Delaware — no collection statute, 3-year SOL (6 for notes), Medical Debt Protection Act

Authority

Delaware has no debt-collection statute and no debt-collector license. There is no mini-FDCPA, no collection-agency act, no licensing board, and no banking-commissioner registration regime for collectors. Four bodies of law do the work instead:

1. Statute of limitations — 10 Del. C. ch. 81 (Personal Actions): §8106 (3 years, the workhorse), §8108 (mutual running accounts), §8109 (6 years — notes, bills of exchange, and written acknowledgments), §8117 (absence tolling), §8121 (borrowing statute). Negotiable instruments also carry 6 Del. C. §3-118 (UCC Art. 3); sales of goods carry 6 Del. C. §2-725 (4 years).
2. Entry gate — 30 Del. C. §2301(a)(11): a $75/year occupational business license from the Division of Revenue (Department of Finance) for a "mercantile agency or collection agency." A revenue license, not a conduct license — no bond, no exam, no regulator with conduct authority over collectors.
3. UDAP — 6 Del. C. ch. 25: subchapter II (Consumer Fraud Act, §§2511–2527, AG enforcement + express private right of action at §2525) and subchapter III (Deceptive Trade Practices, §§2531–2536, treble damages at §2533(c)). Enforced by the Delaware Attorney General's Consumer Protection Unit.
4. Medical debt — 6 Del. C. ch. 25J (Medical Debt Protection Act), the one place Delaware regulates collection conduct directly and hard: a flat ban on reporting any medical debt to a consumer reporting agency, a no-interest/no-fee rule, a 120-day pre-collection cooling-off, and a ban on wage/bank garnishment for medical debt. Violations are per-se Consumer Fraud Act violations (§2511J(a)).

Verification note. delcode.delaware.gov (Delaware Code Online, published by the Delaware Code Revisors) serves static HTML and was fetched directly on 2026-08-11 — no archive fallback was needed, and all quotes below are from those live pages. The load-bearing SOL quotes (§8106(a)'s 3 years, §8106(c)'s $100,000/20 years, §8109's 6 years, §8121's "whichever is shorter") were additionally cross-checked against a second, independent official artifact — the authenticated title10.pdf served by the same publisher (https://delcode.delaware.gov/title10/title10.pdf, Last-Modified: 2026-08-11) — and matched verbatim. Two dating caveats:

• UNVERIFIED — §8106's own amendment date. §8106 was last amended by 79 Del. Laws c. 353, §1. The legis.delaware.gov session-law browser does not publish volume 79, so the calendar date of that amendment could not be pulled from an official source. The text of §8106 (including subsection (c)) is verified as currently in force; the date label is not.
• Ch. 25J is currently published in two versions. Delaware Code Online prints §§2505J, 2508J, and 2511J twice — once "[Effective until fulfillment of contingency in 85 Del. Laws, c. 349, § 6(b)]" and once "[Effective upon fulfillment of contingency…]". 85 Del. Laws c. 349 is SS 1 for SB 13, signed 2026-07-20, whose official bill-detail page records "Effective Dates: Pending; 1/1/27". The pre-contingency version is therefore the operative text today; the contingent version is quoted separately below as PENDING. The exact wording of the enacting act's §6(b) could not be retrieved (the General Assembly's bill-text endpoint errors and the session-law browser stops at 85 Del. Laws c. 293), so the trigger is described from the legislature's own published synopsis and labeled accordingly.

Operative text

Entry gate — 30 Del. C. §2301(a)(11), §2101, §2119

(a) "Persons" as defined in § 2701 of this title engaged in the occupations listed and defined in this section shall pay annual license taxes at the rates specified below. … (11) Mercantile agency or collection agency, $75. "Mercantile agency" or "collection agency" includes every person operating a business of investigation of financial ratings and credit and/or the collection of commercial or consumer accounts for other persons, except attorneys-at-law having a license to practice such profession in this State. — 30 Del. C. §2301(a), (a)(11)

No person shall engage in or carry on any trade or business for which a license is required by this part without first having obtained a license therefor from the Department of Finance and paid therefor the fee or tax prescribed in this part. … — 30 Del. C. §2101

