodepopularnames/) — the only entry matching "debt"/"collect" is the Virginia Debt Collection Act, which resolves to §2.2-4800 (Commonwealth receivables, quoted above). No collection-agency act exists under any name.
2. Title 6.2 (Financial Institutions and Services) chapter list — the complete chapter enumeration runs ch. 1–26 and contains no collection-agency, debt-collector, or debt-buyer chapter. The two adjacent regimes are ch. 20 Agencies Providing Debt Management Plans (§§6.2-2000 to -2025) and ch. 20.1 Debt Settlement Services Providers (§§6.2-2026 to -2050), which are debtor-side services, not collection.
3. Title 54.1 (Professions and Occupations) chapter list — no chapter matching "collect"; DPOR does not regulate collectors.
4. The regulator's own site — the SCC Bureau of Financial Institutions "Regulated Industries" page lists its non-depository licensees as "trust companies, consumer finance companies, mortgage lenders and brokers, money transmitters, credit counseling agencies, motor vehicle title lenders, industrial loan associations, short-term lenders, check cashers, student loan servicers, and debt settlement services providers." Collection agencies, debt collectors, and debt buyers are absent.

The only Virginia-wide gate on a foreign collection agency is the generic requirement that a foreign entity register with the SCC to transact business in the Commonwealth — a corporate formality, not a collections license. (Corporate-registration mechanics not compiled on this page — Title 13.1 was not pulled.)

Medical Debt Protection Act — §§59.1-611 to -613 (2025, c. 692)

Definitions that put third-party agencies and debt buyers squarely in scope:

"Extraordinary collection action" means any action taken to obtain payment of a medical debt that:

1. Involves selling an individual's medical debt to another party;
2. Involves reporting adverse information about an individual to consumer reporting agencies;
3. Involves deferring, denying, or requiring a payment before providing emergency services or urgent services because of an individual's nonpayment of medical debt; or
4. Requires a legal or judicial process, including placing a lien on an individual's property, foreclosing on an individual's real property, attaching or seizing an individual's bank account or any other personal property, commencing a civil action against an individual, causing an individual's arrest, causing an individual to be subject to a writ of body attachment, or garnishing an individual's wages. … "Medical debt buyer" means a person that is engaged in the business of purchasing medical debt or collecting medical debt on behalf of another entity, whether such person collects the medical debt directly or hires an attorney or other third party to collect such medical debt.

"Medical debt collector" means any person that regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, medical debts originally owed, due, or asserted to be owed or due to another. "Medical debt collector" includes a medical debt buyer. — Va. Code §59.1-611

The operative limits:

A. No large health care facility or medical debt buyer shall charge a patient any interest or late fees on medical debt until 90 days following the due date applicable to the final invoice, and no such interest or late fees shall exceed three percent of the amount of such medical debt per annum.

B. No medical creditor or medical debt collector shall use any of the following extraordinary collection actions to collect medical debts:

1. Causing an individual's arrest;
2. Causing an individual to be subject to a writ of body attachment;
3. Foreclosing on an individual's real property;
4. Placing a lien on an individual's personal property; or
5. Garnishing the wages of any individual qualifying for financial assistance under the financial assistance policy applicable to the underlying medical debt.

C. No medical creditor shall sell an individual's medical debt to a medical debt buyer except if, prior to such sale, the medical creditor has entered into a legally binding written agreement with the medical debt buyer under which all of the following apply:

1. The medical debt buyer is prohibited from engaging in any extraordinary collection action described in subsection B to obtain payment;
2. The medical debt buyer is prohibited from charging interest on the debt at a rate higher than three percent per annum;
3. The debt is returnable to or recallable by the medical creditor upon a determination by the medical debt buyer that the individual is eligible for financial assistance …; and
4. The medical debt buyer is required to adhere to specified procedures that ensure that the individual does not pay, and has no obligation to pay, the medical debt buyer more than such individual is responsible for paying in compliance with this chapter.

