New Hampshire — Unfair, Deceptive or Unreasonable Collection Practices (RSA 358-C) + SOL

Authority

RSA chapter 358-C (Title XXXI, Trade and Commerce) is New Hampshire's mini-FDCPA: a conduct-only statute with no licensing arm. Enforced by private action (§358-C:4, I — $200 per violation or actual damages), by counterclaim/set-off in the creditor's own collection suit (§358-C:4, III), by private injunction in superior court (§358-C:4, IV), and — because every 358-C violation is a per se RSA 358-A:2 violation (§358-C:4, VI) — by the Attorney General's Consumer Protection and Antitrust Bureau (§358-A:4) and by a private RSA 358-A:10 action carrying a $1,000 statutory minimum and mandatory 2×–3× enhancement for willful or knowing violations.

There is no New Hampshire collection-agency license, registration, or bond (verified negative — method below). Statute of limitations for suit on a debt: RSA 508:4, I — 3 years, one of the shortest in the country — except that negotiable notes ride RSA 382-A:3-118 at 6 years and sealed instruments/judgments ride RSA 508:5 at 20.

Verification note. The RSAs are published by the General Court at gc.nh.gov (the older gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/... URLs 301-redirect there); those pages fetch cleanly and all statutory text below is direct from them, pulled 2026-08-12. Two official NH hosts refuse automated access and were worked around:

• nh.gov / www.banking.nh.gov (NH Banking Department) — Akamai "Access Denied" 403 to both curl (any UA/header set) and automated fetch. The licensed-entity roster below was read from an Internet Archive capture of the official banking.nh.gov page (https://web.archive.org/web/20260201091839/https://www.banking.nh.gov/about-us, captured 2026-02-01). web.archive.org itself serves curl but 403s automated fetch.
• www.courts.nh.gov (NH Judicial Branch) — same Akamai 403, and the Supreme Court opinion PDFs have no Internet Archive captures. New Hampshire Supreme Court opinion text is therefore manual-verification-only in this environment, which is why the revival rule below is recorded as an unverified gap rather than a fact.

Verified negatives were established with the General Court's own full-text RSA search (https://gc.nh.gov/rsa/search/default.aspx — an ASP.NET postback form; drive it by POSTing ctl00$pageBody$txtJustRSa with the page's __VIEWSTATE / __EVENTVALIDATION). Searching the entire Revised Statutes:

Search term	Hits across the whole RSA
debt collector	5 — all of them RSA 358-C:1 through 358-C:5. Nothing else in NH law uses the term
collection agency	1 — RSA 359-B:12 (a credit-reporting disclosure-fee section)
collection agencies	2 — RSA 236:31 (toll evasion), RSA 384-G:11 (revolving-credit attorney's fees)
medical debt	0
time-barred	0
licensed to collect	0
new promise / part payment / acknowledgment of a debt	0 / 3 (none about limitations) / 0
borrowing statute / barred by the laws of	0 / 0

Operative text

Scope — RSA 358-C:1 (who is a "debt collector")

VI. "Debt" means any obligation or alleged obligation arising out of a consumer transaction. VII. "Debtor" means a person who owes or allegedly owes an obligation arising out of a consumer transaction. VIII. "Debt collector" means: (a) Any person who by any direct or indirect action, conduct or practice enforces or attempts to enforce an obligation that is owed or due, or alleged to be owed or due, by a consumer as a result of a consumer credit transaction; or (b) Any person who, for any fee, commission or charge other than wages or salary, engages in any direct or indirect action, conduct or practice to enforce or attempt to enforce an obligation that is owed or due, or alleged to be owed or due, by a consumer as a result of a consumer transaction; or (c) Any person who, pursuant to an assignment, sale or transfer of a claim against a consumer, engages in any direct or indirect action, conduct or practice to enforce an obligation that is owed or due, or alleged to be owed or due, by a consumer as a result of a consumer transaction. — RSA 358-C:1, VI–VIII

The two transaction definitions the three prongs turn on:

II. "Consumer credit transaction" means a transaction between a creditor and a consumer in which real or personal property, services, money or a form of money is acquired on credit and the consumer's obligation is payable in 4 or more installments or for which credit a finance charge is or may be imposed. The term includes consumer credit sales, consumer loans, consumer leases of personal property and transactions pursuant to a seller or lender credit card, but shall not include leases of real property. III. "Consumer transaction" means a transaction between a consumer and a person who sells, leases or provides property, services or credit to consumers. The term shall not include leases of real property. — RSA 358-C:1, II–III

