Kansas — No collection-agency licensing; KCPA as the conduct statute; 5/3-year SOL with live post-expiry revival

Authority

Kansas has no debt-collection statute and no collection-agency license (see the negative-verification method below). The operative conduct law is the Kansas Consumer Protection Act, K.S.A. 50-623 et seq., whose "supplier" definition reaches debt collectors on its own text and has been so applied. Enforced by the Attorney General and by county/district attorneys (K.S.A. 50-632, 50-636) and by a private right of action (K.S.A. 50-634). Consumer-credit collection fees are capped by the Kansas UCCC, K.S.A. 16a-2-507. Limitations on suit: K.S.A. 60-511 (5 years, written) and 60-512 (3 years, not in writing), with negotiable notes at 6 years under K.S.A. 84-3-118.

Verification note. All statutory text below was pulled 2026-08-12 from the Kansas Office of Revisor of Statutes (ksrevisor.gov), the official publisher of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, which serves clean HTML at https://www.ksrevisor.gov/statutes/chapters/ch<CH>/<CCC>_<AAA>_<SSSS>.html. Two Kansas official sources bot-block automated fetch and were handled as follows:

• osbckansas.gov (Office of the State Bank Commissioner) — 403s automated fetch and an ordinary browser request. Sourced instead from an Internet Archive capture of the OSBC's own "About Us" page (captured 2025-01-16), quoted below.
• kscourts.gov (Kansas Judicial Branch opinions) — 403s all automated fetch, and the O'Malley opinions have no usable archive capture. Kansas case holdings below are therefore quoted from the Revisor's official annotations (ksrevisor.gov/statutes/annos/...), which are published by the same official body, and are labeled as case law rather than statute.

Operative text

Statute of limitations — the two contract periods

Kansas has exactly two contract limitations periods. There is no open-account statute and no separate credit-card provision (verified by enumerating all of Chapter 60, Article 5 — §§ 60-501 through 60-523 — on the Revisor's site; the only contract periods are 60-511 and 60-512).

The following actions shall be brought within five (5) years: (1) An action upon any agreement, contract or promise in writing. — K.S.A. 60-511(1) (L. 1963, ch. 303; L. 1965, ch. 354, § 12; eff. January 1, 1966)

The following actions shall be brought within three (3) years: (1) All actions upon contracts, obligations or liabilities expressed or implied but not in writing. (2) An action upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture. — K.S.A. 60-512 (L. 1963, ch. 303; eff. January 1, 1964)

Civil actions, other than for the recovery of real property, can only be commenced within the period prescribed in the following sections of this article, after the cause of action shall have accrued. — K.S.A. 60-510

Negotiable notes — K.S.A. 84-3-118 (6 years, NOT 60-511's 5)

Kansas enacted Revised UCC Article 3 effective February 1, 1992, so a negotiable note runs six years:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date. (b) Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of 10 years. — K.S.A. 84-3-118(a)–(b) (L. 1991, ch. 296, § 18; eff. February 1, 1992)

§ 84-3-118(c)–(g) give shorter periods for other paper: unaccepted drafts (3 years after dishonor or 10 years after the date of the draft, whichever expires first); certified checks, teller's checks, cashier's checks and traveler's checks (3 years after demand); certificates of deposit (6 years after demand); accepted drafts (6 years); and conversion / breach-of-warranty / residual Article 3 claims (3 years).

Non-negotiable written notes fall outside Article 3 and back into 60-511(1)'s five years — the Revisor's annotation to 60-511 records:

63. Action to enforce term of promissory note subject to five-year statute of limitations contained in subsection (l). Hoelting Enterprises v. Nelson, 23 Kan. App. 2d 228, 231, 929 P.2d 183 (1996). — Revisor's annotations to K.S.A. 60-511

Revival — K.S.A. 60-520 (⚠ part payment revives, and needs no writing)

This is the most dangerous provision on the page. Read the sentence structure carefully: the writing requirement attaches only to the acknowledgment or promise, not to the part payment.