Penalty for operating without it:

If any individual, copartnership, firm or corporation or any association of persons acting as a unit shall engage in, prosecute, follow or carry on any occupation or business for which a license is required by this Part, within the limits of this State, without having first obtained a proper license therefor, that person or persons … for every such offense shall be liable to the payment of the license fees and shall be fined not more than $3,000, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. — 30 Del. C. §2119

An out-of-state corporate collector or debt buyer also faces a courthouse-door bar if it does business in Delaware without qualifying:

(a) A foreign corporation which is required to comply with §§ 371 and 372 of this title and which has done business in this State without authority shall not maintain any action or special proceeding in this State unless and until such corporation has been authorized to do business in this State and has paid to the State all fees, penalties and franchise taxes for the years or parts thereof during which it did business in this State without authority. … — 8 Del. C. §383(a)

No state debt-collection statute — the negative, scoped

Searched on 2026-08-11 against the official Delaware Code chapter indexes: Title 24 (Professions and Occupations) has no collection-agency board or chapter; Title 5 (Banking) licenses only mortgage loan brokers (ch. 21), licensed lenders (ch. 22), and mortgage loan originators (ch. 24); Title 6 subtitle II's consumer chapters run from Credit Services Organizations (ch. 24) and Debt-Management Services (ch. 24A) to the Prohibited Trade Practices chapters — with no debt-collection chapter anywhere in the sequence. The only collection-specific entry in the entire Code located by this compilation is the occupational-license line at 30 Del. C. §2301(a)(11).

Consequence: there is no Delaware mini-FDCPA, no state validation notice, no state mini-Miranda, no state call-frequency cap, no state call-time window, and no state time-barred-debt disclosure. The FDCPA and Reg F are the operative floor and ceiling on collection conduct in Delaware, except for medical debt (ch. 25J) and the generic UDAP overlay.

The closest Delaware analog to a call-conduct rule is the criminal harassment statute, which is an intent standard, not a counter:

(a) A person is guilty of harassment when, with intent to harass, annoy or alarm another person: … (2) Communicates with a person by telephone, telegraph, mail or any other form of written or electronic communication in a manner which the person knows is likely to cause annoyance or alarm … (5) Makes repeated or anonymous telephone calls to another person whether or not conversation ensues, knowing that person is thereby likely to cause annoyance or alarm. (b) Harassment is a class A misdemeanor. — 11 Del. C. §1311

UDAP — 6 Del. C. §§2511, 2513, 2522, 2525; §§2532–2533

The Consumer Fraud Act reaches conduct "in connection with the sale, lease, receipt, or advertisement of any merchandise," and "merchandise" is defined broadly enough to include services and intangibles:

(6) "Merchandise" means any objects, wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real estate or services. … (9) "Unfair practice" means any act or practice that causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, violations of public policy as established by law, regulation, or judicial decision applicable in this State may be considered as evidence of substantial injury. — 6 Del. C. §2511(6), (9)

(a) The act, use, or employment by any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, unfair practice, or the concealment, suppression, or omission of any material fact with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression, or omission, in connection with the sale, lease, receipt, or advertisement of any merchandise, whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged thereby, is an unlawful practice. … — 6 Del. C. §2513(a)

AG enforcement and the civil penalty:

(b) If a court of competent jurisdiction finds that any person has wilfully violated this subchapter, upon petition to the court by the Attorney General in the original complaint or made at any time following the court's finding of a wilful violation, the person shall forfeit and pay to the State a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. For purposes of this subchapter, a wilful violation occurs when the person committing the violation knew or should have known that the conduct was of the nature prohibited by this subchapter. (c) If a court of competent jurisdiction finds that any person has violated this subchapter … the court may order the violator to cease and desist the unlawful conduct prospectively, return any moneys obtained unlawfully, and when appropriate freeze designated assets of the violator, order restitution, rescission, or recoupment, or grant other relief appropriate to prevent violators from being unjustly enriched. — 6 Del. C. §2522(b), (c)

