Kentucky — no collection-agency act; SOL split by contract execution date

Authority

Kentucky has no mini-FDCPA and no collection-agency licensing act. There is no state statute regulating debt-collection conduct as such: the operative state-law hooks are the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (KRS 367.110–367.300, "KCPA"), enforced by the Attorney General's Office of Consumer Protection (KRS 367.120(1), 367.190) with a limited private right of action (KRS 367.220), and the criminal harassing communications statute (KRS 525.080). Federal law — FDCPA, Reg F, TCPA, FCRA — is the whole of the conduct rulebook for third-party collectors working Kentucky paper.

Limitations live in KRS chapter 413, with negotiable instruments carved out to KRS 355.3-118 (Kentucky's UCC §3-118). The defining Kentucky feature is a hard split in the written-contract period keyed to the contract's execution date: 15 years for written contracts executed on or before July 15, 2014; 10 years for those executed after.

Verification note. apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/statute.aspx?id=<n> serves each section as an official LRC-generated PDF, not HTML — text below was extracted from those PDFs on 2026-08-11. Section IDs are stable identifiers on the Legislative Research Commission's site (the official publisher). The 2014 session-law text is from the official Acts PDF.

Negative-finding method (entry gate). "No collection-agency license" is established by absence, so the method is disclosed: the full official KRS chapter/subtitle index (754 entries, enumerated programmatically from apps.legislature.ky.gov/law/statutes/) contains no collection-agency or debt-collector chapter — the only chapters matching "collection" are ch. 134 (tax collection), ch. 135 (collection of public claims by action), KRS 355 Art. 4 (bank deposits and collections), ch. 357 (Bank Collection Code, superseded), and ch. 345 (collective bargaining). KAR Title 808 (Public Protection Cabinet — Department of Financial Institutions), the regulator that would hold such a program, lists chapters for Administration, Cemeteries, Credit Unions, Finance Charges, Industrial Loans, Consumer Loans, Savings and Loans, Funeral Homes, Check Cashing, Securities, Multibank Companies, Mortgage Loan Companies and Brokers, Thrift Institutions, Administrative Hearings, General, and Student Education Loan Servicing — no collection agency chapter. See Traps for the residual local-license caveat.

Operative text

Statute of limitations — the 2014 split

Fifteen years remains the general rule, with written contracts routed out by execution date:

Except as provided in KRS 396.205, 413.110, 413.220, 413.230 and 413.240, the following actions shall be commenced within fifteen (15) years after the cause of action first accrued: (1) An action upon a judgment or decree of any court of this state or of the United States, or of any state or territory thereof, the period to be computed from the date of the last execution thereon; (2) An action upon a recognizance, bond, or written contract, except that actions upon written contracts executed after July 15, 2014, shall be governed by KRS 413.160; — KRS 413.090 (Effective: July 15, 2014; Amended 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 142, sec. 2)

And the ten-year period it routes to:

An action upon a written contract executed after July 15, 2014, unless otherwise provided by statute, and an action for relief not provided for by statute can only be commenced within ten (10) years after the cause of action accrued. — KRS 413.160 (Effective: July 15, 2014; Amended 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 142, sec. 1)

The cutover date is July 15, 2014. The enacting act (HB 369) was signed by the Governor on April 25, 2014 and drafted with a self-referential date, which the LRC codified to the session's normal effective date:

Section 1. KRS 413.160 is amended to read as follows: An action upon a written contract executed after the effective date of this Act unless otherwise provided by statute … can only be commenced within ten (10) years after the cause of action accrued. Section 2. KRS 413.090 is amended to read as follows: … (2) An action upon a recognizance, bond, or written contract, except that actions upon written contracts executed after the effective date of this Act shall be governed by Section 1 of this Act; — 2014 Ky. Acts ch. 142 (HB 369), AN ACT relating to the statute of limitations for written contracts; Signed by Governor April 25, 2014

The applicability split is inside the statutes themselves — there is no separate savings or applicability clause in ch. 142. A written contract executed on or before July 15, 2014 stays in KRS 413.090(2) at 15 years; one executed after that date falls under KRS 413.160 at 10 years. The trigger is the date the contract was executed, not the date of default, charge-off, or accrual.