In any case founded on contract, when any part of the principal or interest shall have been paid, or an acknowledgment of an existing liability, debt or claim, or any promise to pay the same, shall have been made, an action may be brought in such case within the period prescribed for the same, after such payment, acknowledgment or promise; but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby.

If there be two or more joint contractors, no one of whom is entitled to act as the agent of the others, no such joint contractor shall lose the benefit of the statute of limitations so as to be chargeable by reason of any acknowledgment, promise or payment made by any other or others of them, unless done with the knowledge and consent of, or satisfied [ratified] by the joint contractor sought to be charged. — K.S.A. 60-520 (L. 1963, ch. 303; eff. January 1, 1964). The bracketed "[ratified]" is the Revisor's own correction, footnoted on the official page as: The word "satisfied" should have been "ratified" instead.

The statute says an action may be brought "within the period prescribed for the same, after such payment" — it sets no cutoff at the original expiry date. Kansas courts have applied it exactly that way. The Revisor's official annotations to 60-520 record:

12. Partial payment on defaulted note, 12 years after last payment, revives entire note (principal and 14% interest). O'Malley v. Frazier, 29 Kan. App. 2d 947, 34 P.3d 478 (2001).
13. Part payment of time-barred note was qualified as to payment of principal only and did not obligate payor to pay past due interest. O'Malley v. Frazier, 274 Kan. 84, 49 P.3d 438 (2002). — Revisor's annotations to K.S.A. 60-520

Two further annotations constrain the doctrine:

4. Acknowledgment under this section must be unequivocal before statute of limitations tolled. Bowen v. Westerhaus, 224 Kan. 42, 49, 578 P.2d 1102.
5. Acknowledgment of liability must be made to creditor or his representative. Bowen, Administrator v. Lewis, 198 Kan. 605, 610, 426 P.2d 238. — Revisor's annotations to K.S.A. 60-520

And on part payment by someone other than the debtor:

8. Payment by principal debtor does not toll statute of limitations as to guarantor. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Galloway, 613 F. Supp. 1392, 1398, 1399 (1985). — Revisor's annotations to K.S.A. 60-520

Borrowing statute — K.S.A. 60-516 (a hard bar, not a comparison)

Where the cause of action has arisen in another state or country and by the laws of the state or country where the cause of action arose an action cannot be maintained thereon by reason of lapse of time, no action can be maintained thereon in this state except in favor of one who is a resident of this state and who has held the cause of action from the time it accrued. — K.S.A. 60-516 (L. 1963, ch. 303; L. 1970, ch. 236, § 1; eff. July 1, 1970)

Tolling — absence/concealment (K.S.A. 60-517) and the savings statute (K.S.A. 60-518)

If when a cause of action accrues against a person he or she be out of the state, or has absconded or concealed himself or herself, the period limited for the commencement of the action shall not begin to run until such person comes into the state, or while he or she is so absconded or concealed, and if after the cause of action accrues he or she depart from the state, or abscond or conceal himself or herself, the time of the absence or concealment shall not be computed as any part of the period within which the action must be brought. This section shall not apply to extend the period of limitation as to any defendant whose whereabouts are known and upon whom service of summons can be effected under the provisions of article 3 of this chapter. — K.S.A. 60-517 (emphasis added)

If any action be commenced within due time, and the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or, if the plaintiff die, and the cause of action survive, his or her representatives may commence a new action within six (6) months after such failure. — K.S.A. 60-518

K.S.A. 60-521 is NOT a co-obligor rule

Flagged because it is easy to mis-cite: 60-521 concerns public bodies, not joint debtors. The co-obligor rule is the second paragraph of 60-520, quoted above.

