Reg F § 1006.6 — Communications, cease-communication, and electronic opt-outs
Authority
12 CFR 1006.6 (Regulation F), implementing FDCPA section 805 (15 U.S.C. 1692c); enforced by the CFPB. Current text effective November 30, 2021 (85 FR 76887; eCFR versioner shows no amendment since).
Operative text
Who counts as a "consumer" for this section — § 1006.6(a)
(a) Definition. For purposes of this section, the term consumer includes:
(1) The consumer's spouse;
(2) The consumer's parent, if the consumer is a minor;
(3) The consumer's legal guardian;
(4) The executor or administrator of the consumer's estate, if the consumer is deceased; and
(5) A confirmed successor in interest, as defined in Regulation X, 12 CFR 1024.31, or Regulation Z, 12 CFR 1026.2(a)(27)(ii). — 12 CFR 1006.6(a)
Time and place — § 1006.6(b)(1)
(b) Communications with a consumer—(1) Prohibitions regarding unusual or inconvenient times or places. Except as provided in paragraph (b)(4) of this section, a debt collector must not communicate or attempt to communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt:
(i) At any unusual time, or at a time that the debt collector knows or should know is inconvenient to the consumer. In the absence of the debt collector's knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a time before 8:00 a.m. and after 9:00 p.m. local time at the consumer's location is inconvenient; or
(ii) At any unusual place, or at a place that the debt collector knows or should know is inconvenient to the consumer. — 12 CFR 1006.6(b)(1)
Related prohibitions: attorney-represented consumer (§ 1006.6(b)(2)) and place of employment where the employer prohibits such communications (§ 1006.6(b)(3)). Exceptions to all of (b)(1)–(3):
(4) Exceptions. The prohibitions in paragraphs (b)(1) through (3) of this section do not apply when a debt collector communicates or attempts to communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection of any debt with:
(i) The prior consent of the consumer, given directly to the debt collector during a communication that does not violate paragraphs (b)(1) through (3) of this section; or
(ii) The express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction. — 12 CFR 1006.6(b)(4)
Cease communication — § 1006.6(c)
(c) Communications with a consumer—after refusal to pay or cease communication notice— (1) Prohibition. Except as provided in paragraph (c)(2) of this section, if a consumer notifies a debt collector in writing that the consumer refuses to pay a debt or that the consumer wants the debt collector to cease further communication with the consumer, the debt collector must not communicate or attempt to communicate further with the consumer with respect to such debt. — 12 CFR 1006.6(c)(1)
(2) Exceptions. The prohibition in paragraph (c)(1) of this section does not apply when a debt collector communicates or attempts to communicate further with a consumer with respect to such debt:
(i) To advise the consumer that the debt collector's further efforts are being terminated;
(ii) To notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor may invoke specified remedies that the debt collector or creditor ordinarily invokes; or
(iii) Where applicable, to notify the consumer that the debt collector or creditor intends to invoke a specified remedy. — 12 CFR 1006.6(c)(2)
Third-party communications — § 1006.6(d)(1)–(2)
(d) Communications with third parties—(1) Prohibitions. Except as provided in paragraph (d)(2) of this section, a debt collector must not communicate, in connection with the collection of any debt, with any person other than:
(i) The consumer;
(ii) The consumer's attorney;
(iii) A consumer reporting agency, if otherwise permitted by law;
(iv) The creditor;
(v) The creditor's attorney; or
(vi) The debt collector's attorney. — 12 CFR 1006.6(d)(1)
(2) Exceptions. The prohibition in paragraph (d)(1) of this section does not apply when a debt collector communicates, in connection with the collection of any debt, with a person:
(i) For the purpose of acquiring location information, as provided in § 1006.10;
(ii) With the prior consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector;
(iii) With the express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction; or
(iv) As reasonably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy. — 12 CFR 1006.6(d)(2)
Email/text reasonable-procedures safe harbor — § 1006.6(d)(3)
(3) Reasonable procedures for email and text message communications. A debt collector maintains procedures that are reasonably adapted, for purposes of FDCPA section 813(c), to avoid a bona fide error in sending an email or text message communication that would result in a violation of paragraph (d)(1) of this section if those procedures include steps to reasonably confirm and document that:
(i) The debt collector communicated with the consumer by sending an email to an email address described in paragraph (d)(4) of this section or a text message to a telephone number described in paragraph (d)(5) of this section; and
