Illinois — Collection Agency Act (205 ILCS 740) + SOL

Authority

The Illinois Collection Agency Act — a licensing statute and a mini-FDCPA — is the controlling collections law. Enforced by the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR / "the Department") through licensing, discipline, fines to $10,000 per violation (§9(a)), civil penalties to $10,000 per offense for unlicensed practice (§4.5), cease-and-desist (§40), summary suspension (§45), and criminal referral (§14b, Class A misdemeanor / Class 4 felony on repeat). The Attorney General may enforce most of the conduct sections as unlawful practices under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (§9.7). Statute of limitations on suit for a debt: 735 ILCS 5/13-206 (10 years, written) and 5/13-205 (5 years, unwritten).

⚠ Citation change — 225 ILCS 425 is stale. ILGA publishes the Act's former home as "(225 ILCS 425/) Collection Agency Act. (Moved to 205 ILCS 740/; see P.A. 102-975)". The move took effect 1-1-2023. Every section carries a "(was 225 ILCS 425/x)" parallel cite, and section numbering was preserved — so old 225 ILCS 425/9 maps 1:1 to 205 ILCS 740/9. Any tool, template, or dispute letter still citing chapter 225 is citing a relocated act.

Verification note: ilga.gov's Legislation/ILCS/... pages are a JS-wrapped app, but the Legislative Information System serves plain statute documents at https://www.ilga.gov/documents/legislation/ilcs/documents/<DocName>.htm (same official publisher). All text below was pulled from those documents, plus the official consolidated Act page (ActID=4292&ChapterID=20), on 2026-08-11.

Operative text

Scope — §2 definitions (TWO conflicting versions currently published)

Two 104th-GA public acts amended §2 and have not been harmonized; ILGA publishes both. This is a live ambiguity, not a transcription error.

Version from P.A. 104-149 — enumerated-activity definition, expressly reaching debt buyers:

"Collection agency" means any person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly: (1) engages in the business of collection of any debt for others; (2) engages in the business of receiving, by assignment or otherwise, debt from any person who owns or controls 20% or more of the business receiving the assignment with the purpose of collecting moneys due on such debt; (3) sells or attempts to sell, or gives away or attempts to give away to any other person, other than a person licensed under this Act, any system of collection, letters, demand forms, or other printed matter where the name of any person, other than that of the creditor, appears in such a manner as to indicate, directly or indirectly, that a request or demand is being made by any person other than the creditor for the payment of the sum or sums due or asserted to be due; (4) engages in the business of buying debt; (5) engages in the business of using a fictitious name in collecting its own accounts, bills, or debts with the intention of conveying to the debtor that a third party has been employed to make such collection; or (6) engages in the business of collection of a check or other payment that is returned unpaid by the financial institution upon which it is drawn. — 205 ILCS 740/2 (Text of Section from P.A. 104-149, eff. 1-1-26)

Version from P.A. 104-297 — a single, far broader clause:

"Collection agency" means any person who, in the ordinary course of business, regularly, on behalf of himself or herself or others, engages in the collection of a debt. — 205 ILCS 740/2 (Text of Section from P.A. 104-297, eff. 1-1-26) (emphasis added)

Shared definitions (both versions):

"Debt" means money, property, or their equivalent which is due or owing or alleged to be due or owing from a person to another person. "Debt buyer" means a person that is engaged in the business of purchasing delinquent or charged-off consumer loans or consumer credit accounts or other delinquent consumer debt for collection purposes, whether it collects the debt itself or hires a third party to collect or hires an attorney-at-law for litigation to collect such debt. "Department" means the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation. — 205 ILCS 740/2

Exemptions — §2.03 (this is what keeps most first-party creditors out)