As to any cause of action accruing to the state, any political subdivision, or any other public body, which cause of action arises out of any proprietary function or activity, the limitations prescribed in this article shall apply to actions brought in the name or for the benefit of such public body in the same manner as to actions by private parties, except in (1) actions for the recovery of real property or any interest therein, or (2) actions to recover from any former officer or employee for his or her own wrongdoing or default in the performance of his or her duties. — K.S.A. 60-521

Conduct statute — Kansas Consumer Protection Act reaches debt collectors on its text

The KCPA has no debt-collection article. It reaches collection through the definition of "supplier," which covers a person who enforces consumer transactions whether or not dealing directly with the consumer:

(l) "Supplier" means a manufacturer, distributor, dealer, seller, lessor, assignor, or other person who, in the ordinary course of business, solicits, engages in or enforces consumer transactions, whether or not dealing directly with the consumer. — K.S.A. 50-624(l)

(c) "Consumer transaction" means a sale, lease, assignment or other disposition for value of property or services within this state, except insurance contracts regulated under state law, to a consumer; or a solicitation by a supplier with respect to any of these dispositions. … — K.S.A. 50-624(c)

Kansas case law confirms the application to collection agencies. Per the Revisor's official annotations to K.S.A. 50-634:

3. Debt collection agency is "supplier" within meaning of Consumer Protection Act. State ex rel. Miller v. Midwest Service Bureau of Topeka, Inc., 229 Kan. 322, 324, 623 P.2d 1343. — Revisor's annotations to K.S.A. 50-634

The two prohibitions that do the work:

(a) No supplier shall engage in any deceptive act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. (b) Deceptive acts and practices include, but are not limited to, the following, each of which is hereby declared to be a violation of this act, whether or not any consumer has in fact been misled: (1) Representations made knowingly or with reason to know that: … (2) the willful use, in any oral or written representation, of exaggeration, falsehood, innuendo or ambiguity as to a material fact; (3) the willful failure to state a material fact, or the willful concealment, suppression or omission of a material fact; … — K.S.A. 50-626 (emphasis added)

(a) No supplier shall engage in any unconscionable act or practice in connection with a consumer transaction. An unconscionable act or practice violates this act whether it occurs before, during or after the transaction. (b) The unconscionability of an act or practice is a question for the court. In determining whether an act or practice is unconscionable, the court shall consider circumstances of which the supplier knew or had reason to know, such as, but not limited to the following that: (1) The supplier took advantage of the inability of the consumer reasonably to protect the consumer's interests because of the consumer's physical infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, inability to understand the language of an agreement or similar factor; … (4) when the consumer transaction was entered into, there was no reasonable probability of payment of the obligation in full by the consumer; … — K.S.A. 50-627 (emphasis added)

Collection-fee cap — K.S.A. 16a-2-507 (UCCC, 15% ceiling)

(1) (a) With respect to a consumer credit transaction, the agreement may provide for the payment by the debtor of reasonable costs of collection paid to outside parties, including, but not limited to, court costs, attorney fees and collection agency fees, except that such costs of collection shall not: (A) Include costs that were incurred by a salaried employee of the creditor or its assignee; (B) include the recovery of both attorney fees and collection agency fees; or (C) be in excess of 15% of the unpaid debt after default. (2) A provision in violation of this subsection shall be unenforceable. — K.S.A. 16a-2-507(1) (L. 1973, ch. 85, § 35; L. 1994, ch. 276, § 1; L. 2024, ch. 6, § 58; eff. January 1, 2025)

Penalties, private right of action, AG enforcement

(b) A consumer who is aggrieved by a violation of this act may recover, but not in a class action, damages or a civil penalty as provided in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 50-636 and amendments thereto, whichever is greater. (e) Except for services performed by the office of the attorney general or the office of a county or district attorney, the court may award to the prevailing party reasonable attorney fees … if: (1) The consumer complaining of the act or practice that violates this act has brought or maintained an action the consumer knew to be groundless and the prevailing party is the supplier; or a supplier has committed an act or practice that violates this act and the prevailing party is the consumer … — K.S.A. 50-634