(ii) The debt collector did not communicate with the consumer by sending an email to an email address or a text message to a telephone number that the debt collector knows has led to a disclosure prohibited by paragraph (d)(1) of this section. — 12 CFR 1006.6(d)(3)
Qualifying email addresses — § 1006.6(d)(4)
Three routes. (i) consumer-sourced:
(i) Procedures based on communication between the consumer and the debt collector. (A) The consumer used the email address to communicate with the debt collector about the debt and the consumer has not since opted out of communications to that email address; or
(B) The debt collector has received directly from the consumer prior consent to use the email address to communicate with the consumer about the debt and the consumer has not withdrawn that consent; or — 12 CFR 1006.6(d)(4)(i)
(ii) creditor-sourced — requires that the creditor obtained and used the address, plus a transfer notice with an opt-out window; key numeric requirement:
(5) The date by which the debt collector or the creditor must receive the consumer's request to opt out, which must be at least 35 days after the date the notice is sent; — 12 CFR 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(C)(5)
(D) The opt-out period provided under paragraph (d)(4)(ii)(C)(5) of this section has expired and the consumer has not opted out; and
(E) The email address has a domain name that is available for use by the general public, unless the debt collector knows the address is provided by the consumer's employer. — 12 CFR 1006.6(d)(4)(ii)(D)–(E)
(iii) prior-debt-collector-sourced:
(iii) Procedures based on communication by the prior debt collector. (A) Any prior debt collector obtained the email address in accordance with paragraph (d)(4)(i) or (ii) of this section;
(B) The immediately prior debt collector used the email address to communicate with the consumer about the debt; and
(C) The consumer did not opt out of such communications. — 12 CFR 1006.6(d)(4)(iii)
Qualifying telephone numbers for text — § 1006.6(d)(5)
(5) Procedures for telephone numbers for text messages. For purposes of paragraph (d)(3)(i) of this section, a debt collector may send a text message to a telephone number if:
(i) The consumer used the telephone number to communicate with the debt collector about the debt by text message, the consumer has not since opted out of text message communications to that telephone number, and within the past 60 days either:
(A) The consumer sent the text message described in paragraph (d)(5)(i) of this section or a new text message to the debt collector from that telephone number; or
(B) The debt collector confirmed, using a complete and accurate database, that the telephone number has not been reassigned from the consumer to another user since the date of the consumer's most recent text message to the debt collector from that telephone number; or
(ii) The debt collector received directly from the consumer prior consent to use the telephone number to communicate with the consumer about the debt by text message, the consumer has not since withdrawn that consent, and within the past 60 days the debt collector either:
(A) Obtained the prior consent described in paragraph (d)(5)(ii) of this section or renewed consent from the consumer; or
(B) Confirmed, using a complete and accurate database, that the telephone number has not been reassigned from the consumer to another user since the date of the consumer's most recent consent to use that telephone number to communicate about the debt by text message. — 12 CFR 1006.6(d)(5)
Electronic opt-out notice — § 1006.6(e)
(e) Opt-out notice for electronic communications or attempts to communicate. A debt collector who communicates or attempts to communicate with a consumer electronically in connection with the collection of a debt using a specific email address, telephone number for text messages, or other electronic-medium address must include in such communication or attempt to communicate a clear and conspicuous statement describing a reasonable and simple method by which the consumer can opt out of further electronic communications or attempts to communicate by the debt collector to that address or telephone number. The debt collector may not require, directly or indirectly, that the consumer, in order to opt out, pay any fee to the debt collector or provide any information other than the consumer's opt-out preferences and the email address, telephone number for text messages, or other electronic-medium address subject to the opt-out request. — 12 CFR 1006.6(e)
Plain English
Interpretation — if this conflicts with the quotes above, the quotes win.
- "Consumer" is bigger here. For § 1006.6 only, spouse, parent-of-minor, legal guardian, executor/administrator, and confirmed successor in interest are all "the consumer" — the (b) and (c) protections cover them, and contacting them is not a third-party disclosure.