Five-year bucket — KRS 413.120

The following actions shall be commenced within five (5) years after the cause of action accrued: (1) An action upon a contract not in writing, express or implied. (2) An action upon a liability created by statute, when no other time is fixed by the statute creating the liability. (3) An action for a penalty or forfeiture when no time is fixed by the statute prescribing it. (4) An action for trespass on real or personal property. (5) An action for the profits of or damages for withholding real or personal property. (6) An action for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract and not otherwise enumerated. (7) An action upon a bill of exchange, check, draft or order, or any endorsement thereof, or upon a promissory note, placed upon the footing of a bill of exchange. (8) An action to enforce the liability of a steamboat or other vessel. (9) An action upon a merchant's account for goods sold and delivered, or any article charged in such store account. (10) An action upon an account concerning the trade of merchandise, between merchant and merchant or their agents. (11) An action for relief or damages on the ground of fraud or mistake. (12) An action to enforce the liability of bail. (13) An action for personal injuries suffered by any person against the builder of a home or other improvements. … — KRS 413.120 (Effective: June 24, 2015; Amended 2015 Ky. Acts ch. 121, sec. 3)

Answering the subsection question directly: oral contracts are (1); open/store accounts are (9) (and merchant-to-merchant mutual accounts are (10)). Credit cards are named in neither — see the interpretation flag below.

Accrual — KRS 413.130 (the open-account quirk)

(1) In every action upon a merchants' account as described in subsection (9) of KRS 413.120, the limitation shall be computed from January 1 next succeeding the respective dates of the delivery of the several articles charged in the account. Judgment shall be rendered for no more than the amount of articles actually charged or delivered within five (5) years preceding that in which the action was brought. … (2) In an action to recover a balance due upon a mutual open and current account concerning the trade of merchandise between merchant and merchant or their agents, as described in subsection (10) of KRS 413.120, where there have been reciprocal demands between the parties, the cause of action is deemed to have accrued from the time of the last item proved in the account claimed, or proved to be chargeable on the adverse side. (3) In an action for relief or damages for fraud or mistake, referred to in subsection (11) of KRS 413.120, the cause of action shall not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the fraud or mistake. However, the action shall be commenced within ten (10) years after the time of making the contract or the perpetration of the fraud. — KRS 413.130 (Effective: June 24, 2015)

Negotiable instruments — KRS 355.3-118 (Kentucky's UCC §3-118)

(1) Except as provided in subsection (5) of this section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six (6) years after the accelerated due date. (2) Except as provided in subsection (4) or (5) of this section, if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six (6) years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of ten (10) years. (3) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within three (3) years after dishonor of the draft or ten (10) years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first. (4) An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller's check, cashier's check, or traveler's check must be commenced within three (3) years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor or issuer, as the case may be. (5) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to a certificate of deposit to pay the instrument must be commenced within six (6) years after demand for payment is made to the maker, but if the instrument states a due date and the maker is not required to pay before that date, the six (6) year period begins when a demand for payment is in effect and the due date has passed. (6) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an accepted draft, other than a certified check, must be commenced: (a) Within six (6) years after the due date or dates stated in the draft or acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable at a definite time; or (b) Within six (6) years after the date of the acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable on demand. (7) Unless governed by other law regarding claims for indemnity or contribution, an action: (a) For conversion of an instrument, for money had and received, or like action based on conversion; (b) For breach of warranty; or (c) To enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this article and not governed by this section must be commenced within three (3) years after the claim for relief accrues. — KRS 355.3-118 (Effective: January 1, 1997)