(a) The commission of any act or practice declared to be a violation of this act shall render the violator liable to the aggrieved consumer, or the state or a county as provided in subsection (c), for the payment of a civil penalty, recoverable in an individual action, including an action brought by the attorney general or county attorney or district attorney, in a sum set by the court of not more than $10,000 for each violation. … (b) Any supplier who willfully violates the terms of any court order issued pursuant to this act shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of not more than $20,000 per violation … (d) Any act or practice declared to be a violation of this act not identified to be in connection with a specific identifiable consumer transaction but which is continuing in nature shall be deemed a separate violation each day such act or practice exists. — K.S.A. 50-636 (emphasis added)

Protected-consumer enhancement — a second $10,000 layer:

If any person is found to have violated any provision of the Kansas consumer protection act, and such violation is committed against a protected consumer, in addition to any civil penalty otherwise provided by law, the court may impose an additional civil penalty not to exceed $10,000 for each such violation. — K.S.A. 50-677

(g) "Protected consumer" means: (1) An elder person; (2) a disabled person; (3) a veteran; (4) the surviving spouse of a veteran; (5) a member of the armed forces; and (6) an immediate family member of a member of the armed forces. — K.S.A. 50-676(g); "elder person" is defined at 50-676(a) as "a person who is 60 years of age or older."

The Revisor's annotations to 50-677 record that the enhancement has been litigated against a collection agency and that scienter is not required:

1. Knowledge by defendant of plaintiff's disability status is not a precondition for enhanced penalty. Lowe v. Surpas Resource Corp., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1230 (2003).
2. Issue concerning whether debtor was entitled to enhanced penalty under KCPA cannot be decided on summary judgment motion. Caputo v. Professional Recovery Services, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 1249, 1262 (2003). — Revisor's annotations to K.S.A. 50-677

Judgment dormancy and revivor — K.S.A. 60-2403, 60-2404

(a) (1) Except as provided in subsection (b), if a renewal affidavit is not filed or if execution, including any garnishment proceeding, support enforcement proceeding or proceeding in aid of execution, is not issued, within five years from the date of the entry of any judgment in any court of record in this state … the judgment, including court costs and fees therein shall become dormant, and shall cease to operate as a lien on the real estate of the judgment debtor. When a judgment becomes and remains dormant for a period of two years, it shall be the duty of the judge to release the judgment of record when requested to do so. Undisputed payments made prior to a request for a release of judgment are voluntary and not subject to refund or recoupment. (a)(2) A "renewal affidavit" is a statement under oath, signed by the judgment creditor or the judgment creditor's attorney, filed in the proceedings in which the judgment was entered and stating the remaining balance due and unpaid on the judgment. (c) The time within which action must be taken to prevent a judgment from becoming dormant does not run during any period in which the enforcement of the judgment by legal process is stayed or prohibited. — K.S.A. 60-2403 (emphasis added)

A dormant judgment may be revived and have the same force and effect as if it had not become dormant if the holder thereof files a motion for revivor and files a request for the immediate issuance of an execution thereon if such motion is granted. … If the motion for revivor was filed within two years after the date on which the judgment became dormant … on the hearing thereof the court shall enter an order of revivor unless good cause to the contrary be shown … — K.S.A. 60-2404 (emphasis added)

Call-frequency and call-time — no Kansas rule, and the no-call act excludes debt calls

Kansas has no call-frequency cap and no call-time window for debt collection. The Kansas No-Call Act reaches only solicitation calls, and expressly carves out debt-related calls from the definition it regulates:

(1) "Consumer telephone call" means a call made by a telephone solicitor to the residence or mobile telephone number of a consumer for the purpose of soliciting a sale of any property or services to the person called, or for the purpose of soliciting an extension of credit for property or services to the person called, or for the purpose of obtaining information that will or may be used for the direct solicitation of a sale … (3) "Unsolicited consumer telephone call" means a consumer telephone call other than a call made: … (B) primarily in connection with an existing debt or contract, payment or performance of which has not been completed at the time of such call; … — K.S.A. 50-670(a)(1), (a)(3)(B) (emphasis added)