Private right of action — express, and it does not wait on the AG:

(a) A private cause of action shall be available to any victim of a violation of this subchapter. Such cause of action may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction in this State without prior action by the Attorney General as provided for in this subchapter. — 6 Del. C. §2525(a)

The parallel Deceptive Trade Practices subchapter adds treble damages and its own $10,000 penalty:

(c) The relief provided in this section is in addition to remedies otherwise available against the same conduct under the common law or other statutes of this State. If damages are awarded to the aggrieved party under the common law or other statutes of this State, such damages awarded shall be treble the amount of the actual damages proved. … (e) If a court of competent jurisdiction finds that any person has wilfully violated this subchapter … the person shall forfeit and pay to the State a civil penalty of not more than $10,000 for each violation. — 6 Del. C. §2533(c), (e)

Medical debt — 6 Del. C. ch. 25J (Medical Debt Protection Act)

Scope. The Act reaches original medical creditors, debt buyers, and third-party collectors alike, and it is a rule of construction in the consumer's favor:

This chapter is known as the "Medical Debt Protection Act." … The purpose of this chapter is to reduce burdensome medical debt and to protect patients in their dealings with medical creditors, medical debt buyers, and medical debt collectors with respect to such debt. This chapter is to be construed as a consumer protection statute and must be liberally and remedially construed to effectuate its purposes. — 6 Del. C. §2501J

(11) "Medical debt" means the following: a. Debt owed by a consumer that is both of the following: 1. Owed to a person whose primary business is providing health-care services. 2. For the provision of medical services, products, or devices. b. Medical debt includes medical bills that are not past due or have already been paid. c. Medical debt does not include debt charged to a credit card unless the credit card is issued under an open-end or closed-end credit plan offered specifically for the payment of health-care services. (12) "Medical debt buyer" means an individual or entity that is engaged in the business of purchasing medical debts for collection purposes, whether it collects the debt itself or hires a third party for collection or an attorney for litigation in order to collect such debt. (13) "Medical debt collector" means any person that regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, medical debts originally owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another. A medical debt buyer is a medical debt collector. … Medical debt collector does not include anyone collecting debt charged to a credit card. — 6 Del. C. §2502J(11)–(13)

The credit-reporting ban — total, on both sides of the wire:

(a) No person may report any medical debt to a consumer reporting agency. (b) A consumer reporting agency is prohibited from making a consumer report that the consumer reporting agency knows or should know contains information related to a consumer's medical debt. — 6 Del. C. §2507J (as amended by 85 Del. Laws c. 107, eff. 90 days after approval 2025-07-29)

No interest, no fees, mandatory payment plans:

(a) Large health-care facilities and medical debt collectors may not charge any interest or late fees to patients. (b) Large health-care facilities and medical debt collectors must offer to any patient with outstanding debt totaling $500 or more a payment plan and may not require the patient to make monthly payments that exceed 5% of the patient's gross monthly income. Failure to provide proof of income may not be used as a basis to deny any patient a payment plan. (c) No initial payment on a monthly-payment plan may be due under any of the following circumstances: (1) Within the first 30 days after the health-care services were provided. (2) Within 30 days after the first bill is sent. (3) During any period in which a medical creditor or medical debt collector has requested any form of documentation from a patient. (d) Prepayment or early payment penalties or fees, service or administrative charges or fees, or any other fees or charges unrelated to the care provided are prohibited, including on any payment plans. — 6 Del. C. §2504J

(a) Patients may not be charged interest or late fees on medical debt, regardless of any agreements to the contrary. (b) Subsection (a) of this section also applies to any judgments resulting from medical debt, regardless of any agreements to the contrary. — 6 Del. C. §2509J

The collection-conduct rules (currently operative version — "[Effective until fulfillment of contingency in 85 Del. Laws, c. 349, § 6(b)]"):