When the clock stops — KRS 413.250

An action shall be deemed to commence on the date of the first summons or process issued in good faith from the court having jurisdiction of the cause of action. — KRS 413.250 (Effective: October 1, 1942)

Tolling — absence, obstruction, disability

(1) If, at the time any cause of action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 accrues against a resident of this state, he is absent from it, the period limited for the commencement of the action against him shall be computed from the time of his return to this state. (2) When a cause of action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160 accrues against a resident of this state, and he by absconding or concealing himself or by any other indirect means obstructs the prosecution of the action, the time of the continuance of the absence from the state or obstruction shall not be computed as any part of the period within which the action shall be commenced. … — KRS 413.190 (Effective: October 1, 1942)

If a person entitled to bring any action mentioned in KRS 413.090 to 413.160, except for a penalty or forfeiture, was, at the time the cause of action accrued, an infant or of unsound mind, the action may be brought within the same number of years after the removal of the disability or death of the person, whichever happens first, allowed to a person without the disability to bring the action after the right accrued. — KRS 413.170(1) (Effective: October 1, 1942)

Limitations shall not begin to run in favor of persons coming temporarily into this state, but shall attach only in favor of actual residents in good faith, and after notice to the person to be affected thereby. — KRS 413.290 (Effective: October 1, 1942)

Borrowing statute — KRS 413.320

When a cause of action has arisen in another state or country, and by the laws of this state or country where the cause of action accrued the time for the commencement of an action thereon is limited to a shorter period of time than the period of limitation prescribed by the laws of this state for a like cause of action, then said action shall be barred in this state at the expiration of said shorter period. — KRS 413.320

If, by the laws of any other state or country, an action upon a judgment or decree rendered in that state or country cannot be maintained there by reason of the lapse of time, and the judgment or decree is incapable of being otherwise enforced there, an action upon it may not be maintained in this state, except in favor of a resident thereof who has had the cause of action from the time it accrued. — KRS 413.330 (Effective: October 1, 1942)

Tolling agreements are enforceable — KRS 413.265

Written agreements entered into in good faith and at arms length to extend limitations periods for the filing of civil actions, including agreements entered into prior to July 15, 1988, shall be valid and enforceable according to their terms. — KRS 413.265 (Effective: July 15, 1988)

Revival — what the statute books do and do not say

Chapter 413 contains no part-payment or new-promise revival section. The chapter's full official section list runs 413.010 → 413.340 and includes no revival, acknowledgment, or renewed-promise provision. The nearest statutory touch is a limiting rule for lien-secured debt:

(1) No promise, acknowledgment, or payment of money by any person bound on any bond or obligation for the payment of money secured by a lien shall operate as an extension of the time within which the lien may be enforced as against purchasers or creditors, unless, before expiration of the limitations period for enforcement of the debt under KRS 413.090(2) or 413.160, as applicable: (a) For liens secured by a recorded mortgage, a copy of the extension is recorded in accordance with KRS 382.297; or (b) For liens secured by a recorded deed, a memorandum notice of the extension is recorded that contains: 1. The book and page number where the deed is recorded; 2. A statement that the debt is extended; 3. The time period of the extension; 4. The amount of indebtedness remaining due; and 5. The signature of each promisor and the holder of the lien, acknowledged before a notary public. — KRS 413.100 (Effective: July 15, 2024; Amended 2024 Ky. Acts ch. 130, sec. 2)

Kentucky's statute of frauds does not list a promise to pay a debt barred by limitations among the promises that must be in writing:

No action shall be brought to charge any person: (1) For any representation or assurance concerning the character, conduct, credit, ability, trade, or dealings of another …; (2) Upon any promise to pay a debt contracted during infancy, or any ratification of a contract or promise made during infancy; (3) Upon any promise of a personal representative as such to answer any liability of his decedent out of his own estate; (4) Upon any promise to answer for the debt, default, or misdoing of another; (5) Upon any agreement made in consideration of marriage …; (6) Upon any contract for the sale of real estate …; (7) Upon any agreement that is not to be performed within one year from the making thereof; (8) Upon any promise, agreement, or contract for any commission or compensation for the sale or lease of any real estate …; or (9) Upon any promise, contract, agreement, undertaking, or commitment to loan money, to grant, extend, or renew credit, or make any financial accommodation to establish or assist a business enterprise … unless the promise, contract, agreement, representation, assurance, or ratification, or some memorandum or note thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or by his authorized agent. — KRS 371.010 (Effective: July 13, 1990)

There are only nine enumerated subsections, and none reaches time-barred debt. Answering the brief's question: no Kentucky statute requires a new promise on a time-barred debt to be in writing, and no Kentucky statute grants or denies revival by partial payment. Kentucky revival is common-law territory — see the FLAG in Traps.

State conduct law — Kentucky Consumer Protection Act

(1) Unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful. (2) For the purposes of this section, unfair shall be construed to mean unconscionable. — KRS 367.170

(2) "Trade" and "commerce" means the advertising, offering for sale, or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or thing of value, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of this Commonwealth. — KRS 367.110(2)

Private right of action — note the purchaser/lessee limitation and the two-year clock:

(1) Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method, act or practice declared unlawful by KRS 367.170, may bring an action under the Rules of Civil Procedure in the Circuit Court … to recover actual damages. The court may, in its discretion, award actual damages and may provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to limit a person's right to seek punitive damages where appropriate. (3) In any action brought by a person under this section, the court may award, to the prevailing party, in addition to the relief provided in this section, reasonable attorney's fees and costs. (4) Any permanent injunction, judgment or order of the court made under KRS 367.190 shall be prima facie evidence in an action brought under this section that the respondent used or employed a method, act or practice declared unlawful by KRS 367.170. (5) Any person bringing an action under this section must bring such action within one (1) year after any action of the Attorney General has been terminated or within two (2) years after the violation of KRS 367.170, whichever is later. — KRS 367.220

AG enforcement and the civil penalty:

(1) Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person is using, has used, or is about to use any method, act or practice declared by KRS 367.170 to be unlawful, and that proceedings would be in the public interest, he may immediately move in the name of the Commonwealth in a Circuit Court for a restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction to prohibit the use of such method, act or practice. … — KRS 367.190(1)

(1) Any person who violates the terms of a temporary or permanent injunction issued under KRS 367.190 shall forfeit and pay to the Commonwealth a civil penalty of not more than twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) per violation. For the purposes of this section, the Circuit Court issuing an injunction shall retain jurisdiction, and the cause shall be continued, and in such cases the Attorney General acting in the name of the Commonwealth may petition for recovery of civil penalties. — KRS 367.990(1)

Criminal harassment exposure — KRS 525.080

(1) A person is guilty of harassing communications when, with intent to intimidate, harass, annoy, or alarm another person, he or she: (a) Communicates with a person, anonymously or otherwise, by telephone, telegraph, mail, or any other form of electronic or written communication in a manner which causes annoyance or alarm and serves no purpose of legitimate communication; (b) Makes a telephone call, whether or not conversation ensues, with no purpose of legitimate communication; … (2) Harassing communications is a Class B misdemeanor. — KRS 525.080 (Effective: July 15, 2016)

Call frequency and call-time window — none, and the telemarketing law says so expressly

Kentucky has no numeric call-frequency cap and no statutory call-time window for debt collection. KRS 525.080 is an intent-based criminal standard, not a counter. Kentucky's telemarketing / no-call statute carries the time-of-day and no-call machinery, and it expressly excludes collection calls from "telephone solicitation":

(2) "Telephone solicitation" does not mean the following: … (b) A telephone call made to the debtor or a party to the contract in connection with the payment or performance of an existing debt or contract, the payment or performance of which has not been completed at the time of the call; — KRS 367.46951(2)(b)

So the federal floor governs: Reg F's 7-in-7 presumption (12 CFR 1006.14(b)(2)(i)) and the FDCPA/Reg F 8am–9pm consumer-local window are the operative limits in Kentucky.