Sec. 2.03. Exemptions. This Act does not apply to the following: 1. Banks, including trust departments, affiliates, and subsidiaries thereof, and fiduciaries (except those who own or operate collection agencies); 2. Abstract companies doing an escrow business; 3. Real estate brokers when acting in the pursuit of their profession; 4. Public officers and judicial officers acting under order of a court; 5. Licensed attorneys at law; 6. Insurance companies; 7. Credit unions, including affiliates and subsidiaries thereof (except those who own or operate collection agencies); 8. Persons licensed pursuant to the Residential Mortgage License Act of 1987 when engaged in activity authorized under that Act; 9. Retail sellers collecting on retail installment contracts or retail charge agreements originated by the retail seller; 10. Unit Owner's Associations established under the Condominium Property Act, and their duly authorized agents, when collecting assessments from unit owners; 11. Any person under contract with a creditor to notify the creditor's debtors of a debt using only the creditor's name; 12. Persons licensed pursuant to the Sales Finance Agency Act when engaged in collection of accounts purchased or loans they made pursuant to that Act; 13. Persons licensed pursuant to the Student Loan Servicing Act when engaged in activity authorized under that Act; 14. Persons licensed pursuant to the Consumer Installment Loan Act when engaged in collection of loans that they originated under that Act; 15. Persons engaged in the business of originating loans of money pursuant to the Interest Act when engaged in collecting loans that they originated under that Act; 16. Motor vehicle retail sellers collecting motor vehicle retail installment contracts originated by the motor vehicle retail seller; 17. Any person licensed pursuant to the Consumer Legal Funding Act when engaged in activity authorized by that Act; 18. Any person licensed pursuant to the Pawnbroker Regulation Act of 2023 when engaged in activity authorized by that Act; and 19. Any person identified by the Department by rule. — 205 ILCS 740/2.03 (Source: P.A. 104-149, eff. 1-1-26)

Entry gate — license required, §4 (plus the interstate carve-out)

Sec. 4. No collection agency shall operate in this State, directly or indirectly engage in the business of collecting debt, solicit debt claims for others, have a sales office, a client, or solicit a client in this State, exercise the right to collect, or receive payment for another of any debt, without obtaining a license under this Act. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section, no collection agency shall be required to be licensed if the agency's activities in this State are limited to collecting debts from debtors located in this State by means of interstate communication, including telephone, mail, or facsimile transmission, electronic mail, or any other Internet communication from the agency's location in another state provided they are licensed in that state and these same privileges are permitted in that licensed state to agencies licensed in Illinois. — 205 ILCS 740/4 (Source: P.A. 104-149, eff. 1-1-26)

Penalty for operating unlicensed — §4.5, §14a, §14b

(a) Any person who practices, offers to practice, attempts to practice, or holds oneself out to practice as a collection agency without being licensed under this Act shall, in addition to any other penalty provided by law, pay a civil penalty to the Department in an amount not to exceed $10,000 for each offense as determined by the Department. — 205 ILCS 740/4.5(a)

Sec. 14b. Penalty of unlawful practice; second and subsequent offenses. Any person that practices or offers to practice as a collection agency in this State without being licensed for that purpose, or whose license is suspended, revoked, or expired, or that violates any of the provisions of this Act for which no specific penalty has been provided herein, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor. Any person that has been previously convicted under any of the provisions of this Act and that subsequently violates any of the provisions of this Act is guilty of a Class 4 felony. … — 205 ILCS 740/14b (Source: P.A. 104-149, eff. 1-1-26)

§14a additionally declares unlicensed practice "a public nuisance" and lets the Secretary, the AG, any State's Attorney, or any person obtain a TRO on a bare showing of non-licensure.

Bond — §8 ($25,000, creditor-protective only)

Sec. 8. Bond requirement. A collection agency shall be required to file and maintain in force a surety bond, issued by an insurance company authorized to transact fidelity and surety business in the State of Illinois. The bond shall be for the benefit of creditors who obtain a judgment from a court of competent jurisdiction based on the failure of the agency to remit money collected on account and owed to the creditor. No action on the bond shall be commenced more than one year after the creditor obtains a judgment against the collection agency from a court of competent jurisdiction. The bond shall be in the form prescribed by the Secretary in the sum of $25,000. … A license shall be cancelled on the termination date of the agency's bond unless a new bond is filed with the Department to become effective at the termination date of the prior bond. — 205 ILCS 740/8 (Source: P.A. 99-227, eff. 8-3-15) (emphasis added)

Debt buyers — §§8.5, 8.6

Sec. 8.5. Debt buyers. A debt buyer shall be subject to all of the terms, conditions, and requirements of this Act, except as otherwise provided for in subsection (b) of Section 8.6 of this Act. — 205 ILCS 740/8.5

