Louisiana — Liberative Prescription (Civil Code) + Collection Practices

Authority

Louisiana is a civil-law jurisdiction. It has no "statute of limitations" on debt. The governing concept is liberative prescription, in Civil Code Book III, Title XXIV (arts. 3447–3504). Prescription is not a procedural filing deadline layered on a surviving right — it is a mode of barring actions, and its mechanics (interruption, suspension, renunciation, the ban on contractual variation) differ from common-law limitations law in ways that change the arithmetic. Anything in this KB or in GetPaid's tools that treats Louisiana as "a state with a SOL like any other" will be wrong at the edges even when the headline year count happens to match.

Collection-side authority is scattered rather than consolidated — Louisiana has no mini-FDCPA:

• Entry gate: La. R.S. 9:3534.1(B) — registration with the Secretary of State.
• Practices: La. R.S. 9:3562 (Louisiana Consumer Credit Law, "unauthorized collection practices") — a third-party-contact and cease-contact rule, applying to creditors.
• General deception/unfairness: LUTPA, La. R.S. 51:1401 et seq. — enforced by the Attorney General (R.S. 51:1405(B), 1407–1408) and by private action (R.S. 51:1409).
• Prescription: C.C. arts. 3494 (3 years), 3498 (5 years), 3499 (10 years); La. R.S. 10:3-118 (Louisiana's adopted UCC Article 3).

Verification note. legis.la.gov serves current statute text as plain HTML at Law.aspx?d=<docid> and is not bot-blocked; every quote below was pulled directly from that official server on 2026-08-11 (doc ids are listed inline in source_urls). No Internet Archive fallback was needed. Caution flag: widely-circulated secondary summaries of "Louisiana time-barred debt disclosure" cite "La. Civ. Code art. 1788.14" and "CCP §337d" — those are California citations (Rosenthal Act / Cal. Code Civ. Proc.) mislabeled as Louisiana. No such Louisiana provisions exist; see Traps below.

Operative text

The civil-law frame — arts. 3447, 3452, 3467

Art. 3447. Liberative prescription Liberative prescription is a mode of barring of actions as a result of inaction for a period of time. — La. Civ. Code art. 3447 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983)

Art. 3452. Necessity for pleading prescription Prescription must be pleaded. Except as otherwise provided by legislation, courts may not supply a plea of prescription. — La. Civ. Code art. 3452 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983; Acts 2021, No. 259, §1)

Art. 3467. Persons against whom prescription runs Prescription runs against all persons unless exception is established by legislation. — La. Civ. Code art. 3467 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983)

Contractual variation is NULL — art. 3471

Art. 3471. Limits of contractual freedom A juridical act purporting to exclude prescription, to specify a longer period than that established by law, or to make the requirements of prescription more onerous, is null. — La. Civ. Code art. 3471 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983)

Three-year prescription — art. 3494 (open account, money lent, professional fees)

Art. 3494. Actions subject to a three-year prescription The following actions are subject to a liberative prescription of three years: (1) An action for the recovery of compensation for services rendered, including payment of salaries, wages, commissions, professional fees, fees and emoluments of public officials, freight, passage, money, lodging, and board; (2) An action for arrearages of rent and annuities; (3) An action on money lent; (4) An action on an open account; and (5) An action to recover underpayments or overpayments of royalties from the production of minerals, provided that nothing herein applies to any payments, rent, or royalties derived from state-owned properties. — La. Civ. Code art. 3494 (Acts 1986, No. 1031, §1; Acts 2018, No. 471, §1)

Accrual for that three-year period:

Art. 3495. Commencement and accrual of prescription This prescription commences to run from the day payment is exigible. It accrues as to past due payments even if there is a continuation of labor, supplies, or other services. — La. Civ. Code art. 3495 (Acts 1983, No. 173, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1984)