General prohibition — RSA 358-C:2

No debt collector shall collect or attempt to collect a debt in an unfair, deceptive or unreasonable manner as defined in this chapter. — RSA 358-C:2

Prohibited acts — RSA 358-C:3

The chapeau, then the paragraphs that add to or differ from federal law:

For the purposes of this chapter, any debt collection or attempt to collect a debt shall be deemed unfair, deceptive or unreasonable if the debt collector: — RSA 358-C:3 (lead-in)

Call timing and frequency — an intent standard, no clock (I(a)):

I. Communicates or attempts to communicate with the debtor, orally or in writing: (a) By causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously or at unusual times or at times known to be inconvenient with the intent to abuse, oppress or harass any person at the called number; or — RSA 358-C:3, I(a)

Workplace contact — the one hard number in the chapter (I(c)):

(c) At the debtor's place of employment if said place is other than the debtor's residence, provided that: (1) a debt collector may send a single letter to the debtor at his place of employment if he has otherwise been unable to locate the debtor; and (2) a debt collector may phone the debtor at his place of employment if he is unable to contact the debtor at his residence, provided that: A. the debtor does not inform the debt collector that he does not wish the debt collector to communicate or attempt to communicate with him at his place of employment; and B. the debt collector shall not inform the employer of the nature of the call unless asked by the employer; and C. in no event shall the debt collector make more than one phone call per month to the debtor at his place of employment unless the debtor affirmatively indicates in writing that he desires the debt collector to call him at his place of employment. (For the purposes of this subparagraph, any language in any instrument creating the debt which purports to authorize phone calls at the debtor's place of employment shall not be considered an affirmative indication that the debtor desires the debt collector to call him at his place of employment.); or — RSA 358-C:3, I(c)

Identification on every writing and every call (I(d), I(e)):

(d) Using any written communication which fails to clearly identify the name of the debt collector, the name of the person (as defined in RSA 358-C:1, X) for whom the debt collector is attempting to collect the debt, and the debt collector's business address (the foregoing shall not require the name or address of the debt collector or the person for whom the debt collector is attempting to collect the debt to be printed on any envelope containing a communication); or (e) By placement of phone calls without disclosure of the name of the individual making the call and the name of the person (as defined in RSA 358-C:1, X) for whom the debt collector is attempting to collect the debt, or by using a fictitious name while engaging in the collection of debts; or — RSA 358-C:3, I(d)–(e)

Third-party disclosure, message-leaving, and the location-information rules (IV):

IV. Communicates or threatens to communicate, except by proper judicial process, the fact of such debt to a person other than the person who might reasonably be expected to be liable therefor; provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit a debt collector from: (a) Communicating information relating to a debt to a person residing with the debtor and reasonably believed to be a relative or family member over the age of 18, or to an attorney, financial counseling organization or other person who has notified the debt collector that he is representing the debtor; or (b) From leaving a message at the residence of the debtor containing no information other than a request that the debtor contact the debt collector about the debt; or (c) Communicating information relating to the debt to the debtor's spouse or, if the debtor is a minor, to the parents or guardians of the debtor where the purpose of the communication is solely to locate the debtor; provided that: (1) the debt collector has been unable to locate the debtor by other means for a period of 30 days; and (2) the debt collector, having once communicated with any of said persons, shall not again attempt to locate the debtor by communicating with said person; or (d) Reporting, or notifying a debtor that the debt collector may report a debt to: (1) a consumer reporting agency defined in RSA 359-B:3, VI, or any lending institution, provided that if the debt collector knows the debt to be disputed he shall notify the consumer reporting agency or lending institution that the debt is disputed; or (2) to an agent or attorney engaged for the purpose of collecting the debt. (For the purposes of RSA 358-C:3, IV, the use of language on envelopes other than the debt collector's name, address or telephone number, indicating that the communication relates to the collection of a debt shall be deemed a communication of the debt.); or — RSA 358-C:3, IV

Represented consumers — with a 10-day escape hatch the FDCPA does not have (V):