Negative verification — no collection-agency license, no mini-FDCPA, no time-barred disclosure

Vendor and law-firm summaries directly contradict each other on whether Kansas licenses collection agencies (several assert an OSBC "debt collector" registration with a surety bond; others assert no licensing at all). None is a source of record. Three independent official methods were used, and all three return the negative:

1. The Revisor's official KSA index (ksrevisor.gov/statutes/ksa_index/) has no "Collection agencies" heading under C and no "Debt collectors" heading under D. The index's DEBTORS AND CREDITORS heading cross-references only Consumer Credit Code, Consumer Loans, Loan Brokers, Interest, Secured Transactions, Attachment, Bankruptcy, Executions, and Setoff — no licensing act, no collection-practices act.

2. The regulator's own scope statement. The OSBC — the agency the vendor pages name — enumerates what it regulates, and collection agencies are absent:

   The Office of the State Bank Commissioner regulates all state-chartered banks, trust companies, mortgage businesses, supervised lenders, credit service organizations, and money transmitters that do business in the State of Kansas. — Kansas OSBC, "About Us" (osbckansas.gov/about-us/), quoted from the Internet Archive capture of 2025-01-16, the official page being WAF-blocked to automated fetch

3. The current legislature's subject index for the 2025–26 biennium (kslegislature.gov/b2025_26/subject-index/) has no "debt collection," "collection agencies," or "medical debt" subject heading.

Consequences, all following from the same absence: no state licensing, registration, or bond; no mini-FDCPA (so no state-law overlay on validation notices, mini-Miranda, or communications with third parties beyond the federal floor); no state time-barred-debt disclosure; no state ban on suing on time-barred debt; and no first-party carve-out to worry about — the KCPA applies to original creditors and third-party collectors alike, since both "enforce consumer transactions."

The Kansas UCCC's unconscionability provision, unlike the uniform act's § 5.108, contains no "unconscionable debt collection" subsection — K.S.A. 16a-5-108 is confined to the agreement and its clauses. Collection conduct is therefore KCPA territory (50-627), not UCCC territory.

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• Nothing to get licensed for. Kansas is one of the states with no collection-agency license, registration, or bond. The entry gate is effectively zero; the exposure is all on the back end through the KCPA.
• The KCPA is the whole conduct statute, and it is broader in some respects than the FDCPA: it covers original creditors, deception is a violation "whether or not any consumer has in fact been misled," unconscionability reaches conduct "before, during or after the transaction," penalties run to $10,000 per violation with a second $10,000 for protected consumers, and continuing violations count per day.
• SOL is 5 years on written contracts, 3 on anything not in writing — and Kansas has no open-account category at all, so every account lands in one bucket or the other based on whether there is a signed writing.
• Negotiable notes are 6 years, not 5. This is the single most common Kansas SOL error.
• ⚠ Kansas is a live revival state, and the trap is part payment. A written, signed acknowledgment restarts the clock — that much is ordinary. But a part payment also restarts it and does not have to be in writing, and Kansas courts have applied 60-520 to revive a note by a payment made twelve years after the last payment. A single $5 payment taken on a decade-stale Kansas account can resurrect the entire debt. This is close to the opposite of the Texas rule.
• The borrowing statute is a hard bar. If the claim arose in another state and is time-barred there, Kansas will not hear it at all (unless the plaintiff is a Kansas resident who has held the claim since accrual). Kansas does not lengthen a foreign claim to its own 5 years.
• Judgments go dormant in 5 years and can be revived for another 2; after 7 years of inaction the judge must release the judgment on request.
• Collection fees on consumer credit are capped at 15% of the unpaid post-default balance, you cannot stack attorney fees and agency fees, and internal salaried-employee costs are not recoverable.