(a) Debt buyers initiating actions upon an obligation arising out of a consumer debt shall be commenced within the applicable statute of limitations period. (b) With respect to its activities as a debt buyer in pursuing the collection of accounts it owns, a debt buyer shall be subject to all of the terms, conditions, and requirements of this Act, except that a debt buyer shall not be required to (i) file and maintain in force a surety bond under Section 8 of this Act; (ii) maintain a trust account under Section 8c of this Act; (iii) procure written authorization to refer the account to an attorney for suit under Section 8a-1 of this Act; or (iv) adhere to the assignment for collection criteria under Section 8b of this Act. (c) The Attorney General may enforce against debt buyers the provisions identified in Section 9.7 of this Act as an unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. — 205 ILCS 740/8.6

Prohibited practices — §9 (selected; all are grounds for discipline and declared unlawful)

(b) No collection agency while collecting or attempting to collect a debt shall engage in any of the Acts specified in this Section, each of which shall be unlawful practice. — 205 ILCS 740/9(b)

Fee rule:

(33) Collecting or attempting to collect any interest or other charge or fee in excess of the actual debt unless such interest or other charge or fee is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt unless expressly authorized by law or unless in a commercial transaction such interest or other charge or fee is expressly authorized in a subsequent agreement. If a contingency or hourly fee arrangement (i) is established under an agreement between a collection agency and a creditor to collect a debt and (ii) is paid by a debtor pursuant to a contract between the debtor and the creditor, then that fee arrangement does not violate this Section unless the fee is unreasonable. The Department shall determine what constitutes a reasonable collection fee. — 205 ILCS 740/9(a)(33)

Employer contact — an Illinois-specific pre-notice clock with no federal analog:

(18) Threatening to initiate communication with a debtor's employer unless there has been a default of the payment of the obligation for at least 30 days and the licensee has given at least 5 days prior written notice of the intention to communicate with the employer to the employee to the last known address of the debtor. — 205 ILCS 740/9(a)(18)

Frequency / time-of-day — an intent-and-harassment standard, no numeric cap:

(19) Communicating with the debtor or any member of the debtor's family at such a time of day or night and with such frequency as to constitute harassment of the debtor or any member of the debtor's family. For purposes of this Section the following conduct shall constitute harassment: (A) Communicating with the debtor or any member of his or her family in connection with the collection of any debt without the prior consent of the debtor given directly to the debt collector, or the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which should be known to be inconvenient to the debtor. In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a debt collector shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a consumer is after 8 o'clock a.m. and before 9 o'clock p.m. in the debtor's local time. (B) The threat of publication or publication of a list of consumers who allegedly refuse to pay debts, except to a consumer reporting agency. (C) The threat of advertisement or advertisement for sale of any debt to coerce payment of the debt. (D) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone conversation repeatedly or continuously with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass any person at the called number. — 205 ILCS 740/9(a)(19) (emphasis added)

The same window is restated as a standalone communication rule:

(1) At any unusual time, place, or manner that is known or should be known to be inconvenient to the debtor. In the absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a collection agency shall assume that the convenient time for communicating with a debtor is after 8:00 a.m. and before 9:00 p.m. in the debtor's local time. — 205 ILCS 740/9.2(a)(1)

Misrepresentation highlights: (24) enforcing a right "with knowledge or reason to know that the right or remedy does not exist"; (26) simulating legal or judicial process; (30) "Misrepresenting the amount of the debt alleged to be owed"; (31) representing that a debt may be increased by fees "when such fees or charges may not legally be added"; (32) falsely representing the agency is an attorney.

Validation — §9.3 (5-day notice, 30-day dispute, cease-collection)

(a) Within 5 days after the initial communication with a debtor in connection with the collection of any debt, a collection agency shall, unless the following information is contained in the initial communication or the debtor has paid the debt, send the debtor a written notice with each of the following disclosures: (1) The amount of the debt. (2) The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed. (3) That, unless the debtor, within 30 days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the collection agency. … (b) If the debtor notifies the collection agency in writing within the 30-day period … the collection agency shall cease collection of the debt, or any disputed portion thereof, until the collection agency obtains verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment or the name and address of the original creditor and mails a copy … to the debtor. (c) The failure of a debtor to dispute the validity of a debt under this Section shall not be construed by any court as an admission of liability by the debtor. — 205 ILCS 740/9.3