Five-year prescription — instruments and notes — art. 3498

Art. 3498. Actions on negotiable and nonnegotiable instruments Actions on instruments, whether negotiable or not, and on promissory notes, whether negotiable or not, are subject to a liberative prescription of five years. This prescription commences to run from the day payment is exigible. — La. Civ. Code art. 3498 (Acts 1993, No. 901, §§1 and 2, eff. July 1, 1993; Acts 1993, No. 948, §§6 and 9, eff. June 25, 1993)

Ten-year residual — art. 3499

Art. 3499. Personal action Unless otherwise provided by legislation, a personal action is subject to a liberative prescription of ten years. — La. Civ. Code art. 3499 (Acts 1983, No. 173, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1984)

Louisiana's UCC Article 3 analog — La. R.S. 10:3-118

Louisiana did adopt Revised UCC Article 3. Its §3-118 uses five years where most common-law states use six:

§3-118. Prescription (a) Except as provided in Subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within five years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within five years after the accelerated due date. (b) Except as provided in Subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within five years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of five years. (c) Except as provided in Subsection (d), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within three years after dishonor of the draft or five years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first. (d) An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller's check, cashier's check, or traveler's check must be commenced within three years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor or issuer, as the case may be. … (g) Unless governed by other law regarding claims for indemnity or contribution, an action (i) for money had and received, (ii) for breach of warranty, or (iii) to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this Chapter and not governed by this Section must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues. — La. R.S. 10:3-118 (Acts 1992, No. 1133, §3, eff. July 1, 1993; amended by Acts 1993, No. 948, §3, eff. Jan. 1, 1994)

Interruption — arts. 3462, 3463, 3464, 3466 (the clock RESTARTS)

Art. 3464. Interruption by acknowledgment Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the person against whom he had commenced to prescribe. — La. Civ. Code art. 3464 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983)

Art. 3466. Effect of interruption If prescription is interrupted, the time that has run is not counted. Prescription commences to run anew from the last day of interruption. — La. Civ. Code art. 3466 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983)

Art. 3462. Interruption by filing of action or by service of process Unless otherwise expressly provided by legislation, prescription is interrupted when the owner commences action against the possessor, or when the obligee commences action against the obligor, in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue. If action is commenced in an incompetent court, or in an improper venue, prescription is interrupted only as to a defendant served by process within the prescriptive period. If an action is commenced in a competent court of improper venue, prescription is suspended for a period of seven days as to a defendant not served by process within the prescriptive period. — La. Civ. Code art. 3462 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983; Acts 2025, No. 250, §1)

Art. 3463. Duration of interruption; abandonment or discontinuance of suit A. An interruption of prescription resulting from the filing of a suit in a competent court and in the proper venue or from service of process within the prescriptive period continues as long as the suit is pending. B. Interruption is considered never to have occurred if the plaintiff abandons the suit, voluntarily dismisses the suit at any time either before the defendant has made any appearance of record or thereafter, or fails to prosecute the suit at the trial. The dismissal of a suit pursuant to a compromise does not constitute a voluntary dismissal. — La. Civ. Code art. 3463 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983; Acts 1999, No. 1263, §2, eff. Jan. 1, 2000; Acts 2018, No. 443, §1; Acts 2021, No. 414, §1)

Suspension — arts. 3469, 3472 (the clock PAUSES)

Art. 3472. Effect of suspension The period of suspension is not counted toward accrual of prescription. Prescription commences to run again upon the termination of the period of suspension. — La. Civ. Code art. 3472 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983)

Art. 3469. Suspension of prescription Prescription is suspended as between: the spouses during marriage, parents and children during minority, tutors and minors during tutorship, and curators and interdicts during interdiction, and caretakers and minors during minority. — La. Civ. Code art. 3469 (Acts 1988, No. 676, §1)

There is no codified absence-from-the-state tolling analogous to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §16.063 — art. 3467 says prescription runs against all persons absent a legislative exception, and no such exception for nonresidence appears in Title XXIV.