V. Communicates directly with the debtor, except through proper legal action, after notification from an attorney, financial counseling organization or other person representing the debtor that all further communication relative to the debt should be addressed to the attorney, organization or other person unless the attorney, organization or other person fails to answer correspondence, return phone calls or discuss the debt within 10 days or prior approval is obtained from the attorney, organization or other person or the communication is a response in the ordinary course of business to the debtor's inquiry; or — RSA 358-C:3, V

Fees and charges — conjunctive test (X):

X. Collects or attempts to collect any interest or other charge, fee or expense incidental to the principal obligation unless such interest or incidental fee, charge or expense is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the obligation and legally chargeable to the debtor; provided that the foregoing shall not prohibit a debt collector from attempting to collect court costs in a judicial proceeding; or — RSA 358-C:3, X

Fee-inflation representations (VIII, IX) and legal-process threats (XI, VI):

VIII. Makes any representation that an existing obligation may be increased by the addition of attorney's fees, investigation fees, service fees or any other fees or charges when in fact such fees or charges may not be legally added to the existing obligation; or IX. Makes any representation that an existing obligation will definitely be increased by the addition of attorney's fees, investigation fees, service fees or any other fees or charges when the award of such fee or charge is discretionary by a court of law; or — RSA 358-C:3, VIII–IX

XI. Threatens that nonpayment of a debt will result in the arrest of any person or the seizure, garnishment, attachment or sale of any property or wages without indicating, when a court order is a legal prerequisite to any such action; that (a) There must be a court order in effect permitting such action; and, where applicable, (b) That the debtor will have an opportunity to appear in court to contest such action prior to any such court order being effective; or — RSA 358-C:3, XI

The remaining paragraphs: II (force or violence), III (threatening unlawful action or "action which the debt collector in the regular course of business does not take"), VI (simulated judicial process), VII (material false representation of the character, extent or amount of the debt or its status in a legal proceeding), XII (threatening to sell the account with an implication the debtor loses defenses or faces "harsh, vindictive or abusive collection attempts"), and I(b) (profane, obscene or vulgar language) and I(f) (causing the debtor communication expense by concealing the call's purpose).

Returned-check fee cap — RSA 358-C:5 ($25)

I. A creditor involved in a consumer credit transaction or a debt collector designated to collect on a check, negotiable order of withdrawal, share draft, or other negotiable instrument may charge and receive a check collection charge of not more than $25, unless otherwise expressly authorized by written agreement with the consumer. II. … In the case of debt collectors, notification of imposition of a check collection charge pursuant to paragraph I of this section shall be done by telephone or written notice sent by regular mail to the debtor at the debtor's last known telephone number or address or at the address shown on the check or other instrument. The notice shall state the amount of the check collection charge that has been or will be imposed, and shall state that the debtor is responsible for paying the check collection charge as well as the value of the check or other instrument. — RSA 358-C:5 (added 1997, 161:1, eff. Jan. 1, 1998)

Remedies — RSA 358-C:4

I. Any debt collector who violates the provisions of this chapter shall be liable in any court of competent jurisdiction to the debtor for one of the following, whichever is greater: (a) In an action brought by and on behalf of an individual debtor only, the sum of $200 plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees for each violation, or (b) For all damages proximately caused by the violation. II. Notwithstanding the foregoing, a debt collector shall not be held liable in any action brought under this chapter for a violation if the debt collector shows by a preponderance of the evidence that: (a) The violation was a result of a computation error in billing and within 15 days of notification or discovery of said error the debt collector notified the debtor of such error and corrected such error; or (b) The violation was not intentional and resulted from a bona fide error or mistake notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error or mistake. III. In any suit to collect a debt, the debtor may raise, by way of counterclaim, set-off or recoupment, a violation of this chapter, and upon proof of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence, the court shall award damages to the defendant pursuant to this section and shall set such damages off against any recovery by the plaintiff. IV. Any debtor aggrieved by a debt collector's practices in violation of this chapter may bring an action individually and/or on behalf of others similarly situated in the superior court of the county in which he resides to restrain such practices by temporary or permanent injunction. If the debtor prevails in an action authorized by this paragraph, he shall be entitled to his costs and reasonable attorney's fees. V. If the court finds that an action initiated under this chapter was frivolous and brought to harass the debt collector, the debtor shall pay to the debt collector the costs of said action plus reasonable attorney fees. VI. Any violation of the provisions of this chapter shall also constitute an unfair and deceptive act or practice within the meaning of RSA 358-A:2 and may be enforced by the attorney general pursuant to RSA 358-A. — RSA 358-C:4