(a) The following extraordinary collections actions may not be used by any medical creditor or medical debt collector to collect debts owed for health-care services: (1) Causing an individual's arrest. (2) Causing an individual to be subject to a writ of body attachment or capias. (3) Foreclosing on an individual's real property. (4) Garnishing the wages, disability insurance payments or any other disability benefits, workers' compensation payments, or unemployment benefits of a patient. (5) Garnishing or attaching a bank account, pension, annuity, or retirement account of a patient. … (c) No medical creditor or medical debt collector may engage in any permissible extraordinary collection actions until 120 days after the first bill for a medical debt has been sent. (d) At least 30 days before taking any extraordinary collection actions, a medical creditor or medical debt collector must provide to the patient a notice containing all of the following: (1) … stating whether financial assistance is available for eligible individuals and providing a plain-language summary of any such financial assistance policy. (2) Identifying the extraordinary collection actions that will be initiated in order to obtain payment. (3) Providing a deadline after which such extraordinary collection actions will be initiated which may be no earlier than 30 days after the date of the notice. … (f) If the patient has paid any part of the medical debt in excess of the amount the patient owes after any financial assistance or charity care offered by the large health-care facility, the large health-care facility or medical debt collector must refund any excess amount to the patient within 60 days. … (g) A large health-care facility or medical creditor that sells medical debt to a medical debt buyer or medical debt collector under a contract described in § 2502J(4)a. of this title remains liable for any actions taken by the medical debt buyer or medical debt collector, including any violations of any provisions of this chapter. — 6 Del. C. §2505J

Note that "extraordinary collection action" is defined to include selling the debt and reporting it, not just legal process:

(4) "Extraordinary collection action" means any of the following: a. Selling an individual's debt to another party, except if, prior to the sale, the medical creditor has entered into a legally binding written agreement with the medical debt buyer … under which all of the following apply: 1. The medical debt buyer or collector is prohibited from engaging in any extraordinary collection actions to obtain payment for the care. 2. The medical debt buyer is prohibited from charging interest on the debt. 3. The debt is returnable to or recallable by the medical creditor upon a determination … that the individual is eligible for financial assistance. 4. The medical debt buyer is required to adhere to procedures … that ensure that the individual does not pay, and has no obligation to pay, the medical debt buyer and the medical creditor together more than they are personally responsible for paying in compliance with this chapter. 5. The medical debt buyer is prohibited from communicating with, or reporting, any medical debt information to any consumer reporting agency regarding a consumer's medical debt. b. Reporting adverse information about the patient to a consumer reporting agency. c. Actions that require a legal or judicial process, including any of the following: 1. Placing a lien on an individual's property. 2. Attaching or seizing an individual's bank account or any other personal property. 3. Commencing a civil action against an individual. 4. Garnishing an individual's wages. — 6 Del. C. §2502J(4)

Insurance-appeal hold — a hard collection stop plus a mandatory tradeline deletion:

(a) No medical creditor or medical debt collector that knows or should know about an internal review, external review, or other appeal of a health insurance decision that is pending or was pending within the previous 60 days may do any of the following: (1) Provide information relative to unpaid charges for health-care services to a consumer reporting agency. (2) Communicate with the consumer regarding the unpaid charges for health-care services for the purpose of seeking to collect the charges. (3) Initiate a lawsuit or arbitration proceeding against the consumer relative to unpaid charges for health-care services. (b) If a medical debt has already been reported to a consumer reporting agency and the medical creditor or medical debt collector who reported the information learns of an internal review, external review, or other appeal … such medical creditor or medical debt collector shall instruct the consumer reporting agency to delete the information about the debt. (c) No medical creditor that knows or should have known about [such an appeal] … may refer, place, or send the unpaid charges for health-care services to a medical debt collector including by selling the debt to a medical debt buyer. — 6 Del. C. §2508J

Spousal and household liability:

(a) Parents are jointly liable for any medical debts incurred by children under the age of 18. (b) No spouse or other person may be liable for the medical debt or nursing home debt of any other person age 18 or older. A spouse may voluntarily consent to assume liability, but such consent: (1) Must be on a separate standalone document signed by the person. (2) May not be solicited in an emergency room or during an emergency situation. (3) May not be required as a condition of providing any emergency or nonemergency health-care services. — 6 Del. C. §2506J