D. A medical creditor that sells medical debt to a medical debt buyer under an agreement described in subsection C remains liable for any actions taken by such medical debt buyer in relation to such medical debt, subject to any indemnification provisions as may be agreed to by such parties.

E. No medical creditor or medical debt collector shall take any extraordinary collection action until 120 days following the due date applicable to the final invoice for a health care service. At least 30 days before taking any extraordinary collection action, a medical creditor or medical debt collector shall provide the patient a notice including:

1. If the medical debt resulted from health care services provided by a large health care facility, a statement of whether financial assistance is available for eligible individuals and a plain language summary of any financial assistance policy;
2. A list of any extraordinary collection actions that will be taken to obtain payment; and
3. A deadline after which such extraordinary collection actions will be initiated, which shall be at least 30 days after the date such notice is provided. … G. If a patient has paid any part of a medical debt in excess of the amount owed after any financial assistance offered by a large health care facility, the large health care facility or medical debt collector … shall refund any excess amount to the patient within 60 days after determination of such excess payment. — Va. Code §59.1-612 (emphasis added)

Any violation of this chapter shall constitute a prohibited practice under the provisions of § 59.1-200 and shall be subject to any and all of the enforcement provisions of the Virginia Consumer Protection Act (§ 59.1-196 et seq.). — Va. Code §59.1-613

The VCPA hook:

87. (Effective July 1, 2026) Violating any provision of the Medical Debt Protection Act (§ 59.1-611 et seq.) — Va. Code §59.1-200(A)(87)

UNVERIFIED — precise effective date mechanism. Chapter 59 of Title 59.1 carries no "(Effective …)" designation on the official Code chapter listing or on the section pages, i.e. it is in force as of this page's last_verified date. The only official trace of a delayed commencement is the "(Effective July 1, 2026)" designation LIS attaches to the §59.1-200(A)(87) cross-reference, which is consistent with 2025, c. 692 having specified a later date than the Virginia default. That default is constitutional, not statutory:

All laws enacted at a regular session … shall take effect on the first day of July following the adjournment of the session of the General Assembly at which it has been enacted … unless in the case of an emergency … the General Assembly shall specify an earlier date … or unless a subsequent date is specified in the body of the bill or by general law. — Va. Const. art. IV, §13 (emphasis added)

The enactment clause itself could not be read (see Verification note). Nothing turns on this for current operations — the Act is in force either way — but do not print "effective July 1, 2025" or "July 1, 2026" as a verified fact without reading 2025, c. 692.

Medical debt may not be credit-reported at all — §59.1-444.4 (2024, c. 751)

A. No medical care facility listed in § 32.1-102.1:3, no person licensed or certified by a health regulatory board within the Department of Health Professions, and no emergency medical services agency, as defined in § 32.1-111.1, shall report any portion of a medical debt to a consumer reporting agency.

B. No collection entity collecting or attempting to collect a medical debt shall report such collection or attempts to collect to a consumer reporting agency.

C. Any willful violation of the provisions of this section shall constitute a prohibited practice pursuant to the provisions of § 59.1-200 and shall be subject to any and all of the enforcement provisions of Chapter 17 (§ 59.1-196 et seq.). — Va. Code §59.1-444.4 (emphasis added)

"Collection entity" and "medical debt" are broad, and the medical-debt definition has a credit-card carve-out that matters:

"Collection entity" means any person that purchases debt or collects debt on behalf of another entity. … "Medical debt" means debt arising from health care services, including products, devices, durable medical equipment, and prescription drugs, and from the provision of transportation to receive health care services. "Medical debt" does not include debt charged to a credit card but does include an open-end or closed-end extension of credit made by a financial institution to a borrower that may be used by the borrower solely for the purpose of the purchase of health care services. — Va. Code §59.1-444.1 (emphasis added)

VCPA — scope limit, and enforcement

The VCPA's reach is defined by "consumer transaction," which is framed around the sale side, not the collection side:

"Consumer transaction" means:

1. The advertisement, sale, lease, license, or offering for sale, lease, or license, of goods or services to be used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes;
2. Transactions involving the advertisement, offer, or sale to an individual of a business opportunity …;
3. Transactions involving the advertisement, offer, or sale to an individual of goods or services relating to the individual's finding or obtaining employment;
4. A layaway agreement …;
5. Transactions involving the advertisement, sale, lease, or license, or the offering for sale, lease, or license, of goods or services to a church or other religious body; and
6. Transactions involving the advertisement of legal services that contain information about the results of a state or federal survey, inspection, or investigation of a nursing home …

"Supplier" means a seller, lessor, licensor, or professional that advertises, solicits, or engages in consumer transactions, or a manufacturer, distributor, or licensor that advertises and sells, leases, or licenses goods or services to be resold … — Va. Code §59.1-198

The closest generally-applicable prohibited practice touching collections:

13. Using in any contract or lease any liquidated damage clause, penalty clause, or waiver of defense, or attempting to collect any liquidated damages or penalties under any clause, waiver, damages, or penalties that are void or unenforceable under any otherwise applicable laws of the Commonwealth, or under federal statutes or regulations; — Va. Code §59.1-200(A)(13)

Enforcement:

A. Notwithstanding any other provisions of law to the contrary, the Attorney General, any attorney for the Commonwealth, or the attorney for any city, county, or town may cause an action to be brought in the appropriate circuit court in the name of the Commonwealth … to enjoin any violation of § 59.1-200 or 59.1-200.1. … — Va. Code §59.1-203(A)

A. Any person who suffers loss as the result of a violation of this chapter shall be entitled to initiate an action to recover actual damages, or $500, whichever is greater. If the trier of fact finds that the violation was willful, it may increase damages to an amount not exceeding three times the actual damages sustained, or $1,000, whichever is greater. …

B. Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, in addition to any damages awarded, such person also may be awarded reasonable attorneys' fees and court costs. — Va. Code §59.1-204 (emphasis added)

Simulated legal process — criminal (§18.2-213)

Any person who, for the purpose of collecting money, shall knowingly deliver, mail, send or otherwise use or cause to be used any paper or writing simulating or intended to simulate any warrant, process, writ, notice of execution lien or notice of motion for judgment shall be guilty of a Class 4 misdemeanor. — Va. Code §18.2-213 (emphasis added)

Assigned-debt suits require counsel in general district court — §16.1-88.03(A)

Any corporation, partnership, limited liability company … may prepare, execute, file, and have served on other parties in any proceeding in a general district court a warrant in debt, motion for judgment, warrant in detinue … garnishment summons … without the intervention of an attorney. … However, this section shall not apply to an action under subdivision (1) or (3) of § 16.1-77 which was assigned to a corporation, partnership, limited liability company … or individual solely for the purpose of enforcing an obligation owed or right inuring to another. — Va. Code §16.1-88.03(A) (emphasis added)

Call frequency and call window — no Virginia rule

No Virginia statute caps collection-call frequency or narrows the calling window. The 8am–9pm rule that exists in Virginia law is in the Virginia Telephone Privacy Protection Act and binds only telephone solicitors:

No telephone solicitor shall initiate, or cause to be initiated, a telephone solicitation at any time other than between 8:00 a.m. and 9:00 p.m. local time at the contacted person's location, unless the telephone solicitor has obtained the prior consent of the contacted person. — Va. Code §59.1-511

and "telephone solicitation" is defined by sales purpose:

"Telephone solicitation" means (i) any telephone call made or initiated to any natural person's residence in the Commonwealth … or (ii) any text message sent to any wireless telephone with a Virginia area code …, for the purpose of offering or advertising any property, goods, or services for sale, lease, license, or investment, including offering or advertising an extension of credit or for the purpose of fraudulent activity … — Va. Code §59.1-510 (emphasis added)