Debt adjusting ≠ debt collection (KRS ch. 380 does not reach collectors)

The only Kentucky registration regime in this neighborhood is debt adjusting (debt settlement / debt management), and it exempts creditors and their agents:

(3) "Debt adjusting" means doing business in this state in debt adjusting, budget counseling, debt management, debt modification or settlement, foreclosure assistance, or debt pooling service, or holding oneself out as acting or offering or attempting to act as an intermediary between a debtor and his or her creditors for a fee, contribution, or other consideration … — KRS 380.010(3)

The following persons shall not be considered debt adjusters for the purposes of this chapter: … (4) Any person who is a creditor of the debtor, or an agent of one (1) or more creditors of the debtor, and whose services in adjusting the debtor's debts are rendered without cost to the debtor; … (7) Any person who is a creditor of the debtor, when adjusting a debt or debts owed by the debtor to the person. — KRS 380.030

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• Entry gate: none. Kentucky has no collection-agency license, no state registration, and no bond. There is no state regulator for debt collectors and therefore no penalty for "operating without a license." A third-party agency can work Kentucky accounts on federal compliance alone (plus whatever a local business-occupational license requires — see Traps).
• No mini-FDCPA. Kentucky adds no prohibited-practice list, no state mini-Miranda, no state validation notice, no state dispute-investigation clock, no fee-authorization statute, and no time-barred-debt disclosure. Everything a collector must say or must not do in Kentucky comes from the FDCPA, Reg F, TCPA, and FCRA.
• First-party creditors: the KCPA reaches "any trade or commerce" and is not limited to third parties, so a creditor collecting its own debt is in scope for the AG's unfair/deceptive theory to the same degree an agency is. But the private action under KRS 367.220(1) is limited on its face to someone who "purchases or leases goods or services" — a privity limit that has real bite against third-party collectors (see FLAG).
• Call frequency and hours: no Kentucky rule. Reg F 7-in-7 and 8am–9pm are the floor and the ceiling here.
• SOL — the number depends on when the paper was signed. Written contract executed on or before July 15, 2014 → 15 years (KRS 413.090(2)); executed after July 15, 2014 → 10 years (KRS 413.160). Oral/implied contracts and open store accounts → 5 years (KRS 413.120(1), (9)). Notes and other negotiable instruments → 6 years under KRS 355.3-118(1)–(2), with a 10-year absolute cutoff for never-demanded, never-paid demand notes.
• Open accounts start counting late. For merchant/store accounts the five years runs not from the charge but from January 1 of the following year (KRS 413.130(1)), and the judgment is capped at articles charged within the five years preceding the year of suit.
• Filing does not stop the clock — issuance of summons does (KRS 413.250).
• Penalties: no collection-specific penalty. AG injunction under KRS 367.190, then up to $25,000 per violation for violating that injunction (KRS 367.990(1)). Private actual damages plus fees and costs under KRS 367.220, within 2 years of the violation. Abusive calling can also be a Class B misdemeanor under KRS 525.080.