Coerced debt — §9.6 (NEW, P.A. 104-297, eff. 1-1-2026)

A private right of action with its own cease clocks and an SOL-tolling rule:

(a) A debtor is not liable for any coerced debt, as defined in this Act, and may assert that the debtor has incurred a coerced debt by providing to a collection agency a written statement of coerced debt. (e) … the collection agency shall review and consider all the information received from the debtor … within 90 days after receipt. (1) Within 10 days after receipt of the complete statement of coerced debt and supporting information, the collection agency shall (i) cease any pre-judgment attempts to collect the coerced debt from the debtor, including refraining from filing any lawsuit or arbitration to collect the coerced debt; and (ii) notify any consumer reporting agency to which the collection agency or creditor furnished adverse information about the debtor that the debtor disputes the adverse information. (f) In any lawsuit or arbitration to collect a debt, it shall be an affirmative defense that the debt is or is partially coerced debt. … (i) Any statute of limitation that may apply to a debt that is alleged to be coerced debt shall be tolled for the duration of any time period during which the collection agency is temporarily prevented from commencing legal action related to the debt or any portion of the debt. (m) Any collection agency who fails to comply with any provision of this Section is liable to the debtor for the greater of actual damages or damages of up to $2,500 as the court may allow for each debt, court costs, and reasonable attorney's fees. — 205 ILCS 740/9.6 (Source: P.A. 104-297, eff. 1-1-26)

"Coerced debt" is defined in the P.A. 104-297 version of §2 as debt (other than debt secured by real property) incurred "because of fraud, duress, intimidation, threat, force, coercion, undue influence, or the non-consensual use of the debtor's personal identifying information between family or household members … as a result of abuse or exploitation … or due to human trafficking".

Identity theft — §9.4

Documented written claim (police report + statutory affidavit) triggers a cease-until-review duty; the agency may resume only "upon making a good faith determination that the information does not establish that the debtor is not responsible," after written notice of that determination; if it ceases permanently it must tell the CRA to delete the adverse tradeline (§9.4(a), (d), (f)).

AG enforcement and the FDCPA safe harbor — §§9.7, 60

Sec. 9.7. … The Attorney General may enforce the knowing violation of Section 9 (except for items (2) through (4), (7) through (9), (11) through (13), and (23) of subsection (a)), 9.1, 9.2, 9.3, or 9.4 of this Act as an unlawful practice under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. — 205 ILCS 740/9.7

Sec. 60. Liability; federal compliance. A collection agency or a debt buyer shall not be subject to civil liability for its failure to comply with Section 2, 9.1, 9.2, or 9.3 of this Act, as amended by Public Act 99-227, if the collection agency or the debt buyer can demonstrate compliance with comparable provisions of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. — 205 ILCS 740/60

Statute of limitations — 735 ILCS 5/13-206 (10 years, written) with the revival proviso

Sec. 13-206. Ten year limitation. Except as provided in Section 2-725 of the "Uniform Commercial Code", actions on bonds, promissory notes, bills of exchange, written leases, written contracts, or other evidences of indebtedness in writing and actions brought under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act shall be commenced within 10 years next after the cause of action accrued; but if any payment or new promise to pay has been made, in writing, on any bond, note, bill, lease, contract, or other written evidence of indebtedness, within or after the period of 10 years, then an action may be commenced thereon at any time within 10 years after the time of such payment or promise to pay. For purposes of this Section, with regard to promissory notes dated on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1997, a cause of action on a promissory note payable at a definite date accrues on the due date or date stated in the promissory note or the date upon which the promissory note is accelerated. With respect to a demand promissory note dated on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1997, if a demand for payment is made to the maker of the demand promissory note, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the demand promissory note must be commenced within 10 years after the demand. An action to enforce a demand promissory note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the demand promissory note has been paid for a continuous period of 10 years and no demand for payment has been made to the maker during that period. — 735 ILCS 5/13-206 (Source: P.A. 95-209, eff. 8-16-07) (emphasis added)

SOL — 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (5 years, unwritten / catch-all)