Renunciation of accrued prescription — arts. 3449, 3450, 3451

Art. 3449. Renunciation of prescription Prescription may be renounced only after it has accrued. — La. Civ. Code art. 3449 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983)

Art. 3450. Express or tacit renunciation Renunciation may be express or tacit. Tacit renunciation results from circumstances that give rise to a presumption that the advantages of prescription have been abandoned. Nevertheless, with respect to immovables, renunciation of acquisitive prescription must be express and in writing. — La. Civ. Code art. 3450 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983)

Art. 3451. Capacity to renounce To renounce prescription, one must have capacity to alienate. — La. Civ. Code art. 3451 (Acts 1982, No. 187, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1983)

The 2024–25 amendments — tort only, contract/account untouched

Art. 3492 (the old one-year delictual article) was repealed and replaced with a two-year rule:

Art. 3492. Repealed by Acts 2024, No. 423, §2, eff. July 1, 2024. — La. Civ. Code art. 3492

Art. 3493.1. Delictual actions Delictual actions are subject to a liberative prescription of two years. This prescription commences to run from the day that injury or damage is sustained. It does not run against minors or interdicts in actions involving permanent disability and brought pursuant to the Louisiana Products Liability Act or state law governing product liability actions in effect at the time of the injury or damage. — La. Civ. Code art. 3493.1 (Acts 2024, No. 423, §1, eff. July 1, 2024)

The enrolled act confirms the change was confined to tort — art. 3494, art. 3498 and art. 3499 were not touched:

AN ACT To enact Civil Code Articles 3493.11 and 3493.12, and to repeal Civil Code Articles 3492 and 3493, relative to tort actions; to provide prescriptive periods for tort actions; to provide for applicability; to provide for an effective date; and to provide for related matters. … Section 2. Civil Code Articles 3492 and 3493 are hereby repealed their entirety. Section 3. The provisions of this Act shall be given prospective application only and shall apply to delictual actions arising after the effective date of this Act. Section 4. This Act shall become effective on July 1, 2024. — Enrolled Act No. 423, 2024 R.S. (H.B. 315)

(The articles were enacted as 3493.11/3493.12 and appear in the current Code, after Law Institute redesignation, as arts. 3493.1 and 3493.2.)

Entry gate — registration with the Secretary of State, La. R.S. 9:3534.1

§3534.1. Collection agent; registration; assignment of debt to collector A. For purposes of this Section, "collection agency" and "debt collector" are synonymous and interchangeable terms and mean any person, other than a licensed Louisiana attorney, who uses any instrumentality of intrastate or interstate commerce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another, and relative to Louisiana clients, notwithstanding the fact that such person has no employees, offices, equipment, or other physical facilities in this state, or any person who regularly attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due, or asserted to be owed or due another, and who is located in the state regardless of whether the person has Louisiana clients. B. Any collection agency or debt collector doing business in this state shall register with the secretary of state. The secretary of state shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary to provide for the registration required by this Section. C. In any suit brought by a collection agency or debt collector to collect a debt acquired from a client or customer via assignment, an agreement in writing by the such collector to expend time, effort, money, or other resources in pursuit of such debt, and to pay the credit grantor a net percentage of the amount collected on the debt shall be deemed a valid and enforceable assignment pursuant to this Section, and all other applicable laws of Louisiana. D. When such collector attempts the collection of a debt owed a credit grantor, the representation of the credit grantor by such collector shall in all instances be deemed as an assignment and authorization for the purpose of allowing such collector to bring legal action to collect the debt. … E. In any suit brought by a collection agency or debt collection to collect the debt of a client or customer, the formal assignment of the debt to such collector shall be presumed valid if a copy of the assignment is filed in court with the petition. If the defendant fails to object to the validity of the assignment prior to the filing of an answer, then the assignment shall be conclusively presumed valid. — La. R.S. 9:3534.1 (Acts 2006, No. 534, §1, eff. June 22, 2006)

The mechanics, from the Secretary of State's official filing form:

COLLECTION AGENCY/DEBT COLLECTOR REGISTRATION FORM (Pursuant to R.S. 9:3534.1 B) Enclose $25 filing fee … INSTRUCTIONS 1. File this form along with the $25 filing fee with the Secretary of State's Office. 2. You will receive a copy marked "Received and Filed" by the secretary of state. — La. Sec. of State form SS I-1 (rev. 01/24)

The form collects only: full legal name, jurisdiction of organization, address for service of process, employer (if an individual), and an authorized signature. No bond, no examination, no net-worth test, no stated renewal cycle, and no stated penalty for non-registration — R.S. 9:3534.1 contains no penalty clause, and the criminal-penalty section of the Louisiana Consumer Credit Law (R.S. 9:3553) does not list §3534.1.

Collection practices — La. R.S. 9:3562 (cease-contact cap)

§3562. Unauthorized collection practices Except as otherwise provided by law or this section, the creditor, including, but not limited to the creditor in a consumer credit transaction, shall not contact any person other than an extender of credit or credit reporting agency who is not living, residing, or present in the household of the debtor regarding the debtor's obligation to pay a debt. (1) Notwithstanding R.S. 9:3513 the debtor may waive the benefits of this section at any time by giving consent, provided such consent is given at a time subsequent to the date the debt arises. (2) The creditor may contact any person without the debtor's consent: (a) To ascertain information bearing on a debtor's credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics or mode of living which is used or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose of serving as a factor in establishing the debtor's eligibility for credit or insurance provided such contacts are not designed to collect a delinquent debt, or (b) To ascertain the whereabouts of the debtor when the creditor has reason to believe the debtor has changed his employment or has moved from his last known address. (3) If the debtor has defaulted on his promise to pay, and if he has given specific notice in writing by registered or certified mail, instructing the creditor to cease further contacts with the debtor in regard to the indebtedness, the creditor shall thereafter limit mail contacts to one notice per month so long as the notice is not designed to threaten action not otherwise permitted by law. If the debtor has instructed the creditor to cease further contact, as heretofore provided, the creditor may make a maximum of four personal contacts with the debtor for the purpose of settling the obligation provided such contacts are not designed to threaten action not otherwise permitted by law. (4) This section shall not prohibit the extender of credit from (a) contacting any person in order to discover property belonging to the debtor that may be seized to satisfy a debt that has been reduced to judgment; (b) making amicable demand and filing suit on the debt; or (c) contacting persons related to the debtor if permission is specifically given in writing at the time the debt arises or at any time thereafter, provided that such contacts are reasonable. (5) This section shall not limit a debtor's right to bring an action for damages provided by Article 2315 of the Louisiana Civil Code. (6) Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph (3), when the extender of credit has filed suit and obtained judgment he shall be permitted to resume contacts with the consumer against whom judgment has been obtained. — La. R.S. 9:3562 (Added by Acts 1972, No. 454, §1, eff. Jan. 1, 1973; Amended by Acts 1974, No. 466, §2)

Scope of that Part (it reaches assignees who collect directly, and exempts banks):

§3563. Applicability This Part applies to a person engaged in this state in making consumer credit sales or consumer loans and to a person who takes assignments of and undertakes direct collection of payments from or enforcement of rights against debtors arising from these sales or loans. This Part shall not apply to a licensed lender or to any person whose only act of extending credit is the making of a sale to a consumer by honoring a credit card issued by a supervised financial organization subject to regulation, supervision, or auditing by any state or federal agency, and where such seller receives payment for the sale from the credit card issuer and retains neither an interest in the extension of the credit nor a right of recourse against the buyer in the event of nonpayment of the account. — La. R.S. 9:3563

§3563.1. Financial institutions exempt Notwithstanding the provisions of R.S. 9:3563, banks, savings and loan associations, savings banks, credit unions, and any nonpublic elementary and secondary schools that finance their tuition, shall be exempt from the notification filing requirements under this Part. … — La. R.S. 9:3563.1