The RSA 358-A channel that §358-C:4, VI opens is the one with real money in it:

I. Any person injured by another's use of any method, act or practice declared unlawful under this chapter may bring an action for damages and for such equitable relief, including an injunction, as the court deems necessary and proper. If the court finds for the plaintiff, recovery shall be in the amount of actual damages or $1,000, whichever is greater. If the court finds that the use of the method of competition or the act or practice was a willful or knowing violation of this chapter, it shall award as much as 3 times, but not less than 2 times, such amount. In addition, a prevailing plaintiff shall be awarded the costs of the suit and reasonable attorney's fees, as determined by the court. Any attempted waiver of the right to the damages set forth in this paragraph shall be void and unenforceable. … — RSA 358-A:10, I

III. (a) Whenever the attorney general has reason to believe that trade or commerce declared unlawful by this chapter has been, is being or is about to be conducted by any person, the attorney general may bring an action in the name of the state … and may petition the court for an order of restitution of money or property to any person or class of persons injured thereby. … (b) … the court may make any necessary order or judgment and may award to the state civil penalties up to $10,000 for each violation of this chapter. … For the purpose of this section, the court shall determine the number of unlawful acts or practices which have occurred without regard to the number of persons affected thereby. It shall be an affirmative defense to the assessment of civil penalties that the defendant acted pursuant to a good faith misunderstanding concerning the requirements of this chapter. — RSA 358-A:4, III

The exemption that matters — RSA 358-A (and therefore the §358-C:4, VI channel, not §358-C:4, I) does not reach bank-regulated actors:

The following transactions shall be exempt from the provisions of this chapter: I. Trade or commerce that is subject to the jurisdiction of the bank commissioner, the director of securities regulation, the insurance commissioner, the public utilities commission, the financial institutions and insurance regulators of other states, or federal banking or securities regulators who possess the authority to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices. … IV-a. Transactions entered into more than 3 years prior to the time the plaintiff knew, or reasonably should have known, of the conduct alleged to be in violation of this chapter; … V. The burden of proving exemptions from the provisions of this chapter by reason of paragraphs I, II, III, IV and IV-a of this section shall be upon the person claiming the exemption. — RSA 358-A:3

Entry gate — none (verified negative)

RSA 358-C creates no license, registration, bond, or regulator, and no other RSA chapter does either: a full-Code search for debt collector returns only the five sections of RSA 358-C (table in the Authority section above). Title XXXV (Banks and Banking) runs from ch. 383 to ch. 397-B and Title XXXVI (Pawnbrokers and Moneylenders) from ch. 398 to ch. 399-G; neither contains a collection-agency chapter. The Banking Department's own statement of what it licenses confirms the roster from the regulator's side:

The Consumer Credit Division licenses, examines, and regulates companies that provide consumer credit, such as mortgage bankers, mortgage brokers, mortgage servicers, retail auto sellers, sales finance companies, money transmitters, debt adjusters, and small loan lenders. — NH Banking Department, "About Us" (official page, read from the 2026-02-01 Internet Archive capture; see the verification note)

The Department is also charged with the licensing and supervision of residential mortgage bankers, brokers, servicers and loan originators, money transmitters, retail sellers, sales finance companies, small loan lenders and debt adjusters. — same page

Debt adjusters are licensed; debt collectors are not. RSA 399-D licenses "debt adjustment," which is consumer-side work — advice, negotiating on behalf of a debtor, receiving the debtor's money for distribution to creditors:

IX. "Debt adjustment" means: (a) Providing debt management advice or counseling to debtors for direct or indirect compensation; (b) Creating debt adjustment contracts for debtors for direct or indirect compensation; (c) Negotiating with one or more creditors on behalf of a debtor for direct or indirect compensation; (d) Receiving for direct or indirect compensation as an agent of a debtor, monetary value or evidences thereof for the purpose of distributing, or supervising, coordinating, or controlling the distribution of, such money or evidences thereof among creditors in full or partial payment of obligations of the debtor; … — RSA 399-D:1, IX