Sec. 13-205. Five year limitation. Except as provided in Section 2-725 of the "Uniform Commercial Code", approved July 31, 1961, as amended, and Section 11-13 of "The Illinois Public Aid Code", approved April 11, 1967, as amended, actions on unwritten contracts, expressed or implied, or on awards of arbitration, or to recover damages for an injury done to property, real or personal, or to recover the possession of personal property or damages for the detention or conversion thereof, and all civil actions not otherwise provided for, shall be commenced within 5 years next after the cause of action accrued. — 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (Source: P.A. 82-280)

Negotiable instruments — 810 ILCS 5/3-118: Illinois blanked (a) and (b)

Sec. 3-118. Statute of limitations. (a) (Blank). (b) (Blank). (c) Except as provided in subsection (d), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to an unaccepted draft to pay the draft must be commenced within 3 years after dishonor of the draft or 10 years after the date of the draft, whichever period expires first. (d) An action to enforce the obligation of the acceptor of a certified check or the issuer of a teller's check, cashier's check, or traveler's check must be commenced within 3 years after demand for payment is made to the acceptor or issuer, as the case may be. (e) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to a certificate of deposit to pay the instrument must be commenced within 6 years after demand for payment is made to the maker, but if the instrument states a due date and the maker is not required to pay before that date, the 6-year period begins when a demand for payment is in effect and the due date has passed. (f) An action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay an accepted draft, other than a certified check, must be commenced (i) within 6 years after the due date or dates stated in the draft or acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable at a definite time, or (ii) within 6 years after the date of the acceptance if the obligation of the acceptor is payable on demand. (g) Unless governed by other law regarding claims for indemnity or contribution, an action (i) for conversion of an instrument, for money had and received, or like action based on conversion, (ii) for breach of warranty, or (iii) to enforce an obligation, duty, or right arising under this Article and not governed by this Section must be commenced within 3 years after the cause of action accrues. — 810 ILCS 5/3-118 (Source: P.A. 90-451, eff. 1-1-98)

Uniform §3-118(a) (6 years, note payable at a definite time) and (b) (demand note) are not in force in Illinois. Promissory notes are instead governed by 13-206's 10-year period and its 1997 accrual rules, quoted above.

Goods and municipal-ordinance debt

(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitation to not less than one year but may not extend it. — 810 ILCS 5/2-725(1) (Source: Laws 1961, p. 2101)

Sec. 13-227. Collection of debt arising from a municipal violation. An action to collect a debt arising from a violation of a municipal ordinance may not be filed more than 7 years after the date of adjudication. — 735 ILCS 5/13-227 (Source: P.A. 102-192, eff. 7-30-21)

Tolling

Sec. 13-208. Absence from State. (a) If, when the cause of action accrues against a person, he or she is out of the state, the action may be commenced within the times herein limited, after his or her coming into or return to the state; and if, after the cause of action accrues, he or she departs from and resides out of the state, the time of his or her absence is no part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. (b) For purposes of subsection (a) of this Section no person shall be considered to be out of the State or to have departed from the State or to reside outside of the State during any period when he or she is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State with respect to that cause of action pursuant to Sections 2-208 and 2-209 of this Act, Section 10-301 of "The Illinois Vehicle Code", Section 5.25 of the "Business Corporation Act of 1983", or any other statute authorizing service of process which would subject that person to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State. … — 735 ILCS 5/13-208

Borrowing statute:

Sec. 13-210. Foreign limitation. When a cause of action has arisen in a state or territory out of this State, or in a foreign country, and, by the laws thereof, an action thereon cannot be maintained by reason of the lapse of time, an action thereon shall not be maintained in this State. — 735 ILCS 5/13-210 (Source: P.A. 83-707)

Sec. 13-215. Fraudulent concealment. If a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals the cause of such action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the action may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the person entitled to bring the same discovers that he or she has such cause of action, and not afterwards. — 735 ILCS 5/13-215

Sec. 13-216. Stay of action. When the commencement of an action is stayed by injunction, order of a court, or statutory prohibition, the time of the continuance of the injunction or prohibition is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. — 735 ILCS 5/13-216

Minority/disability tolling runs 2 years past majority or removal of the disability, but is capped for debt claims:

In no event shall the period of limitations for a cause of action under Section 13-205 or 13-206 of this Code be stayed in excess of 10 years from the date of the adjudication of legal disability. — 735 ILCS 5/13-211(b) (Source: P.A. 98-1077, eff. 1-1-15)

Judgments — enforcement, revival, and the 2026 consumer-debt rewrite

(a) Except as herein provided, no judgment shall be enforced after the expiration of 7 years from the time the same is rendered, except upon the revival of the same by a proceeding provided by Section 2-1601 of this Act; but real estate, levied upon within the 7 years, may be sold to enforce the judgment at any time within one year after the expiration of the 7 years. … Consumer debt judgments may be revived or enforced in accordance with subsection (a-10) of Section 2-1602. — 735 ILCS 5/12-108(a) (Source: P.A. 104-120, eff. 1-1-26) (emphasis added)

Sec. 13-218. Revival of judgment. A petition to revive a judgment, as provided by Section 2-1601 of this Code, may be filed no later than 20 years next after the date of entry of such judgment. The provisions of this amendatory Act of the 96th General Assembly are declarative of existing law. This Section does not apply to consumer debt judgments that are subject to the standards and procedures set forth in subsection (a-10) of 2-1602. — 735 ILCS 5/13-218 (Source: P.A. 104-120, eff. 1-1-26) (emphasis added)

The three-tier consumer-debt-judgment regime:

(a-5) As used in this Section: (1) "Consumer debt" means money or property, or the equivalent, due or owing, or alleged to be due or owing, from a natural person by reason of a transaction in which property, services, or money is acquired by that natural person for personal, family, or household purposes. (2) "Consumer debt judgment" means a judgment recovered in any court against one or more natural persons arising out of a consumer debt. "Consumer debt judgment" does not include any compensation for bodily injury or death, nor any judgment entered if the debt is guaranteed by or contains a joint and several liability provision between a natural person and a business, whether or not that business is legally constituted under the laws of this State or any other state. (a-10) The following revival standards apply to judgments relating to consumer debt that were entered prior to January 1, 2020, and consumer debt judgments: (1) A judgment relating to consumer debt entered before January 1, 2020 is not a consumer debt judgment and may be revived in accordance with subsection (a). (2) A consumer debt judgment entered on or after January 1, 2020 through the date preceding the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 104th General Assembly may be revived by filing a petition to revive the consumer debt judgment no later than 10 years after its entry and by serving the petition and entering a court order as provided in this Section. (3) A consumer debt judgment entered on or after the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 104th General Assembly may not be revived but may be enforceable for a period of 15 years after its entry. The provisions of this amendatory Act of the 104th General Assembly are declarative of existing law, except subdivision (a-10)(3). — 735 ILCS 5/2-1602 (Source: P.A. 104-120, eff. 1-1-26) (emphasis added)

Sunset status — the Act is no longer on the sunset list (but the list is unharmonized)

The Regulatory Sunset Act version enacted by P.A. 104-149 — the same act that comprehensively rewrote the Collection Agency Act effective 1-1-26 — omits the Act from the 2026 repeal list:

Sec. 4.36. Acts repealed on January 1, 2026. The following Acts are repealed on January 1, 2026: The Barber, Cosmetology, Esthetics, Hair Braiding, and Nail Technology Act of 1985. The Hearing Instrument Consumer Protection Act. The Illinois Athletic Trainers Practice Act. The Illinois Dental Practice Act. The Illinois Roofing Industry Licensing Act. The Illinois Physical Therapy Act. The Professional Geologist Licensing Act. The Respiratory Care Practice Act. — 5 ILCS 80/4.36 (Text of Section from P.A. 104-149, eff. 1-1-26)

Six other published versions of the same section (P.A. 104-151, 104-152, 104-153, 104-154, 104-296, 104-427) do still list "The Collection Agency Act." No sunset section for 2027–2033 (5 ILCS 80/4.37–4.43) names it. See Traps.