Remedies — per-se Consumer Fraud Act violation, plus an anti-arbitration/anti-waiver clause:

(a) In addition to any remedies a consumer may have at law or in equity, any violation of this chapter is an unlawful practice under § 2513 of this title and a violation of subchapter II of Chapter 25 of this title. (b) Any consumer may sue for injunctive or other appropriate equitable relief to enforce this chapter. … (d) No agreement between the patient and a large health-care provider or medical debt collector may contain a provision that, prior to a dispute arising, waives or inhibits or has the practical effect of waiving or inhibiting any rights under this chapter or the rights of a patient to resolve that dispute by obtaining any of the following: (1) Injunctive, declaratory, or other equitable relief. (2) Multiple or minimum damages as specified by statute. (3) Attorneys' fees and costs as specified by statute or as available at common law. (4) A hearing at which that party can present evidence. (5) Requiring any form of alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration. (e) Any provision in a written agreement violating subsection (d) of this section or any other provision of this chapter is void and unenforceable. … — 6 Del. C. §2511J

PENDING (not yet in force) — 85 Del. Laws c. 349 (SS 1 for SB 13, signed 2026-07-20) rewrites §§2505J, 2508J, and 2511J. The Delaware Code prints the replacement text now, marked "[Effective upon fulfillment of contingency in 85 Del. Laws, c. 349, § 6(b)]". The additions that matter to collections:

(6) Levying on tangible personal property of a patient. — 6 Del. C. §2505J(a)(6) (pending)

(g) Any party taking action to collect medical debt must disclose in court pleadings whether the party is a "medical creditor," a "medical debt collector," or neither, as defined in § 2502J of this title. Failure to properly disclose or accurately disclose such … information is a violation of this chapter and subject to all remedies under § 2511J of this title. (h) A medical creditor or medical debt collector may not take any extraordinary collection action against a patient who qualifies for financial assistance under subchapter VII of Chapter 99 of Title 16 or against a patient whom the medical creditor has reason to know likely qualifies for financial assistance under subchapter VII of Chapter 99 of Title 16. — 6 Del. C. §2505J(g), (h) (pending)

(f) In any civil action to collect medical debt from a patient, it is a complete defense that the "hospital" or the "facility-based provider," as defined in § 9961 of Title 16, did not comply with subchapter VII of Chapter 99 of Title 16 or that the patient is eligible for financial assistance under subchapter VII of Chapter 99 of Title 16. (g) A hospital, facility-based provider, or medical debt collector may not be granted a default judgment in any civil action to collect medical debt without filing with the court an affidavit from a responsible officer of the hospital attesting that the hospital offered the patient screening for financial assistance under subchapter VII of Chapter 99 of Title 16 before initiating the action and that the patient was determined ineligible or did not respond to the screening offer. — 6 Del. C. §2511J(f), (g) (pending)

The trigger, per the General Assembly's own published synopsis of SS 1 for SB 13 (official source; a synopsis is not the enacted text):

(6) Section 6 of the Act provides that the minimum financial assistance standards under § 9962(a) and (b) of Title 16 take effect on January 1, 2027, and that all other provisions take effect on the earlier of notice by the Diamond State Hospital Cost Review Board, published in the Register of Regulations, that final implementing regulations have been adopted, or July 1, 2027. — legis.delaware.gov, SS 1 for SB 13 (153rd G.A.), Original Synopsis; bill-detail record shows "Volume:Chapter: 85:349", "Signed 7/20/26", "Effective Dates: Pending; 1/1/27"

Statute of limitations — 10 Del. C. §8106 (3 years)

(a) No action to recover damages for trespass, no action to regain possession of personal chattels, no action to recover damages for the detention of personal chattels, no action to recover a debt not evidenced by a record or by an instrument under seal, no action based on a detailed statement of the mutual demands in the nature of debit and credit between parties arising out of contractual or fiduciary relations, no action based on a promise, no action based on a statute, and no action to recover damages caused by an injury unaccompanied with force or resulting indirectly from the act of the defendant shall be brought after the expiration of 3 years from the accruing of the cause of such action; subject, however, to the provisions of §§ 8108-8110, 8119 and 8127 of this title. — 10 Del. C. §8106(a) (emphasis added)