Statute of limitations — RSA 508:4, I (3 years)

I. Except as otherwise provided by law, all personal actions, except actions for slander or libel, may be brought only within 3 years of the act or omission complained of, except that when the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission were not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered at the time of the act or omission, the action shall be commenced within 3 years of the time the plaintiff discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury and its causal relationship to the act or omission complained of. — RSA 508:4, I (RSA 508:4. 1969, 378:1. 1981, 514:1. 1986, 227:12, eff. July 1, 1986)

New Hampshire runs one undivided 3-year bucket: there is no separate written-contract, oral-contract, or open-account/account-stated limitations section anywhere in ch. 508. The 3 years is measured from "the act or omission complained of," not from a separately defined accrual event.

Chapter 508 yields to any other statute that sets its own period — this is the hook that sends negotiable notes to the UCC:

The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to cases in which a different time is limited by statute. — RSA 508:1

Sealed instruments and judgments — 20 years:

Actions of debt upon judgments, recognizances, and contracts under seal may be brought within 20 years after the cause of action accrued, and not afterward. — RSA 508:5

Notes secured by a real-estate mortgage — no independent clock:

Actions upon notes secured by a mortgage of real estate may be brought so long as the plaintiff is entitled to bring an action upon the mortgage. — RSA 508:6

which ties to the real-action period:

I. No action for the recovery of real estate shall be brought after 20 years from the time the right to recover first accrued to the party claiming it or to some persons under whom the party claims. — RSA 508:2, I

Tolling — absence from the state, disability, and a one-year second-suit window:

If the defendant in a personal action was absent from and residing out of the state at the time the cause of action accrued, or afterward, the time of such absence shall be excluded in computing the time limited for bringing the action. — RSA 508:9

An infant or mentally incompetent person may bring a personal action within 2 years after such disability is removed. — RSA 508:8

If judgment is rendered against the plaintiff in an action brought within the time limited therefor, or upon a writ of error thereon, and the right of action is not barred by the judgment, a new action may be brought thereon in one year after the judgment. — RSA 508:10

Negotiable notes — RSA 382-A:3-118 (6 years, not 3)

New Hampshire enacted uniform Revised Article 3 without variation, so a note runs six years and RSA 508:1 makes that displacement explicit:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date. (b) Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of 10 years. — RSA 382-A:3-118(a)–(b) (1993, 346:1, eff. Jan. 1, 1994)

Subsections (c)–(g) give the rest of the uniform grid: unaccepted drafts 3 years from dishonor or 10 years from the date of the draft, whichever expires first (c); certified, teller's, cashier's and traveler's checks 3 years from demand (d); certificates of deposit 6 years from demand (e); accepted drafts 6 years (f); and conversion, breach-of-warranty, and residual Article 3 claims 3 years (g).

Revival — no New Hampshire statute exists

A full-Code search returns zero sections for new promise, acknowledgment of a debt, revive the debt, or limitation of actions acknowledgment, and the three part payment hits (RSA 227-H:23, 411-A:23, 479-A:8) have nothing to do with limitations. Chapter 508 contains no acknowledgment or part-payment section, and RSA 382-A:3-118 is silent on revival. New Hampshire has no statutory revival rule — the question is governed entirely by common law.

UNVERIFIED — the NH common-law revival rule could not be quote-verified from an official source. New Hampshire Supreme Court opinions live only on www.courts.nh.gov, which 403s all automated fetch, and the opinion PDFs have no Internet Archive captures. The operative holdings (whether a partial payment or an acknowledgment implies a renewed promise, what form the acknowledgment must take, and whether any of it works after expiry) are therefore attorney-review / manual-verification items. Do not encode a New Hampshire revival boolean, in either direction, from this page.