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• Cite 205 ILCS 740, not 225 ILCS 425. Same section numbers, new chapter, since 1-1-2023.
• Illinois is a license state. A collection agency needs an IDFPR license (§4) plus a $25,000 surety bond (§8). Unlicensed collecting costs up to $10,000 per offense civilly (§4.5), is a Class A misdemeanor (Class 4 felony on repeat) (§14b), and can be enjoined on a bare showing of non-licensure by the AG, a State's Attorney, or any private person (§14a). A license is auto-cancelled the day the bond terminates.
• Debt buyers are fully covered (§8.5) and are the only category with a written carve-out: no bond, no trust account, no §8a-1 suit authorization, no §8b assignment formalities (§8.6(b)). Everything else — §9 conduct rules, §9.3 validation, licensing — applies.
• First-party creditors are mostly out, but not by a blanket rule. The Act's scope is definitional plus a 19-item exemption list (§2.03) that carves out banks, credit unions, insurers, attorneys, retail sellers and motor-vehicle sellers collecting their own paper, and several licensed lender categories. A non-exempt original creditor that regularly collects its own debts can be pulled in — and the P.A. 104-297 definition ("on behalf of himself or herself or others") makes that reach explicit. Fictitious-name self-collection is expressly covered under the P.A. 104-149 definition, clause (5).
• No numeric call-frequency cap. §9(a)(19) is an intent/harassment standard. Reg F's 7-in-7 presumption is the operative frequency limit in Illinois.
• Call window is 8:00 a.m.–9:00 p.m. debtor's local time, codified twice (§9(a)(19)(A), §9.2(a)(1)) — same as the federal floor, but independently enforceable by IDFPR and, for knowing violations of §9.2, by the AG under the Consumer Fraud Act.
• Employer contact has an Illinois-only pre-clock: you may not even threaten to contact the employer unless the debt is 30+ days in default and you have given 5 days' prior written notice to the debtor's last known address (§9(a)(18)).
• Validation runs on the FDCPA's pre-Reg F shape: written notice within 5 days of initial communication, 30-day dispute window, cease collection until verification is mailed (§9.3). §60 gives a safe harbor from civil liability under §§2, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3 if you can show compliance with comparable FDCPA provisions — note it does not shield you from IDFPR discipline.
• SOL: 10 years written (13-206), 5 years unwritten and catch-all (13-205). Sale-of-goods contracts are 4 years (2-725), municipal-ordinance debt 7 years from adjudication (13-227).
• Promissory notes are 10 years, not 6. Illinois blanked UCC §3-118(a)–(b) and routed notes into 13-206, which also fixes accrual: definite-date notes accrue on the stated/accelerated due date; demand notes run 10 years from demand, and are absolutely barred after 10 years with no payment and no demand.
• Illinois has statutory revival, and it is written-only. 13-206's proviso restarts a fresh 10 years from a payment or new promise to pay made in writing — and it works "within or after the period of 10 years," i.e. it can resurrect an already-expired written-contract claim. There is no equivalent statutory proviso in 13-205.
• No time-barred-debt disclosure. Illinois requires none. The only statutory rule is §8.6(a): a debt buyer's suit "shall be commenced within the applicable statute of limitations period." Reg F §1006.26 remains the operative disclosure authority.
• Judgments changed on 1-1-2026. Ordinary judgments: 7-year enforcement, revivable out to 20 years. Consumer debt judgments entered on or after 1-1-2026 cannot be revived at all and are enforceable for a flat 15 years. Consumer debt judgments entered 1-1-2020 through 12-31-2025 are revivable on a petition filed within 10 years. Pre-2020 judgments keep the old 20-year rule.
• Coerced debt is a new operational duty (1-1-2026): a complete written statement triggers a 10-day pre-judgment cease + CRA dispute-flagging duty, a 90-day review, an affirmative defense with the burden on the agency to disprove, SOL tolling while collection is blocked, and $2,500 per debt statutory damages plus fees.