The opt-in long-period provision — note the $100,000 floor and the written-contract requirement:

(c) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this chapter (other than subsection (b) of this section) or in § 2-725 of Title 6, an action based on a written contract, agreement or undertaking involving at least $100,000 may be brought within a period specified in such written contract, agreement or undertaking provided it is brought prior to the expiration of 20 years from the accruing of the cause of such action. — 10 Del. C. §8106(c)

Mutual running accounts — accrual is suspended while the account is live:

In the case of a mutual and running account between parties, the limitation, specified in § 8106 of this title, shall not begin to run while such account continues open and current. — 10 Del. C. §8108

Notes, bills, and written acknowledgments — 6 years:

When a cause of action arises from a promissory note, bill of exchange, or an acknowledgment under the hand of the party of a subsisting demand, the action may be commenced at any time within 6 years from the accruing of such cause of action. — 10 Del. C. §8109

The UCC Article 3 analog agrees on notes and adds the demand-note backstop:

(a) Except as provided in subsection (e), an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay a note payable at a definite time must be commenced within six years after the due date or dates stated in the note or, if a due date is accelerated, within six years after the accelerated due date. (b) Except as provided in subsection (d) or (e), if demand for payment is made to the maker of a note payable on demand, an action to enforce the obligation of a party to pay the note must be commenced within six years after the demand. If no demand for payment is made to the maker, an action to enforce the note is barred if neither principal nor interest on the note has been paid for a continuous period of 10 years. … (h) This section is not intended to affect the common law rule in this State pertaining to instruments under seal. — 6 Del. C. §3-118(a), (b), (h)

Goods sold on account — 4 years, under Article 2, not ch. 81:

(1) An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement the parties may reduce the period of limitations to not less than one year but may not extend it. (2) A cause of action accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach. … — 6 Del. C. §2-725(1), (2)

Tolling and borrowing — 10 Del. C. §§8117, 8118, 8121

If at the time when a cause of action accrues against any person, such person is out of the State, the action may be commenced, within the time limited therefor in this chapter, after such person comes into the State in such manner that by reasonable diligence, such person may be served with process. If, after a cause of action shall have accrued against any person, such person departs from and resides or remains out of the State, the time of such person's absence until such person shall have returned into the State in the manner provided in this section, shall not be taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action. — 10 Del. C. §8117

Where a cause of action arises outside of this State, an action cannot be brought in a court of this State to enforce such cause of action after the expiration of whichever is shorter, the time limited by the law of this State, or the time limited by the law of the state or country where the cause of action arose, for bringing an action upon such cause of action. Where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a person who at the time of such accrual was a resident of this State, the time limited by the law of this State shall apply. — 10 Del. C. §8121

A savings clause gives a 1-year refile window after a non-merits termination:

(a) If in any action duly commenced within the time limited therefor in this chapter, the writ fails of a sufficient service or return by any unavoidable accident, or by any default or neglect of the officer to whom it is committed; or if the writ is abated, or the action otherwise avoided or defeated by the death of any party thereto, or for any matter of form; … a new action may be commenced, for the same cause of action, at any time within 1 year after the abatement or other determination of the original action, or after the reversal of the judgment therein. — 10 Del. C. §8118(a)

Collection economics — wage exemption and interest

Delaware's wage exemption is a flat percentage and is more protective than the federal CCPA floor, with a one-attachment-at-a-time rule:

(a) Eighty-five percent of the amount of the wages for labor or service of any person residing within the State shall be exempt from mesne attachment process and execution attachment process under the laws of this State; but such limitation shall be inapplicable to process issued for the collection of a fine or costs or taxes due and owing the State. (b) On any amount of wages due, only 1 attachment may be made. Any creditor causing such attachment to be made shall have the benefit of priority until the judgment with costs for which the attachment was made has been paid in full. — 10 Del. C. §4913

(a) Any lender may charge and collect from a borrower interest at any rate agreed upon in writing not in excess of 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate including any surcharge thereon. Where there is no expressed contract rate, the legal rate of interest shall be 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate including any surcharge as of the time from which interest is due … Except as otherwise provided in this Code, any judgment entered on agreements governed by this subsection, whether the contract rate is expressed or not, shall, from the date of the judgment, bear post-judgment interest of 5% over the Federal Reserve discount rate including any surcharge thereon or the contract rate, whichever is less. — 6 Del. C. §2301(a)

Plain English

Interpretation — the quotes above win on any conflict.