What is quote-backed is the adjacent writing requirement for post-bankruptcy promises, which is a genuine statute and is frequently mis-cited as a revival rule — it is not one:

No action shall be maintained against any person who may have been discharged as a bankrupt under the laws of the United States, or under the laws of this state pertaining to insolvency proceedings or assignments for the benefit of creditors, upon any promise to pay any debt or demand from which he was or shall be released by such discharge, unless such promise is made after such discharge, and is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith. — RSA 506:2-a (1969, 303:1, eff. Aug. 29, 1969)

and the general statute of frauds, which reaches a promise to answer for another's debt (a guaranty), not a debtor's own acknowledgment:

No action shall be brought to charge an executor or administrator upon a special promise to answer damages out of his own estate or to charge any person upon a special promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another, or upon any agreement made in consideration of marriage or that is not to be performed within one year from the time of making it, unless such promise or agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged or by some person authorized by him. — RSA 506:2

Wages are effectively unreachable — RSA 512:21

New Hampshire exempts wages from trustee process outright, except on a debt reduced to a New Hampshire judgment, and even then exempts 50× the federal minimum wage per week:

The money, rights, and credits of the defendant shall be exempt from trustee process in the following instances, and the trustee shall not be chargeable therefor: I. Wages for labor performed by the defendant after the service of the writ upon the trustee. II. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph X of this section, wages of the defendant earned before the service of the writ upon the trustee shall be exempt except in actions founded upon a debt on a judgment issued by a New Hampshire court of competent jurisdiction. In such case, the wages of the defendant earned before the service of a writ upon the trustee founded upon a debt on a judgment to the amount of 50 times the minimum hourly wage as established by the Fair Labor Standards Act for each week shall be exempt. The employer shall pay said exempted amount to the employee on the usual payday unless other cause exists prohibiting such payment. … XI. Money, rights, and credits of the defendant deposited in any account designated as a payroll account. — RSA 512:21 (2004, 52:1, eff. Jan. 1, 2005)

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• New Hampshire is a no-license state. Nothing to apply for, no bond, no regulator, no penalty for "unlicensed collection" because there is no license. The entry gate is zero; the conduct gate is RSA 358-C.
• RSA 358-C reaches original creditors — but the coverage depends on the debt type, and that split is the single most misread thing about the chapter. Prong (a) of the "debt collector" definition has no fee requirement and no third-party requirement: it captures any person enforcing an obligation arising from a consumer credit transaction. A bank collecting its own card balance, a lender collecting its own installment loan, and the agency it hires are all "debt collectors." Prong (b) reaches fee-compensated collectors of any consumer transaction (the broader, non-credit category), and prong (c) reaches assignees, buyers, and transferees of a claim from any consumer transaction. So a hospital or a contractor collecting in-house on a single-pay bill with no finance charge and no installment plan — a "consumer transaction" but not a "consumer credit transaction" — appears to fall outside 358-C, while the agency or debt buyer collecting that exact bill is squarely inside it. (Interpretation from the definitional text; no NH case is quoted here for it.)
• There is no state call-time window. RSA 358-C:3, I(a) forbids calling "at unusual times or at times known to be inconvenient" only "with the intent to abuse, oppress or harass" — an intent standard, not a clock. FDCPA §1692c(a)(1) / Reg F §1006.6(b)(1)'s 8am–9pm consumer-local rule is the operative window in New Hampshire.
• There is no general call-frequency cap either — Reg F's 7-in-7 presumption governs. But there is one absolute number: one phone call per month at the debtor's place of employment, and it only unlocks after the collector cannot reach the debtor at home, and it evaporates the moment the debtor says not to call at work. Boilerplate consent in the credit agreement is expressly disqualified.
• Fees: NH's test is conjunctive. An incidental charge must be both expressly authorized by the agreement and legally chargeable to the debtor. Texas §392.303(a)(2) uses "or"; New Hampshire uses "and," so a fee that is in the contract but not lawful is still a violation. Separately, a returned-check charge is capped at $25 absent a written agreement saying otherwise.
• Represented-consumer contact has a 10-day escape. Unlike FDCPA §1692c(a)(2), which requires actual knowledge of representation and permits contact only with the attorney's consent or on the attorney's failure to respond "within a reasonable period of time," NH fixes the number at 10 days of the representative failing to answer correspondence, return calls, or discuss the debt.
• Damages stack in an unusual way. The chapter's own remedy is modest — $200 per violation plus fees. The teeth come from §358-C:4, VI: the same violation is automatically an RSA 358-A:2 unfair or deceptive act, which carries a $1,000 floor and a mandatory 2×–3× multiplier for willful or knowing conduct, plus AG enforcement at up to $10,000 per violation counted without regard to how many consumers were affected. A collector that is itself bank-regulated may be able to knock out the 358-A layer via §358-A:3, I, but not the §358-C:4, I layer.
• SOL is 3 years for essentially everything except notes. Written contracts, oral contracts, credit cards, open accounts, medical bills — all ride RSA 508:4, I's single 3-year personal-action period, because New Hampshire never enacted separate contract buckets. Negotiable promissory notes are the one carve-out at 6 years (RSA 382-A:3-118(a), reached through RSA 508:1). Contracts under seal and judgments get 20 (RSA 508:5).
• No time-barred-debt disclosure, no suit bar, no anti-revival statute. Expiry in New Hampshire is an affirmative defense and nothing more; Reg F §1006.26 is the only rule restricting suit on stale NH debt.