Traps / edge cases

• The §2 double amendment is unresolved. P.A. 104-149 and P.A. 104-297 both took effect 1-1-2026 and both rewrote §2, and ILGA publishes both texts. The two "collection agency" definitions are not equivalent: 104-297's is materially broader on first-party self-collection. Until the Legislative Reference Bureau harmonizes them, scope the broader (104-297) definition for compliance purposes and get counsel before relying on the narrower one to stay unlicensed. ILGA's own header warns that the database carries not-yet-harmonized and not-yet-effective text.
• The sunset list is also unharmonized, in the opposite direction. Six of the seven published versions of 5 ILCS 80/4.36 still list "The Collection Agency Act" as repealed 1-1-2026; only the P.A. 104-149 version removed it. Practical read (interpretation, not statute): the Act survived — P.A. 104-149 comprehensively amended it effective 1-1-2026, ILGA publishes 205 ILCS 740 as current law as of 2026-08-11 (seven months past the putative repeal date), and no 2027–2033 sunset section names it. Chapter 205 (Financial Regulation) is not the sunset-governed chapter that 225 was. Attorney-review item before relying on Illinois licensure status for a new-market entry.
• Revival is Illinois's biggest SOL divergence from Texas. Where Tex. Fin. Code §392.307(d) says a time-barred debt is not revived by payment, Illinois 13-206 says the opposite for written contracts — and permits revival after expiry. Never port a no-revival assumption into Illinois.
• 13-206's revival proviso says "in writing," but which term it modifies is contested. Read literally, the payment itself must be in writing. Some Illinois authority treats a partial payment as an acknowledgment restarting the clock without a signed writing. UNVERIFIED / interpretation — do not encode automatic payment-triggered re-aging for Illinois without counsel. Encode the written-promise path (unambiguous) and flag bare payments for review.
• Written vs. unwritten is an evidentiary test, not a product-type test. Whether a given account is 10-year or 5-year turns on whether the agreement's essential terms are provable from the writing itself, without resort to parol evidence.
• Credit cards: 5 years — but this is case law, and it is not an Illinois Supreme Court holding. Interpretation, and UNVERIFIED against an official source. Neither 13-205 nor 13-206 mentions credit cards. The classification comes from Portfolio Acquisitions, L.L.C. v. Feltman, 391 Ill. App. 3d 642, 909 N.E.2d 876 (1st Dist. 2009), in which the Appellate Court, First District held a credit-card account to be an unwritten contract under 13-205 where an essential element had to be proven by parol evidence, reasoning that monthly statements are not themselves complete agreements. Practical consequence: a card claim is 5 years unless the creditor produces the signed cardholder agreement and the terms it sues on, in which case 13-206's 10 years is argued to apply. Two caveats before relying on this: (1) it is an intermediate appellate decision, binding statewide only until another district disagrees, and the Illinois Supreme Court has not resolved it; (2) the opinion text could not be retrieved from an official Illinois source — illinoiscourts.gov's pre-2011 opinion archive is a JS application, its direct PDF paths soft-404, and Internet Archive holds no capture of the official PDF. The citation and holding above are recorded from finding aids only and must be confirmed against the official reporter before any litigation-facing use. Do not present the 5-year card figure to users as statute-verified.
• The 15-year consumer-debt-judgment window is a hard stop, not a dormancy period. Post-1-1-2026 consumer debt judgments have no revival mechanism — a missed enforcement window is unrecoverable. Judgment-date bucketing (pre-2020 / 2020–2025 / 2026+) is mandatory to compute the right deadline, and the exclusions in (a-5)(2) matter: joint-and-several business guarantees are not consumer debt judgments and stay on the 20-year track.
• The interstate carve-out in §4 is conditional and reciprocal. No Illinois license is needed for purely remote out-of-state collection only if you are licensed in your home state and that state extends the same privilege to Illinois-licensed agencies. A sales office, an in-state client, or soliciting an in-state client defeats it.
• §60's safe harbor is narrow. It covers civil liability under §§2, 9.1, 9.2, 9.3 only — not §9 conduct violations, not §9.4, not §9.6, and not administrative discipline.
• §9.5 is not a consumer SOL. It is a 5-year limit on IDFPR/enforcement actions against a licensee, with continuing violations dated from first occurrence. Do not confuse it with the debt SOL.
• 13-210 is a pure bar, not a comparison. Illinois does not "borrow" the shorter of two periods; if the claim arose out of state and is dead there, it cannot be maintained here — even if Illinois's own period is longer.
• The Medical Debt Relief Act (305 ILCS 85, P.A. 103-647, eff. 7-1-24, scheduled repeal 7-1-2029) is not a collections restriction. It funds a state pilot that buys and discharges medical debt for residents at or below 400% FPG. It imposes no SOL, disclosure, or conduct rule on collectors, but accounts can be extinguished out from under a placement.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md
• ./tx.md · ./ny.md · ./ca.md · ./_matrix.md