- 8am–9pm is a presumption, not a safe window. Before 8:00 a.m. / after 9:00 p.m. local time at the consumer's location is presumed inconvenient — but any time the collector knows or should know is inconvenient is off-limits even inside 8–9. Both communications AND attempts (which include limited-content messages and unanswered calls) are covered.
- Cease-communication (§ 1006.6(c)) requires a written notice and is per-debt ("with respect to such debt"). After it, only three narrow contact purposes survive: say-goodbye, may-invoke-remedy, will-invoke-remedy.
- Third parties: the collector may talk about the debt only to the six listed parties, plus the four (d)(2) exceptions (location info per § 1006.10, direct prior consent, court permission, post-judgment remedy).
- Email/text safe harbor: § 1006.6(d)(3)–(5) is a bona fide error safe harbor (FDCPA § 813(c)) against accidental third-party disclosure — not a general license to email/text. To be inside it you must document that every address/number used qualifies under (d)(4)/(d)(5), and never use one you know has leaked to a third party. Text numbers additionally carry a rolling 60-day reverification (fresh consumer text, fresh consent, or a reassigned-number database check — e.g. the FCC's Reassigned Numbers Database).
- Every electronic message needs an opt-out notice (§ 1006.6(e)) — clear and conspicuous, simple method, no fee, no extra data demanded. Opt-outs are per address/number, channel-specific.
Traps / edge cases
- Attempts count. (b)(1) and (c)(1) prohibit "communicate or attempt to communicate" — a 7:30 a.m. limited-content voicemail drop violates the time-of-day rule even though an LCM is not a "communication."
- Local time at the consumer's location — if the collector has conflicting location data (area code vs. address), CFPB FAQ guidance treats calling when ANY of the plausible locations is outside 8–9 as risky; evaluate the window against the consumer's best-known location, conservatively.
- Cease-communication is written-only under the federal rule (unlike the § 1006.14(h) medium-specific opt-out, which has no writing requirement). But an oral "stop calling" still feeds § 1006.14(b) presumption-rebuttal factors and (h)(1) if it names a medium.
- § 1006.6(e) opt-out ≠ § 1006.6(c) cease. Opting out of email stops that channel; a written refusal-to-pay/cease notice stops (almost) everything on that debt.
- The (d)(4)(ii) creditor-route notice must give ≥ 35 days to opt out before the collector may email, and employer-provided domains are excluded.
- (h)(2) of § 1006.14 permits a single confirmation message after an electronic opt-out — see call-frequency.md.
- State overlays: NY DFS 23 NYCRR 1 and MA 940 CMR 7.00 layer stricter contact and frequency limits on top of § 1006.6 — see the state pages.
Related
- overview.md
- call-frequency.md — § 1006.14(h) medium opt-out interplay
- limited-content-message.md — LCMs are "attempts," covered by (b)/(c)
- validation-notice.md
- ../fdcpa/communications.md — FDCPA § 805, the statute this implements
- ../cfpb-guidance/debt-collection-faqs.md
- ../../state/ny.md — NY DFS stricter rules
- ../../state/ma.md — MA 940 CMR 7.00 stricter contact caps
Official sources on file
This page cites
- Regulation F (12 CFR Part 1006) — Overview
- Reg F § 1006.2(j) — The limited-content message (LCM)
- New York — 23 NYCRR 1, Consumer Credit Fairness Act, GBL Art. 29-H, NYC DCWP rules
- Massachusetts — AGO 940 CMR 7.00, DOB licensing + 209 CMR 18.00, c. 93 §49, SOL
- Validation notice — required information, timing, and the Model Form B-1 safe harbor
- Disputes and requests for original-creditor information
- Electronic communications (email / SMS) — everything Part 1006 requires
- Sending required disclosures (§ 1006.42) and record retention (§ 1006.100)
Pages that cite this one
- Communications in connection with debt collection — §1692c
- Harassment or abuse — §1692d
- Acquisition of location information (skip tracing) — §1692b
- FDCPA — Scope, definitions, coverage, liability, enforcement
- Reg F § 1006.14 — Call frequency (7-in-7) and harassment
- CFPB Debt Collection Rule FAQs (Compliance Aid)