Wage garnishment cap — §34-29(A)

A. Except as provided in subsections B and C, the maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any workweek that is subjected to garnishment may not exceed the lesser of the following amounts:

1. Twenty-five percent of his disposable earnings for that week; or
2. The amount by which his disposable earnings for that week exceed 40 times the federal minimum hourly wage prescribed by 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) or the Virginia minimum hourly wage prescribed by § 40.1-28.10, whichever is greater, in effect at the time earnings are payable. — Va. Code §34-29(A) (emphasis added; version effective until July 1, 2027)

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• No license, no bond, no registration, no state collections regulator. A third-party agency or debt buyer can work Virginia accounts on federal compliance alone. This is a genuine negative finding established from official chapter listings and the SCC's own page, not an absence of research.
• The SOL axis in Virginia is signature, not writing. Five years requires a contract "in writing and signed by the party to be charged." An unsigned writing is expressly pushed into the same three-year bucket as an oral contract by §8.01-246(A)(4)(i). Producing the paper is not enough; producing the debtor's signature is what buys the extra two years.
• Credit cards therefore sit at three years unless the issuer has a signed agreement (interpretation from the statutory text — see Traps). There is no "open account" category in §8.01-246 at all; subdivision (A)(3)'s five-year account rule is limited to partnership settlements and merchant-to-merchant trade accounts, and it runs "from the cessation of the dealings," not from default.
• Seals are irrelevant. §8.01-246(A)(2) says five years "whether such writing be under seal or not." Do not carry a 10- or 20-year sealed-instrument period into Virginia; §8.01-256 confines any older rule to causes of action that accrued before October 1, 1977.
• Notes are six years and override §8.01-246 for both negotiable and non-negotiable notes (§8.3A-118(h)) — the state's UCC §3-118 analog, uniform text.
• Medical debt is three years from the final invoice's due date (§8.01-246(B)), not from default or last payment, and a written payment plan can extend that; breach of a plan starts a fresh three years from the breach date. Medicaid-funded services are carved out.
• Revival requires the debtor's signature. §8.01-229(G) restarts the clock only on a writing signed by the debtor — either a promise to pay or an acknowledgment from which one can be implied. Virginia has no statutory part-payment revival rule (see Traps).
• No frequency cap and no state call window — the Reg F 7-in-7 presumption and the federal 8am–9pm rule are the operative limits. Virginia's own 8am–9pm statute is a telemarketing rule that by its own definition does not reach collection calls.
• No time-barred-debt disclosure and no suit bar. Virginia has no analog to Texas §392.307 or California §1788.14(d). Limitations is purely an affirmative defense (§8.01-235) — a time-barred Virginia suit is not void, it is defensible, and a defaulting debtor loses.
• Medical debt is the exception to Virginia's otherwise light touch. Two separate 2024–2025 statutes make it the most regulated category in the state: a flat ban on reporting it to credit bureaus (§59.1-444.4(B)), and a 120-day pre-collection hold, a 30-day pre-action notice, a 3% interest cap, and bans on arrest, body attachment, real-property foreclosure, personal-property liens, and garnishment of financial-assistance-eligible debtors (§59.1-612).