Traps / edge cases

• The 2014 cutover is by execution date, not accrual date. In 2026 both periods are still live: an account opened under a 2011 cardholder agreement is on a 15-year clock, one opened in 2015 is on a 10-year clock. Any Kentucky SOL logic that stores a single "written contract = 10 years" value is wrong for pre-cutover paper by five years. The controlling fact is the contract execution date, which is usually the account-opening date, not the charge-off date.
• FLAG — credit cards are not classified by statute (interpretation). KRS 413.120(9) covers "a merchant's account for goods sold and delivered, or any article charged in such store account" and (10) covers merchant-to-merchant accounts. Neither names a bank-issued revolving credit card, and KRS 413.090/413.160 do not define "written contract." Whether a Kentucky credit-card claim is a 15/10-year written contract or a 5-year open account turns on Kentucky case law and on whether a signed agreement exists — not resolvable from statutory text. Treat any credit-card SOL number for Kentucky as UNVERIFIED / attorney-review until a Kentucky appellate decision is pulled and added to this page. Do not ship a confident credit-card figure for KY.
• FLAG — revival is common law, not statute (UNVERIFIED). Kentucky has no part-payment or new-promise revival statute, and KRS 371.010 does not require a new promise on a time-barred debt to be in writing. KRS 413.100(1) is the only statutory touch, and it points the other way — it presupposes that "promise, acknowledgment, or payment of money" can extend the enforcement period, then blocks that extension as against purchasers or creditors on lien-secured debt absent a recorded extension. That is a strong negative inference that inter-party revival by payment or acknowledgment exists in Kentucky, but it is an inference, not a holding: the revival rule, the form it must take, and whether it restarts or merely tolls are all case law. Do not model automatic re-aging on payment for Kentucky until case law is pulled.
• Kentucky is the mirror image of Texas on revival. Texas statutorily forbids revival of time-barred debt-buyer claims (Tex. Fin. Code §392.307(d)); Kentucky says nothing at all. Do not carry a TX-style no-revival rule into KY, and do not carry a KY-style silence into TX.
• KRS 413.250 catches filers. A complaint filed on day 3,649 of a 10-year period does not preserve the claim if the summons issues on day 3,651. Kentucky's commencement rule is summons issuance in good faith, not filing.
• KRS 413.190 tolling applies to residents, not out-of-state debtors. Both subsections are written against "a resident of this state" who is absent or absconding; KRS 413.290 separately says limitations do not run in favor of persons "coming temporarily into this state." A debtor who was never a Kentucky resident is not obviously reached. Treat any KY tolling adjustment as attorney-review, not automatic.
• The borrowing statute is one-directional and shortening-only. KRS 413.320 imports the shorter foreign period when the claim arose elsewhere; it never lengthens a Kentucky period. On a portfolio of out-of-state-originated accounts sued in Kentucky, the governing period may be the origin state's, not Kentucky's 10/15.
• KRS 413.120(2) — "liability created by statute" — is a 5-year residual. A Kentucky statutory claim with no clock of its own (not the KCPA, which has its own 2-year rule in KRS 367.220(5)) lands at 5 years.
• FLAG — KCPA privity limitation (interpretation). KRS 367.220(1) grants the private action to a person "who purchases or leases goods or services." Kentucky courts have read that as a privity requirement, which is the standard defense a third-party collector raises to a consumer's KCPA claim. That reading is case law, not statutory text — the text quoted above is the whole of what the statute says. The AG's KRS 367.170/367.190 authority has no such limitation.
• Residual local-licensing caveat. The negative finding above is about state law. Kentucky cities and counties impose occupational-license and business-license taxes of general application; those may require a local registration for an office located in Kentucky. That is a general business-tax question, not a collection-agency regulatory gate, and it is out of scope for this page.
• KRS 355.3-506 (returned-check collection fee) was repealed in 1997. There is no Kentucky UCC statute authorizing an NSF collection fee. Fee authorization in Kentucky is contract-plus-FDCPA §1692f(1) only; there is no state fee statute to lean on.
• Time-barred debt in Kentucky is a defense, not a bar. Nothing in Kentucky law forbids suing on out-of-stat debt, forbids collecting it, requires a disclosure, or extinguishes the obligation. The federal Reg F rules (12 CFR 1006.26) are the entire constraint.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md — the whole conduct rulebook for KY
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md — 7-in-7 governs KY unmodified
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md — the only time-barred rules that reach KY
• ./tx.md — the revival contrast (TX statutory no-revival vs KY statutory silence)
• ./_matrix.md