Fees — La. R.S. 9:3534 and 9:2781

§3534. Fees; attorney, collection agency A. Any consumer credit transaction agreement may provide for the payment by the consumer of attorney's fees not in excess of twenty-five per cent of the unpaid debt after default and referral to an attorney for collection. B. An extender of credit may not contract with a consumer for the reimbursement of fees paid to a collection agency employed to collect the consumer's indebtedness. — La. R.S. 9:3534 (Acts 1986, No. 584, §1, eff. July 2, 1986)

Attorney fees on open-account suits, and the statute's own (section-limited) definition of "open account":

§2781. Open accounts; attorney fees; professional fees; open account owed to the state A. When any person fails to pay an open account within thirty days after the claimant sends written demand therefor correctly setting forth the amount owed, that person shall be liable to the claimant for reasonable attorney fees for the prosecution and collection of such claim when judgment on the claim is rendered in favor of the claimant. Citation and service of a petition shall be deemed written demand for the purpose of this Section. … Receipt of written demand by the person is not required. … D. For the purposes of this Section and Code of Civil Procedure Articles 1702 and 4916, "open account" includes any account for which a part or all of the balance is past due, whether or not the account reflects one or more transactions and whether or not at the time of contracting the parties expected future transactions. "Open account" shall include debts incurred for professional services, including but not limited to legal and medical services. … — La. R.S. 9:2781 (Acts 1976, No. 399, §1; … Acts 2010, No. 695, §1)

LUTPA — La. R.S. 51:1405, 1406, 1409

§1405. Unfair acts or practices; interpretation and rulemaking authority A. Unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful. B. The attorney general may make rules and regulations interpreting the provisions of this Chapter … — La. R.S. 51:1405

§1406. Exemptions The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to: (1) Any federally insured financial institution, its subsidiaries, and affiliates or any licensee of the Office of Financial Institutions, its subsidiaries, and affiliates or actions or transactions subject to the jurisdiction of the Louisiana Public Service Commission or other public utility regulatory body, the commissioner of financial institutions, the insurance commissioner, the financial institutions and insurance regulators of other states, or federal banking regulators who possess authority to regulate unfair or deceptive trade practices. … (4) Any conduct which complies with section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act [15 U.S.C., 45(a)(1)], as from time to time amended, any rule or regulation promulgated thereunder and any finally adjudicated court decision interpreting the provisions of said Act, rules and regulations. — La. R.S. 51:1406

§1409. Private actions A. Any person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or movable property, corporeal or incorporeal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of an unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice declared unlawful by R.S. 51:1405, may bring an action individually but not in a representative capacity to recover actual damages. If the court finds the unfair or deceptive method, act, or practice was knowingly used, after being put on notice by the attorney general, the court shall award three times the actual damages sustained. In the event that damages are awarded under this Section, the court shall award to the person bringing such action reasonable attorney fees and costs. Upon a finding by the court that an action under this Section was groundless and brought in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, the court may award to the defendant reasonable attorney fees and costs. … E. The action provided by this Section shall be subject to a liberative prescription of one year running from the time of the transaction or act which gave rise to this right of action. — La. R.S. 51:1409 (Acts 1972, No. 759, §1; Acts 2006, No. 218, §1; Acts 2018, No. 337, §1)

Consumer Credit Law remedies and penalties — R.S. 9:3552, 9:3553

R.S. 9:3552 grants a consumer, after certified-mail notice and a 30-day cure window, a refund of the finance charge plus treble the finance charge and attorney fees for intentional or bad-faith violations:

(a) If the court finds that the extender of credit has intentionally or as a result of error not in good faith violated the provisions of this Chapter, the consumer is entitled to a refund of all loan finance charges or credit service charges and has the right to recover three times the amount of such loan finance charge or credit service charge together with reasonable attorney fees. The right to recover the civil penalty under this Subsection accrues only after: (i) Written notice is given to the extender of credit by certified mail …; (ii) A copy of such notice is mailed to the extender of credit's agent for service of process; and (iii) Thirty days have elapsed since receipt of such notice by the extender of credit, and the violation has not been corrected. — La. R.S. 9:3552(A)(1)