• There is no Delaware collection law to comply with. No license from a regulator, no bond, no state validation notice, no mini-Miranda, no call cap, no call window, no time-barred-debt disclosure. Operating in Delaware means operating under the FDCPA and Reg F, full stop — plus the medical-debt chapter and the generic UDAP.
• The "license" is a tax receipt. 30 Del. C. §2301(a)(11) is a $75/year Division of Revenue occupational business license, in the same list as advertising agencies and drayperson-movers. It confers nothing and no agency supervises collection conduct under it. But skipping it is a crime: up to $3,000 and 2 years (§2119). Out-of-state corporations have a second, sharper gate — §383 bars an unqualified foreign corporation from maintaining any action in Delaware, which is a motion-to-dismiss risk on every suit filed by an unregistered debt buyer.
• SOL is 3 years for essentially all ordinary consumer debt — written contracts, oral contracts, and open/credit-card accounts alike. §8106(a) does not distinguish written from oral; it sweeps in "a debt not evidenced by a record or by an instrument under seal" and "a promise" together. Delaware is genuinely one of the shortest states, and the flat-3 reading is what the statute text supports.
• 6 years is the real exception, and it has two doors. A promissory note or bill of exchange gets 6 years (§8109; 6 Del. C. §3-118(a)). And a signed written acknowledgment of a subsisting demand independently gets its own 6-year period under §8109 — that is Delaware's revival mechanism, and it is statutory, not merely common-law.
• 4 years is not a credit-card period; it is a goods period. 6 Del. C. §2-725(1) governs breach of a contract for the sale of goods. Retail installment paper for goods can land there. Nothing in the Code assigns 4 years to open-ended credit accounts.
• §8106(c)'s 20 years is a commercial provision, not a consumer one. It requires a written contract, a face amount of at least $100,000, and a period the parties actually specified in that writing. It is a contractual opt-in ceiling, not a default. It has no application to ordinary consumer accounts.
• Medical debt is the one place Delaware regulates hard. Never furnish it to a bureau (§2507J — a flat ban, no exceptions and no dollar threshold, tighter than the CFPB/NCRA voluntary practices). Never charge interest or late fees, on the debt or on a judgment (§§2504J(a), 2509J). Wait 120 days from the first bill, then send a 30-day pre-action notice, before any extraordinary collection action (§2505J(c), (d)). No wage or bank garnishment for medical debt at all (§2505J(a)(4), (5)). A pending or recently-pending insurance appeal freezes collection and forces a tradeline deletion (§2508J). Non-consenting spouses are not liable (§2506J(b)). Every violation is automatically a Consumer Fraud Act violation with a private right of action (§§2511J(a), 2525(a)).
• Consumer-facing exposure runs through UDAP. §2513's "unfair practice" prong (§2511(9)) is the FTC unfairness test and expressly treats violations of law and regulation as evidence of substantial injury — the practical hook for pleading an FDCPA/Reg F violation as a Delaware statutory claim. §2525 gives the consumer a direct action; §2533(c) supplies trebling on the deceptive-trade-practices side; the AG can seek $10,000 per wilful violation plus restitution and asset freezes (§2522(b), (c)).