Traps / edge cases

• The 60-520 sentence structure. "…but such acknowledgment or promise must be in writing" modifies only the acknowledgment/promise branch. A part payment carries no writing requirement. Systems that model Kansas revival as "written acknowledgment only" will silently under-count revival events, and systems that assume expiry is final will mis-state the consumer's position.
• Post-expiry revival is real, not theoretical. O'Malley involved a payment 12 years after the last one. Treat any payment on a Kansas account — including a payment taken after the account is out of stat — as a clock-restarting event, and get counsel's sign-off before relying on expiry.
• Revival is limited in three ways: an acknowledgment must be unequivocal (Bowen v. Westerhaus) and made to the creditor or its representative (Bowen v. Lewis); a payment by the principal debtor does not toll as to a guarantor (FDIC v. Galloway); and under 60-520 ¶2 a payment or acknowledgment by one joint contractor does not bind the others absent their knowledge and consent or ratification.
• Do not cite 60-521 for the co-obligor rule. 60-521 is about public bodies. The co-obligor rule is 60-520 ¶2.
• 60-517 tolling is narrower than it reads. Its own last sentence shuts it off for any defendant whose whereabouts are known and who can be served under Chapter 60 Article 3 — so a locatable out-of-state debtor does not toll the clock.
• Written vs. not-in-writing is the whole ballgame for cards. Because there is no open-account statute, the credit-card bucket turns entirely on whether a signed written agreement exists and is producible. See the UNVERIFIED flag below — do not treat 3 years as a settled Kansas credit-card rule, and do not treat 5 as one either.
• Notes split two ways. Negotiable note → 84-3-118 (6 years, plus the demand-note rule and the 10-year no-payment backstop). Non-negotiable written note → 60-511(1) (5 years). One number cannot express both.
• The 15% fee cap is contract-level. A provision exceeding it is unenforceable (16a-2-507(2)), and you cannot recover both attorney fees and agency fees on the same debt.
• HB 2736 (2026 session) is a live watch item, not law. It would require hospitals to screen every patient for financial-assistance/charity-care eligibility before pursuing collections. As of 2026-08-12 it had passed committee (report of 2026-02-17, recommended passage as amended) and was pending floor action in the House. It is not authority.

UNVERIFIED / flagged

• UNVERIFIED — credit-card SOL bucket. No Kansas statute addresses credit cards or open accounts, and no Kansas appellate decision squarely holding that a credit-card account is (or is not) an "agreement, contract or promise in writing" under 60-511(1) was locatable on an official source. The nearest official signal is the Revisor's annotation to 60-511 — "23. Action held to be for enforcement of written agreement; provisions of subsection (1) apply. Clark Jewelers v. Satterthwaite, 8 Kan. App. 2d 569, 571, 574, 662 P.2d 1301 (1983)" — a retail credit-account case placing a written consumer credit agreement in the five-year bucket. Interpretation, not authority: a Kansas card debt supported by a producible signed cardholder agreement is more likely 5 years than 3; where no writing can be produced, 3 years applies. Attorney review before either value is presented to a consumer as settled.
• FLAGGED — post-expiry revival by part payment. The rule is quote-backed at the statutory level (60-520) and case-confirmed via official annotations (O'Malley), but the underlying opinions could not be read in full because kscourts.gov 403s automated fetch and has no usable archive capture. The direction of the rule is not in doubt; its outer limits (e.g. whether an involuntary or misapplied payment counts) are unverified. Manual verification recommended before this drives an automated re-aging decision.
• FLAGGED (watch) — HB 2736, 2026 session. Hospital charity-care screening before collections. Pending floor action in the House as of 2026-08-12; not law.
• Official Kansas sources that refuse automated access: osbckansas.gov (use Internet Archive captures of its pages) and kscourts.gov (use the Revisor's statutes/annos/ pages for Kansas case holdings). The Revisor's own ksrevisor.gov statute and annotation pages are reachable; its directory listings (/statutes/chapters/ch60/) are not, so sections are enumerated by the numeric filename pattern.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md
• ./tx.md — the contrast case on revival (TX bars it for debt buyers; KS permits it by unwritten part payment)
• ./mo.md · ./ok.md · ./co.md · ./_matrix.md