E. Any civil action under this Section must be brought within sixty days of final payment of the consumer credit contract, or in the case of a revolving loan or revolving charge account, within one year of the date of the violation. — La. R.S. 9:3552(E)

§3553. Criminal penalties A. … (3) A person who willfully engages in the business of making consumer credit transactions, or of taking assignments of rights against consumers arising therefrom and undertakes direct collection of payments or enforcement of these rights, without complying with the provisions of this Chapter concerning notification (R.S. 9:3563-3565), is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction may be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or to imprisonment not exceeding four months, or both. — La. R.S. 9:3553

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• Louisiana has prescription, not a statute of limitations. Practically, the biggest consequences for collections are: (a) an acknowledgment restarts the clock from zero (art. 3466), it does not merely extend it; (b) a contract cannot lengthen the period — such a clause is null (art. 3471); and (c) prescription must be pleaded by the defendant, and a court may not raise it on its own (art. 3452), so a time-barred suit that goes unanswered still produces a valid default judgment.
• Debt periods, by category:
  • Open account, money lent, professional fees (incl. medical) — 3 years (art. 3494(1), (3), (4)), running from the day payment is exigible (art. 3495).
  • Instruments and promissory notes, negotiable or not — 5 years (art. 3498); Louisiana's UCC analog R.S. 10:3-118 is also 5 years for definite-time and demand notes (not the 6 years most Revised-Article-3 states use).
  • Everything else personal, including an ordinary contract claim not fitting art. 3494 — 10 years (art. 3499).
• Louisiana draws no written/oral contract distinction. There is no separate oral-contract period; an unwritten contract claim is a personal action under art. 3499 (10 years) unless it falls into art. 3494's list. This is the opposite of the common-law pattern where oral gets a shorter period.
• Credit cards are the contested cell. Art. 3494(4) covers "an action on an open account," but the Civil Code does not define "open account," and R.S. 9:2781(D)'s broad definition is expressly limited "For the purposes of this Section and Code of Civil Procedure Articles 1702 and 4916" — i.e. it does not by its terms govern art. 3494. See Traps.
• Entry gate is registration, not licensure. Any collection agency or debt collector doing business in Louisiana registers with the Secretary of State — a one-page form and a $25 fee, no bond, no exam. The definition in R.S. 9:3534.1(A) is deliberately long-armed: it reaches an out-of-state collector with no Louisiana physical presence who has Louisiana clients, and reaches an in-state collector regardless of whether it has Louisiana clients. Licensed Louisiana attorneys are carved out.
• No mini-FDCPA and no first-party statute. R.S. 9:3562 binds the creditor / extender of credit under the Consumer Credit Law, not third-party agencies as such; third-party conduct is policed by the FDCPA federally and by LUTPA at the state level.
• The one real state contact cap: once a defaulted debtor sends a written cease-contact demand by registered or certified mail, the creditor is limited to one mail notice per month and a lifetime maximum of four personal contacts to settle (R.S. 9:3562(3)) — reset only by obtaining a judgment (§3562(6)).
• No call-time window in Louisiana law; the FDCPA/Reg F 8am–9pm rule is the floor.
• Fee rule that bites: a creditor may not contract to pass collection-agency fees to the consumer (R.S. 9:3534(B)); attorney fees are capped at 25% of the unpaid debt after default and referral (§3534(A)).