Traps / edge cases

• The 3-vs-4-year table conflict, resolved. Industry SOL tables that show Delaware at 4 years for open accounts or credit cards are importing 6 Del. C. §2-725 (sale of goods) into a place it does not belong. §8106(a) is the governing text for open accounts and credit cards, and it says 3. The 4-year figure is correct only for a contract for the sale of goods.
• §8106 does not apply to instruments under seal — and the Code does not say what does. §8106(a) carves out "a debt … evidenced by a record or by an instrument under seal," and 6 Del. C. §3-118(h) expressly preserves "the common law rule in this State pertaining to instruments under seal." UNVERIFIED: the length of that common-law period (commonly stated as 20 years) has no statutory text located in the Delaware Code, so this page does not assert a number. Sealed-instrument paper is attorney-review territory, not a calculator row.
• Revival is a signed writing, not a payment. §8109 gives 6 years from "an acknowledgment under the hand of the party" — i.e., a writing signed by the debtor. UNVERIFIED / interpretation: whether an unwritten partial payment restarts or revives the Delaware period is a common-law question with no statute located in ch. 81. Do not model part-payment revival for Delaware from the statute; treat any such re-aging as unsupported until case law is pulled and labeled.
• §8108 is a "mutual" account rule, and mutual means both directions. By its terms the clock does not start while a "mutual and running account" stays open and current. Interpretation: "mutual" in this line of statute conventionally means reciprocal demands running both ways between the parties, which a one-way consumer credit-card account is not. Do not use §8108 to argue that a revolving consumer account never accrues — that reading would swallow §8106 and is not supported by the text quoted here.
• §8117 is an unusually broad absence-tolling provision. It tolls both for a defendant out of state at accrual and for one who later "departs from and resides or remains out of the State." Delaware courts have narrowed its reach where the defendant remained amenable to service — interpretation, not statute text; treat tolling adjustments as attorney review rather than an automatic calculator behavior.
• §8121 cuts both ways. The borrowing statute imposes the shorter of Delaware's period and the period where the claim arose — so a Delaware suit on a claim that arose in a longer-SOL state still gets 3 years. But the second sentence flips it back: if the claim originally accrued in favor of a Delaware resident, Delaware's period applies regardless. For assigned paper, the relevant "person in whose favor the cause of action accrued" is the original creditor, not the buyer.
• §8111 is not the medical-services provision. "Work, labor or personal services" (2 years) governs claims for wages, salary, or overtime by the person who performed the work. It is not the limitation on a provider's suit to collect for services rendered to a patient — that is §8106. Misreading §8111 as a services-debt SOL would produce a wrong 2-year answer.
• "Extraordinary collection action" includes the sale and the tradeline. A placement agency that thinks §2505J's 120-day clock only gates lawsuits will breach it by furnishing to a bureau or selling the file on day 30. Selling medical debt is itself an extraordinary collection action unless the five §2502J(4)a. contract conditions are all satisfied in writing beforehand — and the selling facility stays on the hook for the buyer's conduct either way (§2505J(g)).
• The credit-card carve-out is narrow. Medical debt "does not include debt charged to a credit card unless the credit card is issued under an open-end or closed-end credit plan offered specifically for the payment of health-care services" (§2502J(11)c.). Medical credit cards (CareCredit-style) stay inside the chapter; a general-purpose card used at a hospital does not.
• The wage exemption is 85% flat, and only one attachment at a time. §4913 is more protective than the federal 25%-of-disposable-earnings cap, and §4913(b)'s single-attachment priority rule means a second judgment creditor queues behind the first rather than sharing.
• A pre-dispute arbitration clause is void for medical debt. §2511J(d)(5), (e) — an arbitration or damages-waiver provision agreed before the dispute arose is unenforceable in this space.
• Watch the 85 Del. Laws c. 349 tranche. Once the contingency fires (Board notice in the Register of Regulations, or July 1, 2027 at the latest), medical-debt litigation in Delaware picks up a mandatory party-status disclosure in pleadings, a complete defense based on financial-assistance eligibility, and an affidavit prerequisite for default judgments. That is a material change to any medical-debt litigation workflow and should be re-checked before 2027-07-01.

Related

• ../federal/fdcpa/overview.md
• ../federal/reg-f/call-frequency.md
• ../federal/reg-f/time-barred-debt.md
• ./tx.md · ./ma.md · ./ny.md · ./ca.md · ./fl.md · ./_matrix.md