Traps / edge cases

• Do not read "creditor" in §358-C:1, IV as an exclusion. The chapter defines "creditor" separately and uses it in §358-C:5, which tempts the reading that creditors are outside the "debt collector" definition. They are not: prong VIII(a) has no actor limitation at all for consumer credit transactions.
• The 3-year clock runs from "the act or omission complained of" (RSA 508:4, I), not from a defined accrual event. New Hampshire has no statutory rule fixing the trigger for a debt claim at last payment, default, charge-off, or acceleration, and §508:4's discovery proviso is written for latent-injury cases. Any tool that computes an NH expiry date is making an accrual assumption the statute does not supply — surface that, do not hide it.
• Notes-collapse trap. Because everything else in NH is 3 years, it is easy to publish 3 for notes too. RSA 382-A:3-118(a) says six, RSA 508:1 makes it govern, and demand notes have no clock at all until demand — with a 10-year no-payment backstop under (b). A three-year answer on a note is wrong by a factor of two.
• Revival is a live gap, not a "no." New Hampshire has neither a revival statute (like Indiana's §34-11-9-1) nor an anti-revival statute (like Texas Fin. Code §392.307(d) or CPLR 214-i). The absence of a statute is not the absence of a rule — NH common law supplies one that could not be verified here. Treat NH as unknown, and specifically do not list it as a no-revival state.
• RSA 506:2-a is not a revival statute. It requires a post-discharge, written, signed promise to sue on a bankruptcy-discharged debt. It is a bankruptcy-reaffirmation rule and says nothing about time-barred debt.
• Wage garnishment is close to unavailable. Pre-judgment wages are fully exempt from trustee process (RSA 512:21, I–II), post-judgment collection requires a New Hampshire judgment specifically, and anything in an account "designated as a payroll account" is exempt outright (XI). A threat to garnish NH wages without a court order — or with an out-of-state judgment — risks §358-C:3, XI and §358-C:3, III simultaneously.
• The 30-day/one-contact locate rule (§358-C:3, IV(c)) is stricter than FDCPA §1692b. Federal location-information contact is limited to once "unless … the debt collector reasonably believes that the earlier response … is erroneous or incomplete"; NH allows the spouse/parent locate contact only after 30 days of being unable to locate the debtor by other means, and then once, period, with no re-contact escape.
• Envelope language is a disclosure. §358-C:3, IV's closing parenthetical deems any envelope marking beyond name, address, and phone number that indicates the letter is about a debt to be a prohibited third-party communication of the debt.
• No medical-debt statute — but not no medical rules. medical debt returns zero RSA sections. RSA 358-T ("Prohibition on Balance Billing Covered Persons for Health Care Services") restricts balance billing for emergency services, certain non-emergency services by nonparticipating providers, and ground ambulance services; it is a billing prohibition, not a collection-conduct or SOL rule, and is out of scope for this page.
• No borrowing statute. A full-Code search finds no provision importing another state's limitations period, so a claim that is stale where it arose is not automatically stale in New Hampshire — and RSA 508:9 pushes the other way, excluding the whole period a defendant was "absent from and residing out of the state," which on its face can extend an NH claim against a non-resident indefinitely. Choice-of-law and the constitutional limits on §508:9 are attorney territory.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md · ../federal/fdcpa/communications.md
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md · ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md
• ./ma.md — the opposite New England model: DOB license, $25k bond, 2-in-7 cap, scripted time-barred notice
• ./tx.md — also license-free, but with a bond and a statutory no-revival rule NH lacks
• ./_matrix.md