Traps / edge cases

• Interruption restarts; suspension pauses. Art. 3466 ("time that has run is not counted… commences to run anew") versus art. 3472 ("period of suspension is not counted… commences to run again"). Mixing these up mis-dates every Louisiana claim that has seen a payment.
• Partial payment as tacit acknowledgment — LABELED INTERPRETATION. Art. 3464 says acknowledgment interrupts prescription, but the Code does not say a partial payment is an acknowledgment; that classification is jurisprudential. Louisiana courts have long treated an unconditional partial payment as a tacit acknowledgment that interrupts, but this page does not verify that from official statutory text. Treat "payment restarts the LA clock" as a strong working assumption flagged for attorney review, not as a quote-backed rule.
• Credit-card-as-open-account — LABELED INTERPRETATION / UNVERIFIED. Whether revolving credit card debt is "an action on an open account" (3 years, art. 3494(4)) or a personal action (10 years, art. 3499) is decided by case law, not by the statutes quoted here. The brief's premise that a leading Louisiana Supreme Court case settles it could not be confirmed against any official source in this pass — legis.la.gov publishes statutes, not opinions, and the Louisiana Supreme Court's own site was not consulted. The 3-year figure is the commonly applied one; it is not quote-backed here. Confirm with counsel before relying on it.
• Renunciation is a live re-aging risk that has no common-law twin. Under arts. 3449–3451 an obligor may renounce prescription after it accrues, and renunciation may be tacit — inferred from "circumstances that give rise to a presumption that the advantages of prescription have been abandoned" (art. 3450). Only the immovables carve-out requires writing. So a Louisiana consumer's post-prescription payment or promise can arguably revive a dead claim through renunciation, which is the mirror image of Texas's §392.307(d) no-revival rule. There is no Louisiana statutory anti-revival provision. Whether a given act is a renunciation is a fact question — attorney-review territory, not calculator logic.
• A time-barred Louisiana suit is not self-policing. Because art. 3452 forbids courts from supplying the plea, prescription is an affirmative exception the defendant must raise. Nothing in Louisiana law bars filing on a prescribed debt the way Tex. Fin. Code §392.307(c) does. The restraint is federal — FDCPA §1692e/f — not state.
• No Louisiana time-barred-debt disclosure exists. Secondary summaries assert one and cite "La. Civ. Code art. 1788.14" and "CCP §337d." Those are California provisions (Cal. Civ. Code §1788.14, Rosenthal Act; Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §337d) mis-attributed to Louisiana. The Louisiana Civil Code has no article 1788.14. Do not ship a Louisiana TBD disclosure.
• Contract clauses lengthening prescription are null (art. 3471) — including, on its face, a cardholder agreement's choice-of-law clause selecting a longer-period state, to the extent it operates to lengthen the Louisiana period. Louisiana has no borrowing statute in Title XXIV; the interplay is conflicts-of-law analysis, not a table lookup. Attorney review.
• Contra non valentem is jurisprudential — LABELED INTERPRETATION. Louisiana's discovery-rule-like suspension doctrine (contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio) appears nowhere in the Civil Code; arts. 3467–3472 contain no such exception, and art. 3467 says prescription runs against all persons "unless exception is established by legislation." The doctrine is judge-made. Do not model it.
• LUTPA's private action is narrow: individual only, no class actions (§1409(A)), treble damages only after AG notice, and a one-year prescription from the transaction (§1409(E)) — shorter than the underlying debt claim. And §1406(1) exempts federally insured financial institutions and OFI licensees plus their subsidiaries and affiliates, which removes a large share of first-party creditors from LUTPA entirely.
• Assignment presumptions favor the collector (R.S. 9:3534.1(C)–(F)). A filed copy of the assignment is presumed valid, and becomes conclusively presumed valid if the defendant does not object before answering. Louisiana is unusually collector-friendly on standing/chain of title relative to states with strict debt-buyer pleading rules.
• The 2024 tort overhaul is a distractor. Acts 2024, No. 423 changed delictual prescription from one year to two and repealed arts. 3492/3493. It did not touch arts. 3494, 3498, or
  3499. Any "Louisiana changed its SOL in 2024" claim is about torts, not debt.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md
• ./tx.md — the anti-revival contrast (Tex. Fin. Code §392.307(d)) · ./ma.md · ./_matrix.md