Traps / edge cases

• The credit-card bucket is 3 years by text, and this is the single biggest exposure on the page. §8.01-246(A)(4)(i) expressly assigns unsigned writings to three years, and typical cardholder agreements are accepted by use rather than signed. Labeled interpretation — no Virginia appellate holding or Attorney General opinion was retrieved from an official source to confirm the classification, so this is a reading of statutory text, not case law. UNVERIFIED / FLAGGED: the Virginia Supreme Court's official opinion archive was not searched (protocol bars law-firm summaries as source of record, and no official case database was reachable in this pass). Treat the 3-year reading as the planning assumption and the 5-year reading as unsupported unless a signed agreement is in hand — but get counsel before litigating the boundary.
• Part payment is the other live gap. Chapter 4 of Title 8.01 contains no part-payment revival provision — §8.01-229(G) speaks only of a signed writing, and unlike Ohio (R.C. 2305.08), New Jersey (2A:14-24), or South Dakota (SDCL 15-2-29), Virginia's revival section does not contain a savings clause preserving "the effect of any payment." UNVERIFIED — no statute either way. Do not ship a part-payment restart for Virginia in either direction; this is common-law territory and an attorney-review item, never a boolean.
• Virginia has no post-expiry anti-revival statute either. Because §8.01-229(G) is written in terms of a right of action that "has accrued" and imposes no cutoff, a signed written promise after expiry may start a fresh period. Contrast TX §392.307(d), NV NRS 11.200(2), WA RCW 4.16.270, and NY CPLR 214-i, all of which make expiry permanent. Interpretation — the statute's silence is what is verified, not the outcome.
• Joint obligors do not go down together. §8.01-232(C) means one co-obligor's acknowledgment cannot revive the claim against the others. A payment or signed letter from one cardholder on a joint account does not re-age the co-obligor.
• The 3-year medical SOL and the 120-day hold compound. §59.1-612(E) forbids any extraordinary collection action — including filing suit and selling the debt — for 120 days after the final invoice due date, and requires a 30-day notice before acting. Since §8.01-246(B) also runs from that same final-invoice due date, the practical Virginia medical-debt litigation window is roughly three years minus 120 days, and the first ~150 days are structurally unavailable.
• The §59.1-612(B) ban list is narrower than the §59.1-611 definition — the definition of "extraordinary collection action" includes liens on any property and wage garnishment generally, but the outright ban in subsection (B) covers foreclosure on real property, liens on personal property, and garnishment only of debtors qualifying for financial assistance. The wider definition still triggers the 120-day hold and the 30-day notice for every listed action. Read (B) and (E) as two different lists; do not collapse them.
• Selling a medical account is itself a regulated act. §59.1-612(C) makes the sale conditional on a written agreement carrying four specific covenants forward, and §59.1-612(D) keeps the originating medical creditor liable for the buyer's conduct. Placement/sale contracts for Virginia medical paper need those four clauses.
• Medical-debt credit reporting is banned outright, not merely delayed. §59.1-444.4(B) applies to any "collection entity" — purchasers and contingency agencies alike — with no dollar floor and no aging period. But §59.1-444.1 excludes "debt charged to a credit card" from "medical debt," so a card balance that happens to include a hospital charge is not covered while a provider-branded medical credit line is.
• Debt buyers cannot self-file in general district court. §16.1-88.03(A)'s corporate self-representation privilege is expressly withdrawn for claims "assigned … solely for the purpose of enforcing an obligation owed … to another." Purchased-paper suits in GDC need a Virginia attorney; a non-lawyer-signed warrant in debt on assigned paper is defective.
• The borrowing statute takes the shorter period. §8.01-247 bars a contract action if it is time-barred under either the governing state's law or Virginia's. A choice-of-law clause pointing at a long-SOL state does not buy time in a Virginia court; it can only lose time.
• Nonsuit tolling is generous to plaintiffs. §8.01-229(E)(3) gives six months from the nonsuit order or the remainder of the original period, whichever is longer, and applies across state/federal courts. A dismissed-and-refiled Virginia collection suit is not automatically time-barred.
• Limitations is waivable by inaction. §8.01-235 makes it an affirmative defense that cannot be raised by demurrer and has no jurisdictional effect. Pursuing a time-barred Virginia debt is not a statutory violation of state law — but it remains an FDCPA / Reg F §1006.26 problem, which is the only thing standing in the way.
• Don't cite the "Virginia Debt Collection Act." It is §2.2-4800, about state agencies collecting money owed to the Commonwealth. Citing it in a consumer context is a credibility loss.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md
• ./nc.md · ./tx.md · ./ky.md · ./pa.md · ./_matrix.md